Die Schleiereule: flexibel durch das Leben : Gedanken über einen Kulturfolger

Schleiereulen leben in Deutschland als Gebäudebrüter eng angeschlossen an den Menschen. Der Beitrag spiegelt Gedanken wider, ob und wie Schleiereulen in Mitteleuropa bereits vor der Besiedlung durch den Menschen geeignete Lebensräume vorfanden und eine Population etablieren konnten. Das flexible Verhalten der Schleiereule, insbesondere das variable Paarungssystem, wird auf der Basis verhaltensökologischer Überlegungen vorgestellt und erläutert.Due to their dependence on breeding places in buildings Barn owl Tyto alba occurrence in Germany is closely connected to human settlements. The present contribution approaches the question if Tyto alba was able to spread over Central Europe already before colonization by humans. Further its flexibility in behaviour is described and discussed, especially concerning the reproduction strategy

Migranten am Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland: Integrationsreport, T. 9

"Das Working Paper behandelt anhand von Daten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit und des Mikrozensus die Stellung von Zuwanderern und ihren Nachkommen auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. Dies ist ein zentraler Bereich der strukturellen Integration von Migranten. Dargestellt werden das Ausmaß der Erwerbstätigkeit, die berufliche Stellung, besondere Beschäftigungssituationen sowie die Erwerbslosigkeit im Vergleich zur Bevölkerung ohne Migrationshintergrund." (Autorenreferat

Freedom Without Choice?

The paper addresses a fundamental issue in clarifying the concept of autonomy, namely its relation to the concept of freedom, and argues for an analysis within a libertarian framework. Starting with a brief clarification of the concept of freedom in general, based mainly on the idea of being unhindered, this general idea is explored further by discussing two main dimensions: 1) freedom as openness to alternatives (possibility criterion) and 2) freedom in the sense of an available option being “natural” or “essential” to the agent in question (criterion of naturalness). In subsequently discussing the title-giving question directly, it is asked whether invoking only the second dimension while disregarding the first—generally done by compatibilists—can provide us with plausible cases of freedom without choice. In analyzing various relevant cases of personal freedom, covering freedom of action as well as freedom of will, the answer is then mostly negative. Apart from cases like theoretical rationality or language, all cases of personal freedom mattering most for personal autonomy rely on the first criterion as well, i.e. the agent has to be able to choose between different alternatives. Only then can we understand ourselves as free and autonomous persons

Mediation theory and the problem of psychological discourse on 'inner' events: part II

The present article attempts to investigate the 'philosophical foundations' of psychology and thereby of the social sciences in general with regard to a central problem, viz. the question of the 'inner'. It does this with special critical reference to an authoritative psychological theory, viz. the so-called 'mediation theory', and tries to show the necessity of interdisciplinary clarification. In the first part mediation theory was introduced as a variant of psychological behaviorism which attempts to substitute for the untenable total neglect of 'inner' events a way of talking about them which is secured methodologically and retains a behavioral foundation. Of the three crucial questions raised by the project the second, viz. question (B), which concerns the theoretical status of the assumed inner mediators could be answered to the effect that they must be "hypothetical constructs" (in the sense of MacCorquodale and Meehl 1948) having the nature of real, phenomenally verifiable events, if, indeed, they are to figure as links in (causal) S-R-chains. Conceiving of them as "intervening variables" (and this is theoretically still an open possibility, as a consequence of a purely dispositional description of the phenomena), such a conception would exclude this function. The discussion of 'internalization' of behavior sequences as assumed by mediation theory has led to the conclusion that the relevant phenomena cannot, in this case, justify the necessity of a non-dispositional explanation which goes beyond 'external' performances (question (A)). Likewise the subject matter of question (C) remained undecided; that is, the possibilities of phenomenally verifying the assumed 'inner' mediation processes which are only asserted to exist by the theory but are unspecified in content. Therefore, the observable performances in the case of sequential behaviour do not support the mediation theoretic solution of the problem of the 'inner'

Handlungstheoretische Aspekte der Fahrlässigkeit

Can the risks of the scientific technical world be sufficiently delimited in a normative (legal or moral) sense? The answer provided by this article is yes, assuming that the potentials of negligence liability are clarified and its principles consistently applied. An outline of the basic conditions for this endeavor proceeds from the distinctions drawn by the Analytical Theory of Action. "Negligence" is defined as taking risks beyond normative limits. It is treated on this basis (and not on the basis of "foreseeability") as the generic concept for "intention". A normative theoretical justification of "required care" is proffered. The care required is limited, however, on the one hand by its tie to the norm addressee's practical ability. On the other, it is elevated by the consistent, non-random designation of norms on risk-taking and by the systematic inclusion of the ability to have been addressed normatively at an earlier point in time. The question as to whether one can locate responsibility sometime prior to the harm accidentally caused (so-called "Vorverlegungstheorie") will be discussed and (applying general principles of the theory of action) affirmed