The Earned Income Tax Credit and Reported Self-Employment Income

The Earned Income Tax Credit subsidizes earnings from both the wage sector and the self-employment sector. This paper uses tax return data to investigate how the EITC affects the reporting of self-employment income to the IRS. A difference-in-difference strategy is used, considering three expansions in the EITC and comparing changes across filers with and without children. The expansions are predicted to increase the reporting of self-employment income for those in the phase-in region of the EITC and to reduce the reporting of self-employment income for those in the phase-out region. Among the lowest-income filers, the 1994 EITC expansion is associated with a significant increase in the probability of reporting positive self-employment income, equal to 3.2 percentage points for unmarried filers and 4.1 percentage points for married filers.EITC, self-employment

Tax Preferences for Higher Education and Adult College Enrollment

The federal government delivers substantial college aid through the tax code, after introducing education tax credits in 1998 and a tuition deduction in 2002. The design of the Lifetime Learning tax credit and the tuition deduction may make them particularly useful to older students. This paper investigates how these provisions have affected college attendance of individuals in their 30s and 40s. For most adults, there is no effect on college attendance. Among men whose 1998 educational attainment falls short of earlylife educational expectations, eligibility for an education tax preference is associated with a 2.5 to 3.4 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance.college finance, education tax credits, and college enrollment

The Value of Honesty: Empirical Estimates from the Case of the Missing Children

How much are people willing to forego to be honest, to follow the rules? When people do break the rules, what can standard data sources tell us about their behavior? Standard economic models of crime typically assume that individuals are indifferent to dishonesty, so that they will cheat or lie as long as the expected pecuniary benefits exceed the expected costs of being caught and punished. We investigate this presumption by studying the response to a change in tax reporting rules that made it much more difficult for taxpayers to evade taxes by inappropriately claiming additional dependents. The policy reform induced a substantial reduction in the number of dependents claimed, which indicates that many filers had been cheating before the reform. Yet, the number of filers who availed themselves of this evasion opportunity is dwarfed by the number of filers who passed up substantial tax savings by not claiming extra dependents. By declining the opportunity to cheat, these taxpayers reveal information about their willingness to pay to be honest. We present a novel method for inferring the characteristics of taxpayers in the absence of audit data. Our analysis suggests both that this willingness to pay to be honest is large on average and that it varies significantly across the population of taxpayers.Tax evasion, compliance, honesty, dependent exemption

The EITC, Tax Refunds, and Unemployment Spells

The Earned Income Tax Credit generates large average tax refunds for low-income parents, and these refunds are distributed in a narrow time frame. I rely on this plausibly exogenous source of variation in liquidity to investigate the effect of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration. Among EITC-eligible women, unemployment spells beginning just after tax refund receipt last longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year. There is no evidence that tax refund receipt is associated with longer unemployment duration for men, or that the longer durations for women are associated with higher-quality subsequent job matches.Tax evasion, compliance, honesty, dependent exemption

The Value of Honesty: Empirical Estimates from the Case of the Missing Children

How much are people willing to forego to be honest, to follow the rules? When people do break the rules, what can standard data sources tell us about their behavior? Standard economic models of crime typically assume that individuals are indifferent to dishonesty, so that they will cheat or lie as long as the expected pecuniary benefits exceed the expected costs of being caught and punished. We investigate this presumption by studying the response to a change in tax reporting rules that made it much more difficult for taxpayers to evade taxes by inappropriately claiming additional dependents. The policy reform induced a substantial reduction in the number of dependents claimed, which indicates that many filers had been cheating before the reform. Yet, the number of filers who availed themselves of this evasion opportunity is dwarfed by the number of filers who passed up substantial tax savings by not claiming extra dependents. By declining the opportunity to cheat, these taxpayers reveal information about their willingness to pay to be honest. We present a novel method for inferring the characteristics of taxpayers in the absence of audit data. Our analysis suggests both that this willingness to pay to be honest is large on average and that it varies significantly across the population of taxpayers.

The Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the District of Columbia on Poverty and Income Dynamics

Using unique longitudinal administrative tax panel data for the District of Columbia (DC), we assess the combined effect of the DC supplemental earned income tax credit (EITC) and the federal EITC on poverty and income dynamics within Washington, DC, from 2001 to 2011. The EITC in DC merits investigation, as the DC supplement to the federal credit is the largest in the nation. The supplemental DC EITC was enacted in 2000, and has been expanded from 10 percent of the federal credit in 2001 to 40 percent as of 2009. To implement the study, we estimate least squares models with 0/1 dependent variables to estimate the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty and near-poverty thresholds. We also estimate the likelihood of earnings growth and income stabilization from the EITC. To identify the effect of the EITC, we exploit variation in the EITC subsidy rate from 2008 to 2009, when an additional EITC bracket of 45 percent was added for workers with three or more dependent children, up from 40 percent in the previous year for workers with two or more children. We also estimate a model examining the impact of city-level changes to the EITC. The structure and richness of our data enable us to control for tax filer fixed effects, an important innovation from many previous EITC studies. Overall, we find that the combined EITC raises the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty and near poverty by as much as 9 percent, with the largest consistent effects accruing to single-parent families

Tax Refunds and Unemployment Spells

In this economic climate, understanding the mechanisms through which aid to the unemployed affects job search behavior is particularly important. Recent research suggests that the level of cash-on-hand available to the unemployed is an important determinant of labor market behavior. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) generates substantial seasonal variation in cash-on-hand and produces large average tax refunds for recipients. In addition these refunds are distributed in a very narrow time frame. This project will take advantage of this plausibly exogenous variation in cash-on-hand, investigating how recent receipt of a tax refund influences the job search behavior of the unemployed. The empirical strategy will compare demographically similar EITC-eligible individuals who enter into unemployment at different times of the year, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)

The Effects of Joint Taxation of Married Couples on Labor Supply and Non-wage Income

The United States changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948, from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit. The switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership. This paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation, taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross-state variation in property laws. Married individuals in states with community property laws had always been taxed as if each spouse had earned half of the couple's income, and thus were unaffected by the 1948 legal change. Comparing the behavior of taxpayers in affected and unaffected states indicates that the tax change is associated with a decline of 0.9-1.6 percentage points in the labor force participation rate of married women, consistent with the higher first-dollar tax rates they faced after 1948. Married women were also 0.6-1.9 percentage points less likely to have non-wage income after 1948, reflecting pre-1948 allocation of family assets to wives for tax purposes. The effects of joint taxation on married men's labor force participation and non-wage income holding are generally not statistically significant.joint taxation, labor supply, income shifting

The EITC, Tax Refunds, and Unemployment Spells

The Earned Income Tax Credit generates large average tax refunds for low-income parents, and these refunds are distributed in a narrow time frame. I rely on this plausibly exogenous source of variation in liquidity to investigate the effect of cash-on-hand on unemployment duration. Among EITC-eligible women, unemployment spells beginning just after tax refund receipt last longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year. There is no evidence that tax refund receipt is associated with longer unemployment duration for men, or that the longer durations for women are associated with higher-quality subsequent job matches. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has grown to be an important part of the safety net for low-income families. In 2003, EITC-recipient households received payments averaging $150 per family per month, while the average TANF-recipient household received$140 in monthly welfare benefits and the average food stamp participant got benefits of $80 per month (Congressional Budget Office 2005). Although most transfer programs deliver benefits in periodic payments spread over time, EITC payments typically arrive in one annual lump sum. Beverly