Was bin Laden's Killing Lawful?

There is no abstract for this ite

Sorry Pope, It Hasn't Worked

There is no abstract available for this ite

A Hybrid Conservatorship Model for Greece?

There is no abstract available for this ite

Another Opportunity in Afghanistan

Opinion articl

Time Pakistan Called Halt on Double Game

There is no abstract available for this ite

Russia's Islamic time bomb

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From Darfur to Sinai to Kashmir: The Case for Legalization

This Article analyzes peace agreements in regions with a history of ethno-religious conflicts to determine if there are correlations between the form and substance of the agreements and their successful implementation. For purposes of comparison, I examine several agreements between India and Pakistan, the historic agreement between Israel and Egypt, and the Darfur Peace Agreement, as exemplars of similar conflict situations where a study of agreement design has salience. I endeavour to apply the legalization theory articulated by Kenneth Abbott, et al., to test the explanatory power of the obligation-precision-delegation matrix. [FN1] The Kashmir dispute has raged on for over five decades and has consumed thousands of lives making the region one of the most dangerous conflict zones in the modern world. [FN2] The terrible price, both in terms of human lives and defense expenditures, has not made much of an impact in pushing the parties towards finding a peaceful solution. [FN3] This *404 indifference to cost is not unique--several other dyads that are deeply sundered by ethnic and religious divisions share the same disregard for human suffering with the same devastating consequences. [FN4] The fragility of peace in these conflict zones and the fluctuation of rhetoric depending on the regime in power have meant that hope for a peaceful settlement is slim, [FN5] which might explain the shortage of significant attention to the analysis of such peace negotiations and agreements by legal scholars. The closed and secret nature of the negotiations and the low involvement of the legal community in them have contributed to this state of affairs. One consequence of such indifference has been the repetition of the same features in agreements despite evidence of failure. The scholarly community has to analyze the agreements to unearth avenues that can maximize the probability of better outcomes if the situation is to improve. [FN6] Scholarly attention to the design and structure of agreements between these parties can help us to understand whether there is a correlation between the choice of form and substance and their successful implementation. [FN7] Legal scholars have deferred for too long to the view that politics, rather than *405 law, is the answer to these disputes. This deference is fundamentally flawed and an examination of the agreements using legalization theory may help to bridge the gap between law and politics. It will cast light on the role of law in solving disputes characterized by ethno-religious hatreds, and will demonstrate that contract-like forms are preferable for agreement design. I analyze agreements between India and Pakistan, Israel and Egypt, and the Darfur Peace Agreement, to demonstrate that agreements that are high on the precision-obligation-delegation matrix enjoy higher degrees of success than those that are low on this matrix when concluded in dispute scenarios involving ethno-religious conflicts. I conclude by arguing that India and Pakistan should aim for hard legalization to solve the Kashmir dispute, and that they must learn from the painful experience of the Darfur Peace Agreement and include non-state actors as signatories to any agreement

Changing social norms and CEO pay: the role of norms entrepreneurs

There is an overwhelming sense of outrage and anger at perceived excesses in CEO compensation ensuring regular coverage in the popular press, and making it, arguably, the most pressing question in current corporate law. There is scarcely a day when institutional shareholders, labor unions, politicians, and small investors are not calling for action to address this alleged menace. Inevitably, the heightened scrutiny and often shrill advocacy has contributed to the apparent disesteem for CEOs, with some polls showing that only seventeen percent of the public expect CEOs to tell the truth, in contrast with twenty-five percent for members of the U.S. Congress. This state of affairs has fuelled a vigorous debate about the desirability of regulatory intervention to address the problem, with no discernible agreement about the nature and extent of regulation. The populist nature of the cause has prompted politicians to enter the fray and recent years have seen activity in Congress and the SEC. Parallel to these developments, norms entrepreneurs have been active in creating social norms and enforcing them with social sanctions, with some modicum of success, suggesting that regulatory intervention might be premature until the ramifications of these actions are better understood.6 There is some evidence of apparent declines in executive compensation following the secondary enforcement of social norms. If existing social norms can be leveraged or new norms can be created, the behavioral change necessary for constraining CEO greed might be attained at a lower cost. This is salient in corporate law since the experience with legal sanctions has not been particularly satisfactory. The law might also interact with social norms in salutary ways, a perception that might explain the efforts by norms entrepreneurs and other actors to seek legislative intervention

Banks must help solve the lurking crisis in mortgage defaults

Opinion articl

Transnational commercial law: the way forward

This Article seeks to examine the impelling need for the creation of international rules to govern international commerce, the motivations thereof, and international experience in that regard. No nation is immune from the need to craft solutions of an international nature to govern its interactions with others. This need extends across the spectrum from systems as evolved as the United States to those of some African nations. Distrust can only be overcome in the presence of rules that are formulated by the international community. The following pages examine these issues in the context of two international instruments: the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG") and the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment ("CIIME")