Contracting on the Stock Price and Forward-Looking Performance Measures

We examine the use of earnings, forward-looking performance measures and stock prices in managerial compensation. When the firm's owner and its manager have identical time preferences, the stock price is not useful for motivating the manager, as it is a noisy aggregation of a forward-looking measure and future earnings. In contrast, when the owner and the manager have conflicting time preferences, the noisy stock price is useful for contracting. If the manager has no access to banking and cannot trade the firm's shares, the timeliness of the stock price dominates the extra risk imposed by its noise. At the same time, forward-looking performance measures (such as customer satisfaction) can induce a desirable allocation of management effort between the short term and long term more efficiently than the stock price can. Forward-looking performance measures and the stock price are thus not direct substitutes in rewarding farsighted effort.

Schlotzsky's gourmet deli franchise store

This instructional case examines quantitative and qualitative information in the decision to acquire a franchise store of a Gourmet Deli chain. In particular, it illustrates to students how commonly requested quantitative information in practice, such as an income statement, needs to be tailored to the decision-making context. The case integrates and tests students' introductory understanding of income statements for managerial purposes, cost behaviour, break-even calculations, cost-benefit analysis, regression applications in management accounting, and corporate overhead cost allocations.cost behaviour, cost allocation, break-even, cost-benefit analysis,

Interrelated performance measures, interactive effort, and optimal incentives

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CEO tenure and the performance-turnover relation

In a broad cross-section of US firms, we document that the likelihood of a CEO’s performance-related dismissal declines in his tenure. This finding is consistent with both firm performance revealing information about a CEO’s uncertain executive ability and CEO tenure reflecting weak firm governance choices that reduce the likelihood of performance-related dismissal. In a sample of CEOs who begin their appointment during our sample period, we find evidence more broadly in favor of the former explanation. Specifically, we find that (1) CEO survival is associated with superior firm performance, (2) this relation is unaffected by firm governance choices, (3) the intensity with which a firm monitors its CEO declines over his tenure, and (4) firms’ monitoring intensity increases following CEO turnover. Collectively, our results suggest that periodic performance reports increasingly resolve uncertainty regarding executive ability, thereby lowering firm owners’ demand for monitoring their CEO over his tenure