Stochastically stable implementation.

Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies of the perturbed process is the outcome prescribed by the SCF. For uniform mistakes, we show that any ε-secure and strongly efficient SCF is implementable when there are at least five agents. Extensions to incomplete information environments are also obtained.Robust implementation; Bounded rationality; Evolutionary dynamics; Mechanisms; Stochastic stability;

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within a given institution. We offer results both under complete and incomplete information. First, we show that a necessary condition for assymptotically stable implementation is a small variation of (Maskin) monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. Under standard assumptions in economic environments, we also provide a mechanism for Nash implementation which has good dynamic properties if the rule is quasimonotonic. Thus, quasimonotonicity is both necessary and almost sufficient for assymptotically stable implementation. Under incomplete information, incentive compatibility is necessary for any kind of stable implementation in our sense, while Bayesian quasimonotonicity is necessary for assymptotically stable implementation. Both conditions are also essentially sufficient for assymptotically stable implementation. We then tighten the assumptions on preferences and mutation processes and provide mechanisms for stochastically stable implementation under more permissive conditions on social choice rules.implementation; bounded rationality; evolutionary dynamics; mechanisms

Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within a given institution. We offer results both under complete and incomplete information. First, we show that a necessary condition for assymptotically stable implementation is a small variation of (Maskin) monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. Under standard assumptions in economic environments, we also provide a mechanism for Nash implementation which has good dynamic properties if the rule is quasimonotonic. Thus, quasimonotonicity is both necessary and almost sufficient for assymptotically stable implementation. Under incomplete information, incentive compatibility is necessary for any kind of stable implementation in our sense, while Bayesian quasimonotonicity is necessary for assymptotically stable implementation. Both conditions are also essentially sufficient for assymptotically stable implementation. We then tighten the assumptions on preferences and mutation processes and provide mechanisms for stochastically stable implementation under more permissive conditions on social choice rules.

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms.

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or bestresponses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. We also provide a mechanism for implementation in BRD if the rule is quasimonotonic and excludes worst alternatives – no worst alternative (NWA). Quasimonotonicity and NWA are both necessary and sufficient for absorbing implementation in BRD. Moreover, they characterize implementation in strict Nash equilibria. Under incomplete information, incentive compatibility is necessary for any kind of stable implementation in our sense, while Bayesian quasimonotonicity is necessary for recurrent implementation in interim BRD. Both conditions are also essentially sufficient for recurrent implementation, together with a Bayesian NWA. A characterization of implementation in strict Bayesian equilibria is also provided. Partial implementation results are also obtained.Robust implementation; Bounded rationality; Evolutionary dynamics; Mechanisms;

Stochastically stable implementation

Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies of the perturbed process is the outcome prescribed by the SCF. For uniform mistakes, we show that any ε-secure and strongly efficient SCF is implementable when there are at least five agents. Extensions to incomplete information environments are also obtained.Robust implementation, Bounded rationality, Evolutionary dynamics, Mechanisms, Stochastic stability

Graph Variogram: A novel tool to measure spatial stationarity

Irregularly sampling a spatially stationary random field does not yield a graph stationary signal in general. Based on this observation, we build a definition of graph stationarity based on intrinsic stationarity, a less restrictive definition of classical stationarity. We introduce the concept of graph variogram, a novel tool for measuring spatial intrinsic stationarity at local and global scales for irregularly sampled signals by selecting subgraphs of local neighborhoods. Graph variograms are extensions of variograms used for signals defined on continuous Euclidean space. Our experiments with intrinsically stationary signals sampled on a graph, demonstrate that graph variograms yield estimates with small bias of true theoretical models, while being robust to sampling variation of the space.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing 2018 (IEEE GlobalSIP 2018), Nov 2018, Anaheim, CA, United States. (https://2018.ieeeglobalsip.org/

Relational conflict is not too bad for employees when they have developed their emotional intelligence skills

Team conflict constitutes one of the most prevalent team processes in the workplace (Benítez et al., 2011; De Dreu, 2010), especially in competitive organizational contexts, such as, university organizations (Matthiesen & Einarsen, 2007). De Wit, Greer, & Jehn (2012) 's methanalysis showed that, team conflict is not always negative for employees well-being. Its effects are depending on the conflict type and conflict contexts. In this sense, research has shown that, task conflict could be positive for job satisfaction and, relationship conflict consequences of well-being could be buffer when team members have good skills to solve conflicts (De Dreu et al., 2004; Seong & Choi, 2014). Emotional intelligence has come to be seen as a key concept for the development of organizations. Especially in professions that require continuous management of interpersonal relationships, such as, teachers (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2004, Jiménez & López-Zafra, 2007). When individuals are in a conflict situation, whatever the type, they face the same ones influenced by their emotional state (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Montes 2014). Therefore, employees with high emotional intelligence may be better able to cope with conflict-induced stress than people who do not have such a skill (Armstrong et al., 2011). However, despite the existence of empirical evidence on the influence of emotional intelligence on the adequate management of conflict, there are few studies that have analyzed the moderating role of emotional intelligence in the relationship between both types of conflict (task and relationship conflict) and burnout. This study extends the conflict literature by examining the moderating role of emotional intelligent on the relationship between two conflict types (task conflict and relationship conflict) and burnout core (emotional exhaustion and depersonalization)

Entropy and the value of information for investors

Consider any investor who fears ruin facing any set of investments that satisfy noarbitrage. Before investing, he can purchase information about the state of nature in the form of an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α is more informative than information structure β if whenever he rejects α at some price, he also rejects β at that price. We show that this complete informativeness ordering is represented by the decrease in entropy of his beliefs, regardless of his preferences, initial wealth or investment problem. It is also shown that no prior-independent informativeness ordering based on similar premises exists.Informativeness, Information structures, Entropy, Decision under uncertainty, Investment, Blackwell ordering

Entropy and the value of information for investors

Consider any investor who fears ruin facing any set of investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing, he can purchase information about the state of nature in the form of an information structure. Given his prior, information structure alpha is more informative than information structure beta if whenever he rejects alpha at some price, he also rejects beta at that price. We show that this complete informativeness ordering is represented by the decrease in entropy of his beliefs, regardless of his preferences, initial wealth or investment problem. It is also shown that no prior-independent informativeness ordering based on similar premises exists.informativeness; information structures; entropy; decision under uncertainty; investment; Blackwell ordering