Families and Foes: Ethnic Civil War Duration.

When do ethnic civil wars last especially long? This dissertation examines when, why, and how ethnicity affects the length of civil wars. Two-thirds of civil wars pit ethnic combatants against each other; the duration of these conflicts varies considerably. Existing work on ethnicity in civil wars is effectively stalemated on the questions of how or even whether ethnicity influences the lengths of these wars. Yet the answer has vital normative, policy, and research implications. In this dissertation, I argue that ethnicity will prolong civil wars under two conditions. First, when information derived from ethnic interactions exacerbates combatants’ fears of the future, conflicts will last longer. Second, when support from ethnic kin in other states alters the balance of capabilities or introduces uncertainty into wars, conflicts will be protracted. Using duration analysis of a new dataset of all ethnic civil wars from 1945 to 2004, I show that both of these dynamics prolong ethnic civil wars. Case studies from two post-Soviet republics demonstrate that ethnic interactions are especially likely to prolong conflicts when they exacerbate commitment or signaling problems. Two civil wars in Indonesia show that ethnic kin are especially influential when they influence the balance of capabilities. Case studies of civil wars in Central America and Sri Lanka indicate that these findings also may have implications for both variation within non-ethnic civil wars and between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars.Ph.D.Political ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/63724/1/shannak_1.pd

Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants’ perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants’ goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.civil war; ethnic war; commitment problems; war duration; information