Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through Interest Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority among Competing State Interests and among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests

To a court committed to resolving choice-of-law problems by the application of interest analysis, either exclusively or in conjunction with other approaches, fashioning an order of priority among conflicting state interest is of critical importance. In addition, several different techniques are available to a court utilizing interest analysis. Consequently, establishing an order of priority among such available techniques becomes important. The author attempts to fashion an order of priority among those competing state interests and those available techniques most likely to arise in personal injury actions, thereby facilitating the choice-of-law process in such cases

Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandry for Federal Courts

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. A statement, according to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) requires an assertion. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 801(a) provide that in order for the assertion to fall within the definition of hearsay, it must be intended as an assertion. This article explores the five categories of extrajudicial declarations or conduct identified in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 801(a): verbal assertions; nonverbal conduct intended to be assertive; nonverbal conduct not intended to be assertive; nonassertive verbal conduct; and, assertive verbal conduct. The author concludes that the Advisory Committee\u27s desire to have implied assertions characterized as nonhearsay should be rejected by the courts for several reasons. First, he finds that it is unsupported by the reasoning behind the Advisory Notes, the language of Rule 801 and the legislative history of the Rules. Second, he believes that this characterization is incompatible with the sixth amendment. Finally, it interferes with the efficacy of cross-examination which, the author argues, must be preserved

Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The Wrongful Death Action

Interest analysis has come to be recognized as a phrase of legal art and an acceptable method of resolving choice-of-law problems. In a relatively short period of time, the method has been embraced by courts impressive both in number and in individual judicial prestige. The essence of interest analysis lies in the fashioning of an indicative law which will result in the resolution of a choice-of-law problem by the application of the dispositive law of that state having the greatest interest in the specific issue presented. It is the antithesis of that older methodology which resolved choice-of-law problems by the mechanical application of rigid indicative laws, dictated by the cause of action asserted. Thus, many courts which once resolved virtually all choice-of law problems in tort cases by the application of lex loci delicti, have now come to recognize the propriety of precisely formulating the issue presented, determining which states have legitimate interests in that issue, identifying each of those interests, deciding which state\u27s interests are paramount, and applying the dispositive law of that state to resolve the specific issue presented

Interest Analysis or the Restatement Second of Conflicts: Which Is the Preferable Approach to Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems?

A court confronted with a choice-of-law problem must determine what methodology to utilize to resolve the problem. Among the choices available to the court are interest analysis and the most significant relationship test of the Restatement Second of Conflicts. Concluding that those two approaches differ in method and result, the author compares the two for the purpose of determining which approach is preferable and why. The comparison is effected by using each approach in a series of choice-of-law cases. The author concludes that interest analysis is the preferable approach because it produces more rational results, compels a more precise consideration of the reasons underlying conflicting local laws and better enables courts to utilize prior decisions in resolving choice-of-law problems. In addition, the author finds that the approach of the Restatement Second of Conflicts sends conflicting signals to courts, requiring some degree of interest analysis but then blurring the results of such analysis with a territorial bias and a reversion to lex loci conflicts rules

The Jurisdictional Reach of a Federal Court Hearing a Federal Cause of Action: A Path through the Maze

The ability of a federal court hearing a federal cause of action to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is well established. To what extent it may do so, however, is far from clear. The author attempts to clarify the parameters of such jurisdiction in light of recent congressional amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the recently enacted Federal Courts Improvement Act. In concluding, the author makes specific findings concerning the scope of this jurisdictional reach, the parameters of which may be discerned as possessing a logical symmetry

Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who Don\u27t

In Abendschein v. Farrell, the Supreme Court of Michigan declined to embrace the heady stuff\u27 of interest analysis and decided instead to retain lex loci delicti as the method of resolving choice-of-law problems in tort cases. While my own inclination is toward interest analysis, rather obviously the highest appellate court of any state has the right and the capacity to utilize any constitutionally permissible technique to resolve conflicts problems, and to hell with my personal preference. Still, the result achieved by the court in Abendschein has continued to trouble me. I think now I know why, and, in the process of figuring out why, I think I may have arrived at some conclusions which may be of assistance to courts working with the complexities of interest analysis and of value to those courts which have elected to retain lex loci delicti. First, the facts of Abendschein

Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka

Remember the lyrics to that television commercial touting the slim cigarette made especially for the dainty feminine hand: You\u27ve come a long way, baby, to get where you\u27ve got to today ? Not a bad description of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In the half-dozen years since its decision in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., the court has generated a high degree of sophistication in utilizing interest analysis to resolve choice-of-law problems. Not surprisingly, that enhanced refinement has dramatized the difficulties inherent in weighing the interests of competing states and the various techniques available to effect that process. The sophistication, the difficulties and the techniques uniquely coincide in Cipolla v. Shaposka