7 research outputs found
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Όλ¬Έ (μμ¬) -- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ : κ΅μ λνμ κ΅μ νκ³Ό(νκ΅νμ 곡), 2021. 2. λ°νκ· .On April 22nd, 1981, the South Korean government first asked Japan to support 10 billion dollars for five years as Security-Economic Cooperation for security reasons to respond to the threat from North Korea. Several months later, South Korea officially requested 6 billion dollars from Japan for public aid as the 5th Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan with having the ostensible reason, "security". Though the request by the South Korean government first focused on "security," it was finalized for an "economic support" purpose. The suspicion was raised from the following two aspects: the request primarily focused on the military purpose, and with the relationship between South Korea and Japan back in the 1980s, an astronomical amount of loan was requested. According to this background, this research attempted to analyze the strategic implications of the South Korean government over the Security-Economic Cooperation between South Korea and Japan in the 1980s with a broad perspective including economic aspects by studying empirical data, such as memoirs of key figures, primary data on economic policy, and newspaper articles.
First, the research suggested that South Korea's request for 10 billion dollars mainly focused on its security goals. President Chun Doo-Hwan, the initiative of a 10 billion dollar request, intended South Korea to improve its defense capacity in response to North Korea's military strength enhancement. In addition, Chun's 10 billion dollar Security-economic Cooperation initiative included psychological variables from Japan's economic gain from the special demand caused by the Korean War. Because of the authoritarianism from military-born government officials and the consent from the US to support on Japan-Korea Security-Economic Cooperation, it was possible for Chun to ask for a large amount of aid for security reasons at the time.
Second, although the negotiation between the two countries had been focused on using the fund from Japan entirely for social development as part of the Five-Year Plan, South Korea was persistent with their initial purpose to apply the fund for its security project until the settlement had been made. Despite the original demand for the funds had denied and the negotiation only focused on social development, the South Korean government did not give up and emphasized the flexibility they should have in the use of funds endlessly to introduce funds for the security plan. As some argue, having the ostensible reason, "security", in the beginning, made it possible to achieve a large amount of loan. In addition, it could be argued that proposing the Five-Year Plan also played a role in obtaining security funds after all.
Third, the study showed that the funds resulted in refusing the plan of the Chun Doo-Hwan regime. The funds were proposed for achieving social development, not for security or economic achievement. The principles of the 4 billion dollar fund introduction were agreed between the two countries to regulate towards the Five-Year Plan or purchase of equipment from Japan. This shows the fund was introduced for economic and social development projects.
Fourth, the study concluded that the South Korean government achieved positive economic results through economic cooperation with Japan in spite of the settlement with Japan. The study argues that the large loan from Japan with an average interest rate of 6% was a great achievement because experiencing the phenomenon of high international interest rates and significant creditability loss from other countries, South Korea's economic plan to gain large and quality loans was threatened at the time. In other words, having the ostensible reason, "security" played a big role for South Korea to overcome the difficulties in negotiating with foreign countries with the international economic environment that South Korea was facing at the time and achieved to obtain a large amount of public loan needed for its economic plan. To evaluate South Korea's strategic implications, it is significantly important to discuss South Korea's strategy of having the ostensible reason, "security".1981λ
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Abstract 158Maste
Long-term safety and efficacy of alogliptin, a DPP-4 inhibitor, in patients with type 2 diabetes: a 3-year prospective, controlled, observational study (J-BRAND Registry)
Introduction Given an increasing use of dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP-4) inhibitors to treat patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus in the real-world setting, we conducted a prospective observational study (Japan-based Clinical Research Network for Diabetes Registry: J-BRAND Registry) to elucidate the safety and efficacy profile of long-term usage of alogliptin.Research design and methods We registered 5969 patients from April 2012 through September 2014, who started receiving alogliptin (group A) or other classes of oral hypoglycemic agents (OHAs; group B), and were followed for 3 years at 239 sites nationwide. Safety was the primary outcome. Symptomatic hypoglycemia, pancreatitis, skin disorders of non-extrinsic origin, severe infections, and cancer were collected as major adverse events (AEs). Efficacy assessment was the secondary outcome and included changes in hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c), fasting blood glucose, fasting insulin and urinary albumin.Results Of the registered, 5150 (group A: 3395 and group B: 1755) and 5096 (3358 and 1738) were included for safety and efficacy analysis, respectively. Group A patients mostly (>90%) continued to use alogliptin. In group B, biguanides were the primary agents, while DPP-4 inhibitors were added in up to ~36% of patients. The overall incidence of AEs was similar between the two groups (42.7% vs 42.2%). Kaplan-Meier analysis revealed the incidence of cancer was significantly higher in group A than in group B (7.4% vs 4.8%, p=0.040), while no significant incidence difference was observed in the individual cancer. Multivariate Cox regression analysis revealed that the imbalanced patient distribution (more elderly patients in group A than in group B), but not alogliptin usage per se, contributed to cancer development. The incidence of other major AE categories was with no between-group difference. Between-group difference was not detected, either, in the incidence of microvascular and macrovascular complications. HbA1c and fasting glucose decreased significantly at the 0.5-year visit and nearly plateaued thereafter in both groups.Conclusions Alogliptin as a representative of DPP-4 inhibitors was safe and durably efficacious when used alone or with other OHAs for patients with type 2 diabetes in the real world setting