Strategic Options for Iran: Balancing Pressure with Diplomacy

This third report from The Iran Project, considers the successes, shortfalls, and risks of strategies designed to pressure the Iranian government into changing its policies. It explores some of the advantages and disadvantages for U.S. interests in the Middle East that might flow from bilateral negotiations with Iran to achieve a nuclear deal, and propose steps that the President might take to establish a framework for direct talks with Iran's leadership that would build on the latest round of multilateral negotiations and proposals. Iran's actions -- particularly with regard to its nuclear program -- pose complex and dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security of Israel and possibly to stability in the Middle East. This paper sets out a response to these serious challenges. A strengthened U.S. diplomatic initiative would not replace the pressure track; rather, it would build on pressure already applied. Some measure of sanctions relief will have to be offered as part of a negotiated settlement; but pressure should not be eased without firm and verifiable Iranian commitments to greater transparency and agreed limits on Iran's nuclear program. The proposed bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Iran would not replace the multilateral negotiations that are now underway. Bilateral talks would have to proceed on a basis understood and ideally supported by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) and U.S. allies. This paper differs from earlier Iran Project publications in that it takes policy positions and makes recommendations for government action. The authors have sought to base these suggestions on factual, objective, nonpartisan analyses, consulting with nearly 20 former government officials and experts and seeking advice from a larger group of signatories

The New Era of Doing Business with Iran: Iran’s International Commercial Transactions and Global Security

On January 17, 2016, in a statement following his signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, President Obama addressed that country’s people, stating that “yours is a great civilization, with a vibrant culture that has so much to contribute to the world – in commerce, and in science and the arts.” While the former U.S. President’s evaluation of the Iranian people’s greatness is indisputable, there are questions concerning doing business with Iran which transcend conventional legal issues and commercial problems. Given the juxtaposition of Iran’s duopolistic government structure and ideologically oriented decision-making processes, questions arise as to what extent multinational corporations, including U.S. companies, should reasonably expect to conduct commercial transactions with that country. Specific issues arise related to Iranian banks, international credit recognition, terms of payment, and the conceptual legality of interest in Iran. In addition, more practical issues arise related to the governing law of contract and proper dispute resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, U.S. regulatory constraints limit the efficacy of certain contracts between Iran and U.S. companies. This article attempts to illustrate the structural, legal and operational issues concerning doing business with Iran and, where possible, means for mitigating such issues

Washington's meddling for peace in the politics of Israel and the Palestinian Authority

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2012.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 819-878).Governments often try to use their foreign policies to influence the choice of who will rule in other countries. However, scholars know strikingly little about this commonplace and consequential phenomenon, especially when it is scoped down to the use of diplomatic tools short of force. Indeed, this lacuna is especially striking in comparison to the voluminous literatures on other forms of international meddling such as military intervention or coercive diplomacy for producing policy change. This project seeks to contribute to the nascent research program on partisan intervention by drawing on the historical record to pose tentative answers to two pertinent research questions in the context of America's Mideast policies. The first topic focuses on occurrence: when are sender states likely to engage in this behavior, and when are they less likely to do so? The second topic focuses on efficacy: when does this policy help achieve the sender state's objectives, and when does it fail? This project seeks to answer these questions by drawing on Washington's peace process diplomacy. It uses official archives and expert interviews to supplement the existing historiographic record, documenting America's efforts to bolster perceived pro--peace leaders in Israel since 1977 and among the Palestinians since 1986. It also explores U.S. decision--making toward Iran as a shadow case for leverage over additional study variables, along with other instances of outside intervention into Israeli politics by European or Arab states. It finds that the issue area of leadership selection intervention is unusually subject to the individualistic preferences of top leaders in the sender state. Because exceptionally blatant meddling of this sort tends to elicit a backlash, self-admitted LSI is therefore discouraged. Instead, practitioners go to great lengths to maintain alternative pretenses that prevent revelation of their true intentions. This inherently complicates the task of legislative oversight, decreases points of leverage for lobbyists or working--level bureaucrats, and magnifies these leaders' subjective interpretation of international circumstances. In short, LSI is intensely personal.by David Andrew Weinberg.Ph.D