50 research outputs found
Why Business Firms Have Moral Obligations to Mitigate Climate Change
Without doubt, the global challenges we are currently facingâabove all
world poverty and climate changeârequire collective solutions: states,
national and international organizations, firms and business corporations as
well as individuals must work together in order to remedy these problems. In
this chapter, I discuss climate change mitigation as a collective action
problem from the perspective of moral philosophy. In particular, I address
and refute three arguments suggesting that business firms and corporations
have no moral duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: (i) that business
corporations are not appropriate addressees of moral demands because they
are not moral agents, and (ii) that to the extent that they are moral agents their
primary moral obligation is to their owners or shareholders, and (iii) the
appeal to the difference principle: that individual business corporations
cannot really make a significant difference to successful climate change
mitigation
Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?
Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it is sometimes argued that only moral realists can countenance the claim that nature is intrinsically valuable. Against this, we argue that the acceptance of moral anti-realism is no threat to the environmentalist cause. We argue, further, that the acceptance of moral realism is potentially an obstacle to delivering on a third core environmental ethicist demand: namely, that successful action on climate change and environmental destruction requires us to change some of our commonly-held ethical views and to achieve a workable consensus
Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations
It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in
character. But what exactly does it mean for âordinary citizensâ to have collective obligations visĂ -
vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of
collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which
these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and
unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As
such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice
through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are âcollectiveâ only in a fairly weak
sense
What is Wrong with Nimbys? Renewable Energy, Landscape Impacts and Incommensurable Values
Local opposition to infrastructure projects implementing renewable energy (RE) such as wind farms is often strong even if state-wide support for RE is strikingly high. The slogan âNot In My BackYardâ (NIMBY) has become synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what is wrong with NIMBYs about RE projects and how to best address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair share to producing a desirable public good (clean energy). In fact, with landscape concerns being at the heart of much protest, the question of fair burden distribution becomes sidelined: landscape impacts cannot be distributed nor compensated for. Protests may be attempts to express a true conflict of (incommensurable) values. Understanding them as such will help us better address NIMBY concerns and overcome such opposition through ensuring procedural justice
The possibility of collective moral obligations
Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more agents in that neither agent has that obligation on their own, but they â in some sense â share it or have it in common. In order for two or more agents to jointly hold an obligation to address some joint necessity problem they must have joint ability to address that problem. Joint ability is highly context-dependent and particularly sensitive to shared (or even common) beliefs. As such, joint ability can be deliberately generated in a given collection of agents by providing information related to collective goals and contributory actions. As moral agents, we regularly face problems wherein the outcome of our actions depends on how others choose. There are two ways of deliberating about our own choices in such cases. We can either think of our choices as best responses to othersâ choices (I-mode reasoning). Or we can think of our own choices as contributions to the collectively best option (even when we do not know how others are (likely) to choose) (we-mode reasoning). In deliberating about the right (individual) course of action vis-Ă -vis collective action problems, agents regularly we-frame the case at hand, that is, they include options in their deliberation that are only collectively available, and they we-reason with regard to their individual contributory actions. It is a necessary condition for collective obligations that potential collaborators facing a joint necessity case have grounds to privilege we-reasoning over reasoning in I-mode
The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a âtripartiteâ social ontology
of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that
reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this âthree-sizes-fit-allâ approach
promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the
epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more
fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and
combinations
Collective moral obligations: âwe-reasoningâ and the perspective of the deliberating agent
Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the perspective of the moral deliberating agent who faces a collective action problem, i.e. the type of reasoning she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to show that agents have collective obligations precisely when they are required to employ âwe-reasoningâ, a type of reasoning that differs from I-mode, best response reasoning, as I shall explain below. More precisely, two (or more) individual agents have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collectively available (more on that later) and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest out of the options available to them
Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge
We study shared intentions in what we call âloose groupsâ. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata
Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge
We study shared intentions in what we call âloose groupsâ. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata
Renewables
There exist overwhelming â and morally compelling â reasons for shifting to renewable energy (RE), because only that will enable us to timely mitigate dangerous global warming. In addition, several other morally weighty reasons speak in favor of the shift: considerable public health benefits, broader environmental benefits, the potential for sustainable and equitable economic development and equitable energy access, and, finally, long-term energy security. Furthermore, it appears that the transition to RE is economically, technologically, and politically feasible at this point in time. However, there are different possible pathways towards that goal, all of which involve tough choices. Some of these concern different ways of living: Do we have to make a choice between being sustainable and maintaining our current living standard? And if so, how can we balance the value of high living standards against that of a sustainable energy regime? In this chapter, I will not conduct a comprehensive analysis of all available renewable energy technologies, but rather provide a number of examples of tough choices entailed by solar, wind and hydropower. I will also attempt to rebut some of the common misconceptions regarding RE technologies