Multinationals in economic development: the benefits of FDI

During her five years at the World Bank, Harrison initiated four studies involving multinational enterprises in four developing countries: Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco and Venezuela. These studies measure the role of multinational enterprises in promoting technology transfer; test whether multinationals push up wages for local workers; and analyze the validity of the "pollution haven hypothesis," which states that foreign investors flock to developing countries to take advantage of lax environmental standards. Harrison finds no evidence of pollution havens and shows that multinationals raise wages for local workers. However, she finds that technology transfer has generally been limited to the joint ventures who receive foreign equity participation.multinational corporations; wages; pollution havens; technology transfer

Trade Agreements

This paper reviews the most significant recent developments in the theory of trade agreements. The paper offers an integrated approach to evaluating trade agreements, and uses the approach to present results on preferential and multilateral trade agreements. The paper identifies also several questions for further research.trade agreements, multilateralism, free trade, customs unions, free trade areas, preferential trade

Free Trade and the Environment

What should environmentalists say about free trade? Many environmentalists object to free trade by appealing the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, but there are reasons to worry about unrestricted free trade’s environmental effects nonetheless; the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization may be unjustifiable. Programs to compensate for trade-related environmental damage, appropriate trade barriers, and consumer movements may be necessary and desirable. At least environmentalists should consider these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent the achievement of other important moral objectives, can efficiently reduce environmental problems, and institutional safeguards can prevent their abuse

Multinationals in economic development: the benefits of FDI

During her five years at the World Bank, Harrison initiated four studies involving multinational enterprises in four developing countries: Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco and Venezuela. These studies measure the role of multinational enterprises in promoting technology transfer; test whether multinationals push up wages for local workers; and analyze the validity of the "pollution haven hypothesis," which states that foreign investors flock to developing countries to take advantage of lax environmental standards. Harrison finds no evidence of pollution havens and shows that multinationals raise wages for local workers. However, she finds that technology transfer has generally been limited to the joint ventures who receive foreign equity participation

Multinationals in economic development: the benefits of FDI

During her five years at the World Bank, Harrison initiated four studies involving multinational enterprises in four developing countries: Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco and Venezuela. These studies measure the role of multinational enterprises in promoting technology transfer; test whether multinationals push up wages for local workers; and analyze the validity of the "pollution haven hypothesis," which states that foreign investors flock to developing countries to take advantage of lax environmental standards. Harrison finds no evidence of pollution havens and shows that multinationals raise wages for local workers. However, she finds that technology transfer has generally been limited to the joint ventures who receive foreign equity participation

Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: A Tale of Death, Money & Taxes

Ever since Mancur Olson\u27s The Logic Of Collective Action was published in 1965, if not before, the traditional conception of politics in Western democracies has given pride of place to special interests -- small groups with high stakes -- seeking favors from legislators. These groups are able to solve the coordination and free-rider problems that plague larger group interests, and get their way in Congress and other legislative bodies by doling out campaign contributions and other benefits. The groups are the predator, legislators the prey. In this article we argue that in an important range of cases, the traditional conception gets it backward. Legislators who desire money will act rationally to set the conditions under which small groups with high stakes can form, in order to shake them down for contributions. We call this a reverse Mancur Olson or ex ante rent extraction phenomenon. Legislators become the predators, individuals and groups the prey. We illustrate it with an extended case study of estate tax repeal/non repeal, and suggest several extensions. The new conception changes our understanding of the political process

Scandal in the US and Australian Wine Industry! Trademarks and GIs As a Consumer Magnet?, 118 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 421 (2019)

In a dense global market, wine is heavily reliant on catering to the needs of consumers. Consumers, as part of the decision-making process, rely on information – comprising information type, and the way that it is portrayed. This article identifies branding opportunities for New World wineries – particularly in the United States and Australia – to capitalize on without compromising innovation in branding nor breaching IP law. It highlights that wineries in the New World have a plethora of opportunity to create a spunk and pizazz effect in their branding. At the same time, it cautions what wineries should avoid for the purpose of otherwise being classified as ‘scandalous’