The lender of last resort in the european single financial market

The paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EU’s financial-stability architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one EU Member State. The paper identifies challenges and possible ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture

Reform of the Global Financial Architecture

This paper examines the implications of the global financial crisis of 2007-10 for reform of the global financial architecture, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board and their interaction. These two institutions are not fully comparable, but they must work more closely in the future to help prevent global financial crises. To this end, the paper identifies institutional and substantive reforms separately and in their joint work that would be desirable and appropriate.International Monetary Fund, Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements, Group of Twenty, banking supervision and regulation, financial crises, financial stability, financial reform

Portfolio Diversification, Leverage, and Financial Contagion

This paper studies the extent to which basic principles of portfolio diversification explain "contagious selling" of financial assets when there are purely local shocks (e.g., a financial crisis in one country). The paper demonstrates that elementary portfolio theory offers key insights into "contagion." Most important, portfolio diversification and leverage are sufficient to explain why an investor will find it optimal to significantly reduce all risky asset positions when an adverse shock impacts just one asset. This result does not depend on margin calls: it applies to portfolios and institutions that rely on borrowed funds. The paper also shows that Value-at-Risk portfolio management rules do not have significantly different consequences for portfolio rebalancing than a variety of other rules. Copyright 2000, International Monetary Fund

Towards an EU Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability

Finanzmarktkrise, Internationaler Finanzmarkt, Kapitalmarktliberalisierung, Wirtschafts-politische Wirkungsanalyse, Regulierung, EU-Staaten, Financial crisis, International finan-cial market, Financial liberalization, Economic policy analysis, Regulation, EU countries

Defining Financial Stability and a Framework for Safeguarding It

Financial stability is as important a policy objective as maintaining monetary stability if economic growth and stability are to be achieved and sustained. A prerequisite for more effective official oversight is the development and implementation of a better framework for assessing the ability of the financial system to perform its key economic functions, i.e. matching needs of savers and investors, providing transactions and payments services; risk pricing, spreading, sharing, and management; and the production, processing, and monitoring of information. However, the ultimate goal is sustained economic growth, stability, and prosperity. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to discuss a definition of financial stability and a framework for policy analysis more closely aligned with economic processes and efficiency; and second, to examine the implications and challenges for assessing systemic risk and the safeguarding of financial-system stability.

Financial Stability and Policy Cooperation

Within the context of the Global Crisis, this paper examines the ongoing policy challenges in establishing a European framework for financial regulation and supervision. We do so taking into account the evidence provided during the crisis of pervasive spillover effects and cross-country interdependence. The paper applies game-theoretic models as tools to think about the cross-country aspects of European financial integration over time. Specifically, the paper applies the economic theory of alliances of Olson and Zechauser (1966) and the private provision of public goods of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). We contrast the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium allocation with cooperative (Coase) outcomes. The latter can be expected to obtain under zero transaction costs. We follow Coase in taking zero transaction costs as a benchmark to examine the factors that may favor (or hinder) cooperation in specific circumstances. We consider the importance of iterated interactions through the theory of repeated games, case studies, and experimental evidence to identify factors favoring or hindering successful cooperation. The total number of participants, time, foresight, multiple equilibria, leadership, the magnitude and volatility of gains and losses, imperfect and asymmetric information, decision and bargaining costs, monitoring, and enforcement are all important factors. In the paper we stress the importance of an institutional approach that minimizes obstacles to reaching cooperative outcomes. We highlight the need for effective procedures to deal with systemic risk, an agreed set of rules underpinning the single European financial market (e.g. state aid rules and a single rule book), and effective restructuring, resolution and crisis management mechanisms.

Reform of the global financial architecture

This paper examines the implications of the global financial crisis of 2007-10 for reform of the global financial architecture, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board and their interaction. These two institutions are not fully comparable, but they must work more closely in the future to help prevent global financial crises. To this end, the paper identifies institutional and substantive reforms separately and in their joint work that would be desirable and appropriate