CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-RACIAL SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Segregation of races, particularly separation of white and colored races, has long been condoned by American courts as permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Underlying the traditional view is the idea that the equal protection clause is not violated by segregation so long as equal facilities are provided for both races. On this basic premise a large number of jurisdictions, particularly the southern states, have predicated constitutional provisions and statutory enactments compelling racial segregation, while a number of other states where segregation has not been forbidden by express constitutional or statutory provision have achieved the same practical result. The possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States may hive occasion to pass on the validity of the basic assumption makes it desirable to review in some detail the attitude of the courts toward this problem

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-NECESSITY OF ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS\u27 ESTATES-EFFECT OF STATUTES WHICH CHANGE THE DEVOLUTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

It is almost an axiom of the common law that upon the death of a person the title to his personal property vests in his personal representative. On the other hand it is equally axiomatic that title to real property descends directly to the heirs or devisees, subject to the control of the personal representative and the probate court for purposes of satisfying the debts of the decedent in the absence of sufficient personalty. A number of jurisdictions, however, have by statute altered the common-law doctrine and have provided that title to both personalty and realty passes directly to the distributee. This is true in California and Texas, in the case of both testate and intestate property, while in a number of other jurisdictions intestate property alone is affected. The manifest purposes of such statutory provisions are: first, to abrogate the largely historical difference .in treatment of a decedent\u27s real and personal property and second, to make it easier to dispense with administration of decedents\u27 estates. It is the purpose of this comment to evaluate the practical effect and operation of these statutes, insofar as they purport to change the common-law doctrine relative to the devolution of personalty, on the necessity for an administration of a decedent\u27s personal property

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-NECESSITY OF ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS\u27 ESTATES-EFFECT OF STATUTES WHICH CHANGE THE DEVOLUTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

It is almost an axiom of the common law that upon the death of a person the title to his personal property vests in his personal representative. On the other hand it is equally axiomatic that title to real property descends directly to the heirs or devisees, subject to the control of the personal representative and the probate court for purposes of satisfying the debts of the decedent in the absence of sufficient personalty. A number of jurisdictions, however, have by statute altered the common-law doctrine and have provided that title to both personalty and realty passes directly to the distributee. This is true in California and Texas, in the case of both testate and intestate property, while in a number of other jurisdictions intestate property alone is affected. The manifest purposes of such statutory provisions are: first, to abrogate the largely historical difference .in treatment of a decedent\u27s real and personal property and second, to make it easier to dispense with administration of decedents\u27 estates. It is the purpose of this comment to evaluate the practical effect and operation of these statutes, insofar as they purport to change the common-law doctrine relative to the devolution of personalty, on the necessity for an administration of a decedent\u27s personal property