281 research outputs found
Rational ignorance is not bliss: When do lazy voters learn from decentralised policy experiments?
A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. We argue that such learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues if representativesâ actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. Decentralisation provides improved learning processes compared to unitary systems, but the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature.Policy decentralisation; fiscal competition; model uncertainty; collective learning.
Tax Morale, Leviathan and the Political Process: A Theoretical Approach
It is proposed that a more accurate predicition of tax evasion activity than in the standard portfolio-choice model can be derived even for risk-neutral individuals if psychological costs are considered. Contrary to earlier models integrating psychological costs they are systematically derived by assuming a relationship between cognitive dissonance, taxpayer satisfaction with public policy and taxes evaded. It is shown that this approach to modelling tax evasion can bridge a gap to the literature from economic psychology on the same topic by accounting for several influences that traditionally play a role there, but are neglected in the portfolio-choice model.
Appeasing Nihilists? Some Economic Thoughts on Reducing Terrorist Activity
Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti- terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.
Learning from Decentralised Policy: The Demand Side
A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentralisation offers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. We argue that such learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well particularly for complex issues if representatives' actions are tightly controlled by the electorate. Decentralisation provides improved learning processes compared to unitary systems, but the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge often described in the literature.This paper looks at competition in the telecommunication industry.Policy decentralisation, fiscal competition, model uncertainty, collective learning
What Do We Know About Geographical Knowledge Spillovers and Regional Growth? A Survey of the Literature
Modern (endogenous) growth theory tells us that knowledge spillovers are crucial for the growth of high-income economies. Against this background the paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical findings highlighting the question of how geographically limited knowledge diffusion can help to explain clusters of regions with persistently different levels of growth. The paper discusses this topic in two steps: First, the theoretical concept of knowledge spillovers is outlined by discussing the different types of knowledge, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, and the geographical mechanisms and structural conditions of knowledge diffusion. This discussion shows that the literature on knowledge spillovers focuses on the hypotheses that such spillovers lead to dynamic externalities and â in the geographical dimension â to agglomeration effects, both of which constitute path dependence in the economic growth of regions. Second, the paper analyses the empirical evidence for these theoretical findings. Existing empirical work mainly supports the theoretically derived hypotheses. This applies especially with focus on the spatial limited character of knowledge spillovers as well as the importance of knowledge transfer for regional productivity and innovative behaviour. --knowledge spillovers,regional growth,research and development,innovation,diffusion of innovations
The Impact of Referendums on the Centralisation of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.centralisation; direct democracy; representative democracy; public good provision.
The Impact of Referendums on the Centralisation of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.centralisation, direct democracy, representative democracy, public good provision
On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland
We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual preferences in two jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous. Under representative democracy, centralization is inefficiently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy centralization. Referendums thus restrict representativesâ ability for rent extraction. An empirical analysis using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 supports the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making.Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Referendums
Inequality and happiness: When perceived social mobility and economic reality do not match
In this paper, we revisit the association between happiness and inequality. We argue that the interaction between the perceived and the actual fairness of the income generation process affects this association. Building on a simple model of individual labor-market participation under uncertainty, we predict that higher levels of perceived fairness cause higher levels of utility, and lower preferred levels of income redistribution. In societies with a low level of actual social mobility, income inequality is perceived more negatively with increased perceived fairness, due to the need for unexpected policy changes as a response to many unsuccessful investments of overly optimistic individuals. This effect becomes smaller as actual social mobility increases. Using data on happiness and a broad set of fairness measures from the World Values Survey, we find strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the disappointment effect in countries with low social mobility. Consistent with our theoretical model, the results for high-mobility countries turn out to be ambiguous.Happiness; life satisfaction; subjective well-being; inequality; income distribution; redistribution; political ideology; justice; fairness; World Values Survey
- âŠ