The role of space in the security and defence policy of Turkey. A change in outlook: Security in space versus security from space

Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey's security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust and resilient space/satellite projects' architecture is proposed for Turkey

Towards Fair and Efficient Evaluations of Leaking Cryptographic Devices - Overview of the ERC Project CRASH, Part I -

Side-channel analysis is an important concern for the security of cryptographic implementations, and may lead to powerful key recovery attacks if no countermeasures are deployed. Therefore, various types of protection mechanisms have been proposed over the last 20 years. In view of the cost and performance overheads caused by these protections, their fair evaluation is a primary concern for hardware and software designers. Yet, the physical nature of side-channel analysis also renders the security evaluation of cryptographic implementations very different than the one of cryptographic algorithms against mathematical cryptanalysis. That is, while the latter can be quantified based on (well-defined) time, data and memory complexities, the evaluation of side-channel analysis additionally requires to quantify the informativeness and exploitability of the physical leakages. This implies that a part of these security evaluations is inherently heuristic and dependent on engineering expertise. The development of sound tools allowing designers and evaluation laboratories to deal with this challenge was one of the main objectives of the CRASH project funded by the European Research Council. In this talk, I will survey a number of results we obtained in this direction, starting with concrete evaluation methodologies that are well-adapted to the investigation of current embedded devices, and following with emerging trends for future implementations. Quite naturally, a large number of researchers and teams have worked on similar directions. For each of the topics discussed, I will add a couple of references to publications that I found inspiring/relevant. The list is (obviously) incomplete and only reflects my personal interests. I apologize in advance for omissions

Towards Securing Low-Power Digital Circuits with Ultra-Low-Voltage Vdd Randomizers

With the exploding number of connected objects and sensitive applications, security against side-channel attacks becomes critical in low-cost and low-power IoT applications. For this purpose, established mathematical countermeasures such as masking and shuffling always require a minimum amount of noise in the adversary’s measurements, that may not be guaranteed by default because of good measurement setups and powerful signal processing. In this paper, we propose to improve the protection of sensitive digital circuits by operating them at a random ultra-low voltage (ULV) supplied by a Vdd randomizer. As the Vdd randomization modulates the switching current, it results in a multiplicative noise on both the current consumption amplitude and its time dependence. As ULV operation increases the sensitivity of the current on the supply voltage, it magnifies the generated noise while reducing the side-channel information signal thanks to the switching current reduction. As a proof-of-concept, we prototyped a simple Vdd randomizer based on a low-quiescent-current linear regulator with a digitally-controlled resistive feedback divider on which we apply a 4-bit random number stream. Using an information theoretic metric, the measurement results obtained in 65nm low-power CMOS confirm that such randomizers can significantly improve the security of cryptographic implementations against standard side-channel attacks in case of low physical noise in the attacks’ setups, hence enabling the use of mathematical countermeasures