805 research outputs found
Contests â A comparison of timing and information structures
We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestantsâ types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Regarding the
information structure, the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information
Contests â A comparison of timing and information structures
We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestantsâ types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Regarding the information structure, the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information.sequential contests; asymmetric information; rent-seeking
Do Women Have More Shame than Men? An Experiment on Self-Assessment and the Shame of Overestimating Oneself
We analyze how subjectsâ self-assessment depends on whether its accuracy is observable to others. We find that women downgrade their selfassessment given observability while men do not. Women avoid the shame they may have if others observe that they overestimated themselves. Men, however, do not seem to be similarly shame-averse. This gender difference may be due to different societal expectations: While we find that men are expected to be overconfident, women are not. Shame-aversion may explain recent findings that women shy away from competition, demanding jobs and
wage negotiations, as entering these situations is a statement to be confident of oneâs ability
Do You Know That I Am Biased? An Experiment
This experiment explores whether individuals know that other people are biased. We confirm that overestimation of abilities is a pervasive problem, but observe that most people are not aware of it, i.e. they think others are unbiased. We investigate several explanations for this result. As a first one, we discuss a possible unfamiliarity with the task and the subjects' inability to distinguish between random mistakes and a real bias. Â Second, we show how the relation between a subject's belief about others and his belief about himself might be driven by a false consensus effect or self-correction mechanism. Third, we identify a self-serving bias when comparing how a subject evaluates his own and other people's biases.Bias, Overconfidence, Beliefs, Experimental Economics, Self-Serving Bias
Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute
terms
On the Positive Effects of Overcon fident Self-Perception in Teams
In this paper, we study the individual payoff effects of overconfident self-perception in teams. In particular, we demonstrate that the welfare of an overconfident agent in a team of one rational and one overconfident agent or a team of two overconfident agents can be higher than that of the
members of a team of two rational agents. This result holds irrespective of the assumption about the agents' awareness of their colleague's bias. Moreover, we show that an overcondent agent is always better of when he is unaware of a potential bias of his colleague
On the Positive Effects of Overcon fident Self-Perception in Teams
In this paper, we study the individual payoff effects of overconfident self-perception in teams. In particular, we demonstrate that the welfare of an overconfident agent in a team of one rational and one overconfident agent or a team of two overconfident agents can be higher than that of the members of a team of two rational agents. This result holds irrespective of the assumption about the agents' awareness of their colleague's bias. Moreover, we show that an overcondent agent is always better of when he is unaware of a potential bias of his colleague.Overconfidence; Team Production
Livestock Husbandry between Ethics and Economics: Finding a Feasible Way Out by Target Costing?
Livestock husbandry is a major line of conflict in many industrialized countries. Farmers are caught in a dilemma between ethical considerations imposed by, for instance, nongovernmental organizations and the wider public on the one hand and competitive and economic pressures on the other. In this paper we use a target-costing approach to determine whether it is possible to implement more animal-friendly husbandry conditions for turkey fattening in Germany without sacrificing competitiveness. Empirical results show that, at first glance, the willingness on the part of consumers to pay for more animal welfare exceeds the costs to farmers of more animal-friendly husbandry systems. A critical discussion reveals that this result may be flawed by methodological problems for which no solutions have yet been found.animal welfare, livestock husbandry, target costing, willingness to pay, Livestock Production/Industries, D12, D63, Q12,
Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute terms.Overconfidence; Contests
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