Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), i.e. their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in teams setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts, the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is suficiently high and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is suficiently low

When\u27s the Payoff?: A Narrative Inquiry into Adjunct Faculty Experiences

This narrative inquiry sought to understand how adjunct faculty negotiated professorial identity and institutional belongingness after failed tenure-track interview processes when those same adjunct faculty continue to teach on that same campus or within that same district that did not offer them a tenure-track position. Two adjuncts teaching within a multi-campus California community college district shared their verbal stories as a means to further understand their experiences related to the research questions. Their narratives suggested that (1) the phase in their career and how the tenure-track experience was framed, impacted their professorial identity and (2) reflecting on various college professional development experiences influenced their perception of institutional belonging. Participants’ narratives indicated areas for practice, which include transparency in tenure-track hiring processes. Furthermore, it would benefit the institution as well as adjunct faculty to re-socialize the adjunct faculty who were not offered tenure-track positions, which follows Levine and Moreland’s (1994) group socialization model

The Treatment of Sexual Violence and Reclaimed Agency in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece

This project explores Shakespeare’s treatment of rape and sexual violence in Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece through close reading, analysis, and discussion of relevant source material. Critiques of Shakespeare that center around his perceived anti-feminist convictions tend to focus on his morbidly comical depictions of rape and violence against female victims. However, despite their position as victims, Lavinia in Titus Andronicus and Lucrece in The Rape of Lucrece reclaim revenge on their attackers. Shakespeare deliberately lends his literary eloquence to Lavinia and Lucrece, enabling them to partly avenge the crimes done unto them. By representing these characters as literate women, Shakespeare allows Lavinia and Lucrece to become more than abject victims. Lavinia and Lucrece fight back against the patriarchal structures which would deny them the capacity to resist the wrongs done unto them

Orangutan Infant Behavior: A Critical Component for Primate Conservation

Orangutans, Pongo sp., are one of the four genera of the great apes (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan, and Homo). Orangutans are often differentiated from the other apes for their bright red fur. However, there are many factors which separate them from the other Great Apes. They are the only Asian great ape, residing in Indonesia and Malaysia, on the islands of Borneo and Sumatra. Orangutans are semi-solitary, arboreal brachiators, meaning that they live primarily alone and travel via swinging through trees (Thorpe and Crompton 2006). This allows them to cover a vast area in search for food. Adult orangutans require a large amount of fruit each day to survive and to reproduce efficiently (Thorpe and Crompton 2006). By living alone, orangutans are able to reduce food competition. Their requirement for a large habitat and resources has made orangutans highly susceptible to environmental threats. Similar to the other great apes, all species of orangutans range from endangered to critically endangered with approximately 112,000 total orangutans left in the wild (WWF 2017)

African American Culture in Historical Art Museums: Remembering a Buried Tragic Past

The transparency of reality reflecting in art often represents a false tragedy in African American history because of the lack of preservation and representation due to a predominantly white dominion, ultimately leaving the veracity of their history to consign to oblivion. There is a common thread of forgetfulness with the retrieval of art in today’s society that embodies the African American community. Although artist Fred Wilson does not explicitly assert his assessment to the lack of black representation on account of cultural differences, he vocalizes how African American culture is indoctrinated to the public in a white, supremacist national narrative which labels misconceived notions of African culture. The purpose of historical museums is to teach visitors culture through historical truth. In spite of that, many art institutions have alternatively debased African American culture because of the founding board’s predominantly white background. To change the ideas curated by museums, Fred Wilson, an art activist, recontextualizes objects to highlight cultural differences through the utilization of installation framing. By juxtaposing Western imperialism’s flawed depiction of African culture to the authenticity of their traditions, Wilson confronts history and racial biases by recognizing the need to reveal and advocate the tragedy and truth of African American culture

Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), i.e. their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in teams setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts, the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is suficiently high and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is suficiently low