Upgrade pricing, market growth, and social welfare

This paper studies the monopolist's dynamic pricing strategy when introducing successive generations of a durable product. We show that when consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified and the innovation is minor, the firm always offers an upgrade discount to former customers. However, the discount depends only on the quality of the old product. In contrast, for moderate and major innovations, the discount depends on the qualities and costs of both the old and the new products. The market growth rate affects the firm's pricing strategy only if consumers are anonymous; furthermore, the effect on prices depends on the discount rate and whether the market growth rate is high or low. For minor innovations, social welfare is maximized if consumers are anonymous. An interesting and paradoxical result is that, when innovations are moderate or major and consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified, price discrimination can actually lead to higher social welfare.Sequential product introduction Dynamic pricing Upgrade policy Product obsolescence Innovation Social welfare

Free samples, profits, and welfare: The effect of market structures and behavioral modes

This paper addresses an important and underresearched issue in the economics and marketing literatures: what are the managerial and social consequences when firms use business models that are based on the dissemination of free samples? We develop an analytical model of free samples for both digital and physical goods that addresses three fundamental managerial and social questions. First, what is the effect of different market structures (i.e., monopoly and oligopoly) and cost structures on optimal marketing policy and prices? Second, what is the effect of different behavioral modes on prices and free samples? Third, how do different market structures and behavioral modes affect social welfare? The main conclusion is that a number of standard results do not hold when firms have the option of selling products and of distributing free samples. For example, the optimal strategy for oligopolists who produce homogeneous goods and coordinate their marketing policies is to increase - not decrease - the quantity of sold output. Similarly, under well-defined cost and demand conditions, monopoly can lead to a socially inferior outcome to competition. From a policy viewpoint, the managerial and social welfare implications of free samples depend on the type of market structure (monopoly or oligopoly) and the behavioral modes chosen by the firms in an industry (e.g., whether to coordinate their free sample policies or to behave non-cooperatively).Behavioral modes Samples Social welfare Spillover effects Cournot-Nash equilibrium Semi-cooperative game Promotion Public good

Measuring Heterogeneous Reservation Prices for Product Bundles

This paper develops a model for capturing continuous heterogeneity in the joint distribution of reservation prices for products and bundles. Our model is derived from utility theory and captures both within-and among-subject variability. Furthermore, it provides dollarmetric reservation prices and individual-level estimates that allow the firm to target customers and develop customized and nonlinear pricing policies. Our experiments show that, regardless of whether the products are durables or nondurables, the model captures heterogeneity and predicts well. Models that assume homogeneity perform poorly, especially in predicting choice of the bundle. Furthermore, the methodology is robust even when respondents evaluate few profiles. Self-stated reservation prices do not have any informational content beyond that contained in the basic model. The direct elicitation method appears to understate (overstate) the variation in reservation prices across consumers for low-priced (high-priced) products and bundles. Hence this method yields biased demand estimates and leads to suboptimal product-line pricing policy. The optimization results show that the product-line pricing policy depends on the degree of heterogeneity in the reservation prices of the individual products and the bundle. A uniformly high-price strategy for all products and bundles is optimal when heterogeneity is high. Otherwise, a hybrid strategy is optimal.bundling, reservation prices, optimal pricing, consumer heterogeneity, multinomial probit models, conjoint analysis, bayesian models