Agenda for Building a New Financial Market Architecture

Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 2008, resolved to "ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." However, the elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities and limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to protect the financial system

Are Women More Credit-Constrained than Men? Evidence from a Rising Credit Market

This study investigates whether gender discrimination is taking place in an innovative credit market known as peer-to-peer lending. Based on the data of the largest German peer-to-peer lending platform, we observe that female borrowers pay on average higher interest rates than males despite the fact that the two gender groups do not differ with respect to their credit risk. Our analysis shows however that this interest rate gap doesn't emerge because of discrimination against female borrowers. In all probability, female borrowers deliberately offer higher interest rates in anticipation that they would be otherwise discriminated

Is the willingness to take financial risk a sex-linked trait? Evidence from national surveys of household finance

We investigate whether the willingness to take investment risk is a sex-linked trait and link the results to the country's gender equality regime. Our empirical analysis involves household data on financial asset holdings as well as on self-reported risk tolerance for Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Of those countries, Italy is by far the country with the greatest degree of gender inequality according to the 2009 Global Gender Gap Report. Two stages of building a portfolio of financial assets are analyzed. For the first-stage decision of whether to invest in risky assets in the first place, gender is found to have no effect in Austria, the Netherlands and Spain but does have an impact in Italy. However, even for Italy, it seems to be irrelevant in the second-stage decision about the share of wealth invested in the risky assets. We infer from these findings that, for countries with a high degree of gender equality, it is inappropriate to base financial advice primarily on gender

Chiral Polaritonics: Analytical Solutions, Intuition, and Use

Preferential selection of a given enantiomer over its chiral counterpart has become increasingly relevant in the advent of the next era of medical drug design. In parallel, cavity quantum electrodynamics has grown into a solid framework to control energy transfer and chemical reactivity, the latter requiring strong coupling. In this work, we derive an analytical solution to a system of many chiral emitters interacting with a chiral cavity similar to the widely used Tavis-Cummings and Hopfield models of quantum optics. We are able to estimate the discriminating strength of chiral polaritonics, discuss possible future development directions and exciting applications such as elucidating homochirality, and deliver much needed intuition to foster the newly flourishing field of chiral polaritonics

Bad bank(s) and recapitalization of the banking sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a work publicly sponsored work out units, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues

Are private equity investors good or evil?

The paper investigates the motives of activity (entry and exit) of Private Equity (PE) investors in European companies. Investment of a PE firm is not viewed unambiguously. First, it is claimed that PE investment is made for the sake of seeking short-term gains by taking control and utilizing the company's resources. Second, a PE firm invests because of prior identification of chances to add value to the company. We attempt to resolve these two conflicting conjectures. We use the Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database of very large, large and medium-sized European companies. Our major results can be summarized as follows. First, PE firms are less willing to enter the firm if there is already a blocking majority, and they are more likely to leave the firm if control cannot be overtaken. Second, less mature firms are less able to lure a PE firm to invest, thus indicating a safe strategy of PE investors. Third, we do not find empirical evidence that a PE investor comes in to strip a firm of its equity. On the other hand, PE investors are likely to leave the company if it deteriorates in terms of returns and cash. Finally, when comparing the activity of PE and other financial investors, we find essential differences in choosing the field and environment of activity

A How-To Guide for Mode of Action Analysis of Antimicrobial Peptides

Antimicrobial peptides (AMPs) are a promising alternative to classical antibiotics in the fight against multi-resistant bacteria. They are produced by organisms from all domains of life and constitute a nearly universal defense mechanism against infectious agents. No drug can be approved without information about its mechanism of action. In order to use them in a clinical setting, it is pivotal to understand how AMPs work. While many pore-forming AMPs are well-characterized in model membrane systems, non-pore-forming peptides are often poorly understood. Moreover, there is evidence that pore formation may not happen or not play a role in vivo. It is therefore imperative to study how AMPs interact with their targets in vivo and consequently kill microorganisms. This has been difficult in the past, since established methods did not provide much mechanistic detail. Especially, methods to study membrane-active compounds have been scarce. Recent advances, in particular in microscopy technology and cell biological labeling techniques, now allow studying mechanisms of AMPs in unprecedented detail. This review gives an overview of available in vivo methods to investigate the antibacterial mechanisms of AMPs. In addition to classical mode of action classification assays, we discuss global profiling techniques, such as genomic and proteomic approaches, as well as bacterial cytological profiling and other cell biological assays. We cover approaches to determine the effects of AMPs on cell morphology, outer membrane, cell wall, and inner membrane properties, cellular macromolecules, and protein targets. We particularly expand on methods to examine cytoplasmic membrane parameters, such as composition, thickness, organization, fluidity, potential, and the functionality of membrane-associated processes. This review aims to provide a guide for researchers, who seek a broad overview of the available methodology to study the mechanisms of AMPs in living bacteria

Are Private Equity Investors Good or Evil?

The paper investigates the motives of activity (entry and exit) of Private Equity (PE) investors in European companies. Investment of a PE firm is not viewed unambiguously. First, it is claimed that PE investment is made for the sake of seeking shortterm gains by taking control and utilizing the company's resources. Second, a PE firm invests because of prior identification of chances to add value to the company. We attempt to resolve these two conflicting conjectures. We use the Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database of very large, large and medium-sized European companies. Our major results can be summarized as follows. First, PE firms are less willing to enter the firm if there is already a blocking majority, and they are more likely to leave the firm if control cannot be overtaken. Second, less mature firms are less able to lure a PE firm to invest, thus indicating a safe strategy of PE investors. Third, we do not find empirical evidence that a PE investor comes in to strip a firm of its equity. On the other hand, PE investors are likely to leave the company if it deteriorates in terms of returns and cash. Finally, when comparing the activity of PE and other financial investors, we find essential differences in choosing the field and environment of activity

Does the tenure of private equity investment improve the performance of European firms?

The paper investigates whether the presence and tenure of Private Equity (PE) investment in European companies improves their performance. Previous studies documented the unambiguous merit of a buyout during the 1980s and 1990s for listed firms in the US and UK markets. This study analyzes such influences in both listed and unlisted European firms during 2002-2007. Our analysis suggests that shortterm PE investments have, on average, a detrimental effect on firm performance. The performance of a firm that has PE backing is lower than that of a firm without PE backing in the first year of PE investment. Such an effect disappears if PE investments remain in the firm for an uninterrupted six-year term