9 research outputs found
Security Theorems via Model Theory
A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic
protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of
protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs .
(phi implies for some ys . psi). Models (interpretations) for these formulas
are *skeletons*, partially ordered structures consisting of a number of local
protocol behaviors. Realized skeletons contain enough local sessions to explain
all the behavior, when combined with some possible adversary behaviors. We show
two results. (1) If phi is the antecedent of a security goal, then there is a
skeleton A_phi such that, for every skeleton B, phi is satisfied in B iff there
is a homomorphism from A_phi to B. (2) A protocol enforces for all xs . (phi
implies for some ys . psi) iff every realized homomorphic image of A_phi
satisfies psi. Hence, to verify a security goal, one can use the Cryptographic
Protocol Shapes Analyzer CPSA (TACAS, 2007) to identify minimal realized
skeletons, or "shapes," that are homomorphic images of A_phi. If psi holds in
each of these shapes, then the goal holds
Skeletons and the shapes of bundles
Abstract. The shapes of a protocol are its minimal, essentially different executions. Naturally occurring protocols have only finitely many, indeed very few shapes. Authentication and secrecy properties are easy to determine from the shapes, as are attacks and anomalies. In this paper, we define the idea of shape, and we also provide some operations that can be used to construct shapes. These operations are versions of the two authentication tests, fundamental patterns for protocol analysis and heuristics for protocol design. The authentication tests were originally presented as theorems about all complete executions. We have strengthened those results here. We also use them to infer construction operations for shapes. These construction operations work on partial descriptions of executions, and serve as information-increasing transformations on the descriptions. 1 The Idea of Shapes In this paper, we study how to construct the shapes of a protocol, where b
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols
Abstract. We describe a method for enumerating all essentially different executions possible for a cryptographic protocol. We call them the shapes of the protocol. Naturally occurring protocols have only finitely many, indeed very few shapes. Authentication and secrecy properties are easy to determine from them, as are attacks and anomalies. cpsa, our Cryptographic Protocol Shape Analyzer, implements the method. In searching for shapes, cpsa starts with some initial behavior, and discovers what shapes are compatible with it. Normally, the initial behavior is the point of view of one participant. The analysis reveals what the other principals must have done, given this participant’s view. The search is complete, i.e. every shape can in fact be found in a finite number of steps. The steps in question are applications of two authentication tests, fundamental patterns for protocol analysis and heuristics for protocol design. We have formulated the authentication tests in a new, stronger form, and proved completeness for a search algorithm based on them.