1,890 research outputs found
Export cartels and domestic markets
This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the icnreased possiblity for collusion in both markets. A condition is given under which this is the case.export cartels; tacit collusion; multimarket contact
Collusion in markets with imperfect price information on both sides
The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which fi?rm to purchase from, and each fi?rm only detects the other fi?rm's price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor, affecting transparency positively on both sides, are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this is so, when fi?rms are easier to inform than consumers.transparency; tacit collusion; cartel theory; competition policy; internet
Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy.
This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy where politicians are accountable, and independent agencies where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorateâs preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.accountability; redistribution; constitutional design; voting; information; direct democracy
Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy
This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorateâs preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.accountability, redistribution, constitutional design, voting, information, direct democracy
Transparency and Product Variety
We study the long run e€ects of transparency in a circular town model of a differentiated market. The market is not fully transparent on the consumer side: A fraction of consumers are uninformed about prices. Increasing transparency reduces the equilibrium price, profit and entry of firms. This improves welfare. If consumers' transportation cost is high, it also improves the average utility of consumers. When transportation costs are very small, the fully transparent market features cut throat competition if there are several firms in the market, and if firms choose pure entry strategies only one firm enters and acts like a monopolist. Consumers therefore prefer that market transparency is as high as possible under the restriction that the market should allow entry for two firms. If firms choose mixed entry strategies, consumers prefer full transparency.market transparency; product differentiation; product variety; competition policy
Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics
The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties fabor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaings at groups where most votes are gained by informating about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the partiesâ policies.political economy, redistribution, information
Virtual Capacity and Competition
In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in competition with the merging firm. The paper compares sale of physical and virtual capacity by the merging firm and shows that virtual capacity leads to a less competitive outcome. The merging firm can build up a reputation for producing little, so that the output price increases in the market, and this increases the auction price on virtual capacity.virtual capacity, reputation, tacit collusion, antitrust, mergers, competition policy
Hard Processes in Electron-Proton Scattering
This report summarizes some of the recent HERA results obtained by studying
hard processes in ep-scattering. By resolving the structure of the proton, hard
ep-reactions provide information on the parton content of the proton and may
give insight into the dynamics of the exchanged parton cascade. In addition,
their study offers the possibility to test the Standard Model, in particular
perturbative Quantum Chromodynamics, on which the theoretical predictions on
ep-scattering cross sections are generally based. Any observed deviation
between the data and existing theoretical models would either indicate the need
to calculate higher order contributions or hint at signs of new physics.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures, talk given at 23rd International Conference on
Physics in Collision (PIC 2003), Zeuthen, Germany, 26-28 Jun 200
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