Capital Jurors in an Era of Death Penalty Decline

The state of public opinion regarding the death penalty has not experienced such flux since the late 1960s. Death sentences and executions have reached their lowest annual numbers since the early 1970s and today, the public appears fairly evenly split in its views on the death penalty. In this Essay, we explore, first, whether these changes in public opinion mean that fewer people will be qualified to serve on death penalty trials as jurors, and second, whether potential jurors are affected by changes in the practice of the death penalty. We conducted surveys of persons reporting for jury duty at the Superior Court of Orange County, California. What we found was surprising. Surveys of jurors in decades past suggested ten to twenty percent of jury-eligible individuals would be excludable due to their substantial doubts about the death penalty. Despite Orange County’s status as a redoubt of death sentencing, we find that 35% or more of jurors reporting for jury service were excludable as having such substantial doubts about the death penalty that it would “substantially impair” their ability to perform their role as jurors. Indeed, large numbers went further: roughly a quarter said they would be reluctant to find a person guilty of capital murder knowing the death penalty was a possibility. A final question asked whether the fact that executions have not been conducted in California for a decade impacts whether jurors would be favorable towards the death penalty. We found that, across all types of attitudes towards the death penalty, that fact made jurors less inclined to sentence a person to death. Rare punishments may seem more arbitrary, even to those who find them morally acceptable. We conclude by describing how this research can be useful for scholars, litigators, and judges concerned with selection of jurors in death penalty cases, and we discuss why, as social and legal practices change, more study of public attitudes towards punishment is needed

Capital Jurors in an Era of Death Penalty Decline

The state of public opinion regarding the death penalty has not experienced such flux since the late 1960s. Death sentences and executions have reached their lowest annual numbers since the early 1970s and today, the public appears fairly evenly split in its views on the death penalty. In this Essay, we explore, first, whether these changes in public opinion mean that fewer people will be qualified to serve on death penalty trials as jurors, and second, whether potential jurors are affected by changes in the practice of the death penalty. We conducted surveys of persons reporting for jury duty at the Superior Court of Orange County, California. What we found was surprising. Surveys of jurors in decades past suggested ten to twenty percent of jury-eligible individuals would be excludable due to their substantial doubts about the death penalty. Despite Orange County’s status as a redoubt of death sentencing, we find that 35% or more of jurors reporting for jury service were excludable as having such substantial doubts about the death penalty that it would “substantially impair” their ability to perform their role as jurors. Indeed, large numbers went further: roughly a quarter said they would be reluctant to find a person guilty of capital murder knowing the death penalty was a possibility. A final question asked whether the fact that executions have not been conducted in California for a decade impacts whether jurors would be favorable towards the death penalty. We found that, across all types of attitudes towards the death penalty, that fact made jurors less inclined to sentence a person to death. Rare punishments may seem more arbitrary, even to those who find them morally acceptable. We conclude by describing how this research can be useful for scholars, litigators, and judges concerned with selection of jurors in death penalty cases, and we discuss why, as social and legal practices change, more study of public attitudes towards punishment is needed

Judicial Overstating

Ostensibly, we are all Legal Realists now. No longer do legal theorists maintain that judicial decision making fits the mechanical and formalist characterizations of yesteryear. Yet, the predominant style of American appellate court opinions seems to adhere to that improbable mode of adjudication: habitually, opinions provide excessively large sets of syllogistic reasons and portray the chosen decision as certain, singularly correct, and as determined inevitably by the legal materials. This article examines two possible explanations for this rhetorical style of Judicial Overstatement. First, we review the psychological research that suggests that judicial overstatement is a product of the cognitive processes by which judges arrive at their decisions. Research on the Coherence Effect suggests that during the decision making process, the cognitive system spreads apart the opposing decisions by inflating one set of arguments and deflating the other, with the effect of making one decision seem considerably stronger than its rival. This leads the judge to perceive the chosen decision as stronger than it is, and thus to overstate the opinion. It might also be possible that judges resort to overstatement because they believe that this form of reasoning promotes the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. We report on a recent experimental study that was conducted to test this possibility. We found that overstated and monolithic reasons did not promote the evaluations of the judges or of the decisions they rendered. Lay people gave more favorable evaluations when the judges provided nuanced opinions that admitted to the appeal of both sides of the dispute. In sum, judicial overstatement is best understood not as a persuasive device, but as an intra-personal, cognitive phenomenon. The certainty and singular correctness that are habitually reported in judicial opinions are not properties of the law, but artifacts of the judges’ constructed representations of it

Judicial Overstating

Ostensibly, we are all Legal Realists now. No longer do legal theorists maintain that judicial decision making fits the mechanical and formalist characterizations of yesteryear. Yet, the predominant style of American appellate court opinions seems to adhere to that improbable mode of adjudication: habitually, opinions provide excessively large sets of syllogistic reasons and portray the chosen decision as certain, singularly correct, and as determined inevitably by the legal materials. This article examines two possible explanations for this rhetorical style of Judicial Overstatement. First, we review the psychological research that suggests that judicial overstatement is a product of the cognitive processes by which judges arrive at their decisions. Research on the Coherence Effect suggests that during the decision making process, the cognitive system spreads apart the opposing decisions by inflating one set of arguments and deflating the other, with the effect of making one decision seem considerably stronger than its rival. This leads the judge to perceive the chosen decision as stronger than it is, and thus to overstate the opinion. It might also be possible that judges resort to overstatement because they believe that this form of reasoning promotes the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. We report on a recent experimental study that was conducted to test this possibility. We found that overstated and monolithic reasons did not promote the evaluations of the judges or of the decisions they rendered. Lay people gave more favorable evaluations when the judges provided nuanced opinions that admitted to the appeal of both sides of the dispute. In sum, judicial overstatement is best understood not as a persuasive device, but as an intra-personal, cognitive phenomenon. The certainty and singular correctness that are habitually reported in judicial opinions are not properties of the law, but artifacts of the judges’ constructed representations of it

Effects of Composted and Raw Manure and Ammonium Sulfate Applications On the Chemical Properties of the Soils at Chorro Creek Ranch, San Luis Obispo, CA.

The majority of agricultural systems, especially large-scale, require inputs of nutrients. In addition, many large scale dairies produce vast quantities of waste that can be potentially recycled as nutrients. This study was conducted to determine the differences in properties of soils amended with manure, compost, and fertilizer, and to assess implications of using animal waste products for forage crop fertilization. Forage crops, wheat, barley, and oat mix have been grown on the Chorro Creek Ranch part of Cal Poly farmland, for 15 years. Ammonium sulfate fertilizer has been applied at a rate of 200 lbs/acre/year for the past 4 years. In 2008 two parcels were altered from the norm, and Cal Poly compost and dairy cattle were applied as nutrient sources instead of ammonium sulfate fertilizer. Manure was broadcast at a rate of 4000 lbs/acre and compost was broadcast at a rate of 400 lbs/acre. Nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium soil EC, pH, CEC and % OM were investigated on all 3 parcels. The organic amendments increased the EC and the pH. The ammonium sulfate decreased the EC, pH, nitrate and P, and increased the CEC. Though applied at the highest rate of 4000 lbs/acre, the manure was not significantly different from the control. Cal Poly has a large dairy unit and has had a history of waste management problems. We believe applications of manure on forage crops to be a good solution to this problem

Mock Jurors’ Evaluation of Firearm Examiner Testimony

Objectives: Firearms experts traditionally have testified that a weapon leaves “unique” toolmarks, so bullets or cartridge casings can be visually examined and conclusively matched to a particular firearm. Recently, due to scientific critiques, Department of Justice policy, and judges’ rulings, firearms experts have tempered their conclusions. In two experiments, we tested whether this ostensibly more cautious language has its intended effect on jurors (Experiment 1), and whether cross-examination impacts jurors’ perception of firearm testimony (Experiment 2). Hypotheses: Four hypotheses were tested. First, jurors will accord significant weight to firearm testimony that declares a “match” compared to testimony that does not (Experiments 1 and 2). Second, variations to “match” language will not affect guilty verdicts (Experiment 1). Third, only the most cautious language (“cannot exclude the gun”) would lower guilty verdicts (Experiment 1). Fourth, cross-examination will reduce guilty verdicts depending on specific language used (Experiment 2). Method: In two preregistered, high-powered experiments with 200 mock jurors per cell, participants recruited from Qualtrics Panels were presented with a criminal case containing firearms evidence, which varied the wording of the examiner’s conclusion and whether cross-examination was present. These variations include conclusion language used by practitioners, language advised by government organizations, and language required by judges in several cases. Participants gave a verdict, rated the evidence and expert in all conditions. Results: Guilty verdicts significantly increased when a match was declared compared to when a match was not declared. Variation in conclusion language did not affect guilty verdicts nor did it affect jurors’ estimates of the likelihood the defendant’s gun fired the bullet recovered at the crime scene. In contrast, however, a more cautious conclusion that an examiner “cannot exclude the defendant’s gun” did significantly reduce guilty verdicts and likelihood estimates alike. The presence of cross-examination did not affect these findings. Conclusion: Apart from the most limited language (“cannot exclude the defendant’s gun”), judicial intervention to limit firearms conclusion language is not likely to produce its intended effect. Moreover, cross-examination does not appear to affect perceptions or individual juror verdicts