Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A Model of Segmentation

This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of elements of inertia and dynamism on the Russian labour market using a segmentation model. Risk averse workers are differentiated according to their productivity. They face a trade-off between wages and access to social services provided by the firm. The most productive workers leave their initial firm, contract on the spot labour market, and concentrate in the best performing firms. The model provides a possible interpretation of wage arrears which can be viewed as an element of an implicit contract between firms and less productive workers. We test some of the predictions of the model using a panel dataset containing 13,410 firms, for 1993 - 1997.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39632/3/wp246.pd

Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A Model of Segmentation

This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of elements of inertia and dynamism on the Russian labour market using a segmentation model. Risk averse workers are differentiated according to their productivity. They face a trade-off between wages and access to social services provided by the firm. The most productive workers leave their initial firm, contract on the spot labour market, and concentrate in the best performing firms. The model provides a possible interpretation of wage arrears which can be viewed as an element of an implicit contract between firms and less productive workers. We test some of the predictions of the model using a panel dataset containing 13,410 firms, for 1993 - 1997.transition, labour market, wage arrears, Russia

Trois enjeux des privatisations à l'Est.

This paper underiines the main objectives and trade-offs faced by Central and Eastern European countries. It describes the strategies adopted by Poland, Rus­sia and the Czech Republic as being dominated respectively by three objectives : enterprise restructuring, depoliticization of the economy and the emergence of market institutions.Cet article met en lumière les objectifs essentiels de la privatisation en Europe centrale et orientale, la manière dont les différents pays ont arbitré entre ces der­niers ainsi que les fondements théoriques de leurs choix. Il décrit la stratégie adoptée par la Pologne, la Russie et la République tchèque comme étant domi­nées respectivement par le souci de la restructuration des entreprises, de la dépo­litisation de l'économie et de l'émergence des institutions indispensables au marché.Grosfeld Irena, Senik-Leygonie Claudia. Trois enjeux des privatisations à l'Est. In: Revue économique, volume 47, n°6, 1996. pp. 1351-1371

Trois enjeux des privatisations à l'Est.

[eng] This paper underiines the main objectives and trade-offs faced by Central and Eastern European countries. It describes the strategies adopted by Poland, Rus­sia and the Czech Republic as being dominated respectively by three objectives : enterprise restructuring, depoliticization of the economy and the emergence of market institutions. [fre] Cet article met en lumière les objectifs essentiels de la privatisation en Europe centrale et orientale, la manière dont les différents pays ont arbitré entre ces der­niers ainsi que les fondements théoriques de leurs choix. Il décrit la stratégie adoptée par la Pologne, la Russie et la République tchèque comme étant domi­nées respectivement par le souci de la restructuration des entreprises, de la dépo­litisation de l'économie et de l'émergence des institutions indispensables au marché.

Le marché du travail russe : entre inertie et flexibilité

The puzzling coexistence of inertia and flexibility in the Russian labor market are explained using a segmentation model. By placing uncertainty at the center of decision-making by both firms and employees, this article shows that workers, all of whom are risk averse, may adopt behaviors differentiated according to their productivity. Some of them, with favorable job prospects, become mobile and enter into contracts whereby their pay varies depending on their productivity. Others, with less favorable opportunities, accept lower wages in exchange for job security and fringe benefits (the firm's social services). This model suggests an interpretation of wage arrears as part of the implicit "insurance contract" between the firm and certain wage-earners. The model's predictions are tested by using a database of 13.628 Russian companies observed from 1992 to 1997.Cet article propose une vision du marché du travail russe permettant d'expliquer la coexistence d'éléments d'inertie et de flexibilité par un phénomène de segmentation. Plaçant l'incertitude au cœur des décisions des firmes et des employés, il montre que les travailleurs, qui ont tous une aversion pour le risque, peuvent adopter des comportements différenciés selon leur productivité relative. Certains, bénéficiant de perspectives favorables, adoptent un comportement mobile et nouent des contrats prévoyant de les rémunérer en fonction de leur productivité. D'autres, jouissant d'opportunités moins favorables, acceptent une réduction de leur rémunération réelle en échange de la sécurité de l'emploi et de l'accès aux actifs sociaux de la firme. Notre cadre d'analyse permet de proposer une interprétation des arriérés de salaire. Ces derniers constitueraient un élément du contrat d'assurance implicite noué entre l'entreprise et certains travailleurs. Nous vérifions les prévisions du modèle à l'aide d'une base de données comprenant 13 628 entreprises russes, observées de 1992 à 1997.Grosfeld Irena, Senik-Leygonie Claudia, Verdier Thierry, Kolenikov Stanislav, Paltseva Elena. Le marché du travail russe : entre inertie et flexibilité. In: Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 30, 1999, n°2-3. Les économies post-socialistes: une décennie de transformation, sous la direction de Éric Magnin et Ramine Motamed-Nejad. pp. 123-152

Workers' heterogeneity and risk aversion: a segmentation model of the Russian labor market

This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of elements of both inertia and dynamism in the Russian labor market. In an environment of high uncertainty, risk averse and heterogeneous workers face a trade-off between wages and insurance against risk. The firm proposes a contract that includes a low monetary wage and access to social services. Workers choose to accept the contract or to leave the firm. Their choice gives rise to ex post segmentation: the most productive workers leave the firm and concentrate in the most productive firms; the less adaptive workers remain in their initial firm, where they accept lower wages as a price for security. In this framework, wage arrears can be viewed as an element of the implicit contract between firms and less productive workers. We test the relevance of this model using a panel data set containing 9,233 Russian firms for 1993 to 1998 as well as a subsample for which we have information on firms' wage arrears

Ouverture et redeploiement dans les republiques de l'ex-URSS

SIGLEAvailable from INIST (FR), Document Supply Service, under shelf-number : AR 16164 (1); AR 16164 (2); AR 16164 (3); AR 16164 (4) / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueMinistere de l'Enseignement Superieur et de la Recherche, 75 - Paris (France)FRFranc