Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information

Recruitment is often delegated to senior employees. Delegated recruitment, however, is vulnerable to moral hazard because senior employees may avoid recruiting the best candidates who could threaten their future seniority. We find that seniors will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to the candidates’ ‘type’. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering ‘tenure’ or guaranteed seniority to the senior employee is neither always desirable for the owner nor necessary to ensure good recruitment. If there is information asymmetry between the owner and the senior employee regarding additional aspects of firm operations, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure may be needed to ensure that the best candidate is selected. Offering tenure may then be desirable for the owner.recruitment, delegation, moral hazard, long term contract

Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information

Recruitment is often delegated to senior employees. Delegated recruitment, however, is vulnerable to moral hazard because senior employees may avoid recruiting the best candidates who could threaten their future seniority. We find that seniors will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to the candidates' type'. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering tenure' or guaranteed seniority to the senior employee is neither always desirable for the owner nor necessary to ensure good recruitment. If there is information asymmetry between the owner and the senior employee regarding additional aspects of firm operations, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure may be needed to ensure that the best candidate is selected. Offering tenure may then be desirable for the owner

Correlates of Distress Financing In Case of Institutional Delivery In India: Evidence From The National Family Health Survey

Using data from NFHS-4, this study examines the progressiveness of out-of-pocket spending and health financing methods used in the case of institutional delivery in India. We used concentration indices to arrive at some intriguing results. Applying Multinomial Logit Model we focus on how various socio-economic factors play crucial role in making choice among alternative distress financing options. Unlike other studies, we find that as women get older, they often arrange for money by selling jewelries for health purpose. This is equally true for women with a secondary education. They also rely on other strategies like saving and selling. In case of different social division in Indian society, the SCs and the OBCs are found to be more susceptible to distress financing. In spite of some government initiatives like Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) the problem of out- of- pocket expenditure related distress has not been reduced substantially. In our opinion this is a policy failure. In order to address this problem a concerted effort from both demand and supply side should be made available