The public loss game: An experimental study of public bads

We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on gains, we observe significant order effects. When participants first play a treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing without punishment the contributions in the very first period of play determine the contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no comparable behavior. --public good,punishment,losses,experiment

Who cares about the balderdash I spouted yesterday? An experiment on the volatility of bargaining norms

When talking about possible bargaining results participants in the Nash bargaining game mainly use fairness norms to support their favored outcome. According to theory a variety of different, fair solutions exists from which the participants can choose. In this paper, we experimentally investigate Nash bargaining with a previous opportunity to chat about the bargaining outcome. We find that playing a dictator game prior to the Nash bargaining game establishes – without any additional communication – a fairness norm, the participants resort to. However, if nothing is played prior to the Nash bargaining game, participants discuss longer about what to play. In addition, we find that deviations in favor of one participant occur the longer preplay communication lasts

Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study

In repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior. --Public Good Game,Neighborhood,Cooperation,Experimental Analysis

Do hormones impact behavior in the minimum effort game? An experimental investigation of human behavior during the weakest link game after the administration of vasopressin

This paper describes an experimental study involving the minimum effort game. In this game, each player faces a trade-off between risk and payoff. Within each group, half of the subjects were administered with vasopressin in nasal spray form while half received a placebo. We found that subjects who received vasopressin were more likely to play the minimally risky strategy in the group and less likely to focus on payoff levels than those who received the placebo

What automaton model captures decision making? A call for finding a behavioral taxonomy of complexity

When investigating bounded rationality, economists favor finite-state automatons - for example the Mealy machine - and state complexity as a model for human decision making over other concepts. Finite-state automatons are a machine model, which are especially suited for (repetitions of) decision problems with limited strategy sets. In this paper, we argue that finite-state automatons do not suffice to capture human decision making when it comes to problems with infinite strategy sets, such as choice rules. To proof our arguments, we apply the concept of Turing machines to choice rules and show that rational choice has minimal complexity if choices are rationalizable, while complexity of rational choice dramatically increases if choices are no longer rationalizable. We conclude that modeling human behavior using space and time complexity best captures human behavior and suggest to introduce a behavioral taxonomy of complexity describing adequate boundaries for human capabilities

When proposers demand less without need Ultimatum bargaining in the loss domain

Subjects in the loss domain tend to split payoffs equally when bargaining. The ultimatum game offers an ideal mechanism through which economists can investigate whether equal splits are the consequence of proposer generosity or due to their anticipation that the responders will reject lower offers. This paper experimentally compares ultimatum bargaining in a loss domain with that under gains. The results reveal that, although responders do not expect more in the loss domain, proposers do make higher offers. As such, proposers reach agreements more often in the loss domain than they do in the gains domain, and responders receive higher payoffs

Perfusion of the interventricular septum during ventilation with positive end-expiratory pressure (PEEP)

Objective: To determine whether regional hypoperfusion of the interventricular septum occurs during ventilation with positive end-expiratory pressure. Design: Animal study. Animals: Anesthetized, closed chest dogs (n = 8). Interventions: Induction of experimental adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and then ventilation with 10,15, and 20 cm H2O of positive end-expiratory pressure. Measurements and Main Results: Cardiac output and regional interventricular septum blood flow 'were assessed at control, at induction of experimental ARDS, and at each level of positive end-expiratory pressure. Ventilation with 20 cm H2O of positive end-expiratory pressure decreased cardiac output (-32% vs. control, p <.05), and did not change absolute, but increased relative (to cardiac output) interventricular septum blood flow. During experimental ARDS and ventilation at 20 cm H2O end-expiratory pressure, there was a redistribution of flow toward the right ventricular free wall (+93%, p < .001) and the right ventricular part of the interventricular septum (+68%, p < .01), while flow to the left ventricular interventricular septum and to the left ventricular free wall remained unchanged. Locally hypoperfused interventricular septum areas or findings indicative of interventricular septum ischemia were not observed during positive end-expiratory pressure. Conclusions: The decrease in cardiac output during positive end-expiratory pressure is not caused by impaired interventricular septum blood supply. The preferential perfusion of the right ventricular interventricular septum indicates increased local right ventricular interventricular septum oxygen-demand and suggests that during positive end-expiratory pressure, this part of the interventricular septum functionally dissociates from the left ventricular interventricular septum and the left ventricular free wall to support the stressed right ventricle

When social preferences and anxiety drive behavior and vasopressin does not: An neuroeconomic analysis of vasopressin and the Hawk-Dove game

We delineated the causal influence of vasopressin on behavior in an iterated Hawk-Dove game. While subjects treated with vasopressin tend to be more aggressive in response to group members who did not coordinate on equilibrium instantaneously, this effect vanishes as soon as the subjects reach an equilibrium. More than vasopressin, social preferences and trait anxiety of the subjects predict the observed behavior

Myopic behavior and overall utility maximization - A study of linked hawks and doves

At present, in the domain of simultaneous action selection and network formation games, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not consistent. While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti- )co-ordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non-Nash) strategy profiles. One reason for this discrepancy is the tendency to model corresponding games as one-shot and derive predictions. In this paper, we calculate the equilibria for a finitely repeated version of the Hawk-Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition leads to additional sub-game perfect equilibria; namely, the efficient strategy profiles played by human subjects. However, efficiency crucially depends on the design of the game. This paper theoretically demonstrates that, although technically feasible, the efficient profiles are not sub-game perfect equilibria if actions are fixed after an initial period. We confirm this result using an experimental study that demonstrates how payoffs are higher if actions are never fixed