The Portfolio Allocation Effects of Investor Sentiment about the Ability of Managers to Beat the Market

I present a model that can transform discounts on closed-end mutual funds into a measure of investor sentiment about the ability of fund managers to beat the market. This measure of sentiment varies positively with capital flows into actively managed open-end mutual funds, but negatively with capital flows into passively managed index funds. Investors appear to re-allocate their portfolios between actively and passively managed investment vehicles based on expectations about by how much managers will beat or trail the market.

Closed-end Fund Discounts and Interest Rates: Positive Covariance in US Data after 1985

Previous papers find no relationship between interest rates and the discounts of US closed-end funds before 1985. This is taken as evidence against management fees being a cause of discounts because a negative relationship is expected: if interest rates rise, you would expect to see discounts fall as the present value of future fees is reduced. But from 1985 forward, there has been a strong positive relationship between interest rates and discounts. This supports an alternative view in which the discount varies positively with interest rates because bond yields are an alternative return against which closed-end funds must compete.

Noise-trading, Costly Arbitrage, and Asset Prices: Evidence from US Closed-end Funds

The behavior of US closed-end funds is very different from that of the UK funds studied by Gemmill and Thomas (2002). There is no evidence that their discounts are constrained by arbitrage barriers, no evidence that higher expenses increase discounts and no evidence that replication risk increases discounts—but strong evidence that noise-trader risk is priced. The differences between US and UK funds may be due to the fact that small investors dominate US funds while institutional investors dominate UK funds, or because the sample selection method for the UK funds chooses only funds that are relatively easy to arbitrage.

Noise-trader Risk: Does it Deter Arbitrage, and Is it Priced?

Arbitrage positions that benefit from the reversion of closed-end fund discounts to rational levels show excess returns that increase in magnitude the more funds are mispriced. At the same time, fund trading volumes and bid-ask spreads more than double as funds become increasingly mispriced. These behaviors suggest that non-diversifiable noise-trader risk increases the more funds are mispriced and that market participants are not only aware of this unique risk factor but demand a compensatory rate of return that varies with its magnitude.

Noise-trader risk: does it deter arbitrage, and is it priced?

Arbitrage positions that benefit from the reversion of closed-end fund discounts to rational levels show excess returns that increase in magnitude the more funds are mispriced. At the same time, fund trading volumes and bid-ask spreads more than double as funds become increasingly mispriced. These behaviors suggest that non-diversifiable noise-trader risk increases the more funds are mispriced and that market participants are not only aware of this unique risk factor but demand a compensatory rate of return that varies with its magnitude

Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Global Access to Medicine

Since its inception in 1988, the United States Trade Representative’s “Special 301” adjudication of foreign intellectual property law standards has been used to promote policies restricting access to affordable medications around the world. President-elect Obama released a platform promising to “break the stranglehold that a few big drug and insurance companies have on these life-saving drugs” and pledged support for “the rights of sovereign nations to access quality-assured, low-cost generic medication to meet their pressing public health needs.” The 2009 and 2010 Special 301 reports, however, indicate that the Obama Administration has not yet implemented this pledge into administration trade policy. Although the 2010 Report shows some improvement, the Obama Administration continues using Special 301 to pressure developing countries to adopt escalating intellectual property rules that are not required by any international agreement and that will negatively impact access to medicines

Sentiment and the interpretation of news about fundamentals

The reaction of closed-end fund share prices to changes in portfolio values is on average the same whether funds are trading at discounts or premia and whether the changes in portfolio values are positive or negative. If closed-end fund discounts and premia do correctly measure investor sentiment, then these results suggest that investor sentiment does not affect the market’s reaction to news about fundamentals. Alternatively, discounts and premia may not in fact measure investor sentiment, or sentiment may play no role at all in closed-end fund pricing. Noise-trader risk and trading costs also fail to explain the observed behavior

Closed-end fund discounts and interest rates: positive covariance in US data after 1985

Previous papers find no relationship between interest rates and the discounts of US closed-end funds before 1985. This is taken as evidence against management fees being a cause of discounts because a negative relationship is expected: if interest rates rise, you would expect to see discounts fall as the present value of future fees is reduced. But from 1985 forward, there has been a strong positive relationship between interest rates and fees. This supports an alternative view in which the discount varies positively with interest rates because bond yields are an alternative return against which closed-end funds must compete