Antidumping enforcement in the European Community

In the European Community (EC), as in the United States,"injury"is what antidumping is all about. Antidumping laws are a flexible tool for preventing imports from displacing domestic production in politically influential industries. The vehicle for achieving that goal in the EC, however, is not protectionist rules, as in the United States, but protectionist discretion. The empirical results of this study have implications for EC trade policy after 1992. If protectionist interests demand compensation for the abolition of national protectionist barriers after 1992, EC antidumping measures offer them considerable scope for achieving their goals since measures are largely determined by political discretion. Antidumping measures could therefore become a pinnacle of"Fortress Europe". The results also suggest certain strategic considerations for the trade policy of developing countries. The authors argue that antidumping measures affecting developing countries are concentrated in industries with shifting comparative advantage, such as steel products, basic chemicals, and synthetic fibers. And such protection is more likely in sectors with strong, politically influential interest groups.TF054105-DONOR FUNDEDOPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade Policy,Access to Markets

The fiscal costs of financial instability revisited

This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal costs of financial instability (defined as major asset price changes and including, as extreme cases, financial crises). The study identifies three channels to fiscal accounts: 1) revenue effects on capital gains, asset turnover and consumption tax, 2) bailout costs as asset price declines undermine balance sheets of companies/banks, and 3) second-round effects from asset prices changes via the real economy and via debt service costs. A panel analysis and case studies show that episodes of financial instability increase the variability of fiscal balances. Moreover, fiscal costs are often very large and much larger than assumed in the literature so far with public debt rising by up to 50% of GDP during such episodes. These fiscal effects can also serve as a, so far under-emphasised, rationale for the deficit and debt targets in the EU?s Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact. JEL Classification: H3, H6, E6asset prices, deficits, financial crisis, financial stability, Fiscal policies

Structural balances and revenue windfalls: the role of asset prices revisited

In this paper we revisit one of the “missing links” between budget balances and the economic cycle, namely the impact of asset prices on fiscal revenues. We estimate revenue elasticities with respect to equity and real estate price indices for 16 OECD countries, as well as for a synthetic euro area aggregate. For a sub-sample of euro area countries, we use these elasticities to investigate the impact of asset prices on budget balances and the assessment of the fiscal stance by adjusting existing estimates of cyclically adjusted balances for the asset price “cycle”. The results support the view that asset price movements are a major factor behind unexplained changes in the cyclically adjusted balance, which, if not accounted for, can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding underlying fiscal developments. JEL Classification: H2, H6, E6, G1asset prices, deficits, Fiscal policies, tax revenues

The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 in an international perspective

This paper compares the boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 with the average boom-bust pattern in industrialized countries as calculated from an international sample for the period 1970-2002. Two clear conclusions emerge. First, the Finnish-Swedish experience is much more volatile than the average boom-bust pattern. This holds for virtually every time series examined. Second, the bust and the recovery in the two Nordic countries differ markedly more from the international pattern than the boom phase does. The bust is considerably deeper and the recovery comes earlier and is more rapid. We explain the highly volatile character of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust episode by the design of economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 was driven by financial liberalization and a hard currency policy, causing large pro-cyclical swings in the real rate of interest transmitted via the financial sector into the real sector and then into the public finances. JEL Classification: E32, E62, E6

Market access advances and retreats : the Uruguay Round and beyond

In the Uruguay Round negotiations, trade distorting agricultural policies were taken up substantively for the first time in any round of multi-lateral trade negotiations. Voluntary export restraints outside the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) were in fact eliminated. Developing countries became equal partners with developed countries. Their tariff cuts covered as large a share of imports as those of the developed countries and were deeper. Because developing country tariffs were higher to start with, their cuts will save importers more (perdollar of imports covered) than will cuts by developed countries. Tariff bindings for most developing countries, although often above applied rates, were extended to 90 percent or more of imports. Few countries agreed to give foreigners unlimited market access in services, or full national treatment in more than a few service activities. But developed countries agreed to some liberalization of cross-border provision for 70 percent of service activities (compared with 25 percent in developing countries). Less positively, although trade restrictions on agricultural products were converted to tariffs, border protection was reduced less on agricultural than on industrial products, and there was little agreement on reducing trade-affecting subsidies. The textiles and clothing agreement binds developed countries to eliminate all MFA-sanctioned restriction but allows them to largely put off doing so until 2005. Concessions to which developing countries agreed are due now. Reciprocal concessions of particular interest are due in the future (elimination of the MFA) or yet to be negotiated (liberalization of agricultural trade). Also disquieting, since the Uruguay Round, developing countries have undertaken anti-dumping cases at a rate (per dollar of imports) three times higher than that for the United States--mostly against other developing countries.Economic Theory&Research,Rules of Origin,Export Competitiveness,Environmental Economics&Policies,Globalization and Financial Integration,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Rules of Origin,Export Competitiveness,World Trade Organization

Public sector efficiency: evidence for new EU member states and emerging markets

In this paper we analyse public sector efficiency in the new member states of the European Union compared to that in emerging markets. After a conceptual discussion of expenditure efficiency measurement issues, we compute efficiency scores and rankings by applying a range of measurement techniques. The study finds that expenditure efficiency across new EU member states is rather diverse especially as compared to the group of top performing emerging markets in Asia. Econometric analysis shows that higher income, civil service competence and education levels as well as the security of property rights seem to facilitate the prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector. JEL Classification: C14, H40, H50DEA, Efficiency, emerging markets, Government expenditure, new EU member states

The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact

Fiscal rules are instrumental for restraining deficit and spending biases in euro area Member States that could threaten the smooth functioning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Ideally, fiscal rules should combine characteristics such as sufficient flexibility to allow for appropriate policy choices with the necessary simplicity and enforceability to actually discipline government behaviour. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact established such a rules-based framework for fiscal polices in EMU. However, the implementation of the Pact was less than fully satisfactory. One year ago, the Pact was reviewed and a reformed version adopted which emphasises more flexible rules and procedures, including more explicit room for judgement and discretion than in its original form. While its proponents argued that these revisions would strengthen commitment and implementation of the rules, others emphasised the risk of weakening the EU fiscal framework. A year on from the SGP reform, this paper takes stock of how the EU fiscal rules have evolved and how they have been implemented from the Maastricht Treaty to the present day, including initial experiences with the implementation of the reformed Pact. The first indications are of a smoother and consistent implementation, but with consolidation requirements that are rather lenient while fiscal targets and projections point to only slow and back-loaded progress towards sound public finances in many countries. The assessment of the implementation of the revised rules is therefore mixed. It is of the essence that the provisions of the revised SGP be rigorously implemented in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. JEL Classification: E61, E62, H6.Stability and Growth Pact, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, EMU.