What Is the Future of European Cyber Security? Three Principles of European Cooperation and the Hybrid Joint Strategy of Cyber Defence

The author argues that EU member states should pursue a joint strategy of cyber security and cyber defence. This claim does not immediately imply support for current EU legislation, in particular for enforcing the NIS Directive or the operation of ENISA in its currently planned capacity. Instead, three principles of European cooperation are discussed and followed by a proposal to centre the joint strategic effort around promoting and explicating the practical and procedural consequences of these principles. A bottom-up approach to joining and uniformization of European cyber defence is presented, aligned with the notion of Europeanization in security policy in the sense of E. Gross and R. Ladrech. This approach requires that European cyber security agencies, including ENISA, focus their efforts on addressing the trust defi cit among the member states through facilitating the environment for safe information exchange, instead of communicating with the member states through the medium of regulations and prescribing security standards. More generally, the author postulates that the European authorities embrace the inherent political character of international trust-building and aspire to the role of mediator, as opposed to presenting themselves as apolitical agents focused on the purely technical aspects of European cyber security

A non-transitive relevant implication corresponding to classical logic consequence

In this paper we first develop a logic independent account of relevant implication. We propose a stipulative denition of what it means for a multiset of premises to relevantly L-imply a multiset of conclusions, where L is a Tarskian consequence relation: the premises relevantly imply the conclusions iff there is an abstraction of the pair <premises, conclusions> such that the abstracted premises L-imply the abstracted conclusions and none of the abstracted premises or the abstracted conclusions can be omitted while still maintaining valid L-consequence.          Subsequently we apply this denition to the classical logic (CL) consequence relation to obtain NTR-consequence, i.e. the relevant CL-consequence relation in our sense, and develop a sequent calculus that is sound and complete with regard to relevant CL-consequence. We present a sound and complete sequent calculus for NTR. In a next step we add rules for an object language relevant implication to thesequent calculus. The object language implication reflects exactly the NTR-consequence relation. One can see the resulting logic NTR-> as a relevant logic in the traditional sense of the word.       By means of a translation to the relevant logic R, we show that the presented logic NTR is very close to relevance logics in the Anderson-Belnap-Dunn-Routley-Meyer tradition. However, unlike usual relevant logics, NTR is decidable for the full language, Disjunctive Syllogism (A and ~AvB relevantly imply B) and Adjunction (A and B relevantly imply A&B) are valid, and neither Modus Ponens nor the Cut rule are admissible

Citizens' cybersecurity in the Visegrad Group

In the programme of the Slovak presidency in the V4 Group from 2014 we find the following desiderata related to enhancing the growth of V4's digital economy: the Slovak Presidency focuses on protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in connection with the use of information and communication infrastructure in order to harmonize the approaches taken by V4 countries.1 This paper will present the legislative and political examples which stand to show that none of the desiderata has been properly pursued since 2014 by the Slovak presidency, or made up for by the Czech (2015-2016) and Polish (2017-2018) presidencies in the Visegrad Group

Violation of privacy in migration control decreases citizens' liberties and public accountability

In this paper I explore the infl uence of the state’s approach to foreigners (migrant or nonmigrant) on the rule of law within the receiving country, limiting my considerations to the problem of protecting the right to privacy. My key argument is that normalizing infringement on the privacy of foreigners, for example due to a certain recurrent ‘state of emergency’, leads to weakening of the execution of privacy protection by means of ground-level regulations. I begin by analyzing the diff erence between the right to privacy and privacy laws, and proceed to make this diff erence clearer by analyzing the foundations of privacy protection in two distinct legal systems, i.e. that of Poland and the USA. Then, I present the similarities and diff erences in treating the foreigners and the citizens of a country using the example of mass surveillance. These observations lead to proposing an answer to the following question: why are foreigners treated diff erently in the context of privacy? Finally, I describe the nature of the aforementioned ‘state of emergency’ and get into more detail on the relationship between security and privacy infringement. The key point of this paper will be made by describing the process of weakening the citizens’ privacy protection by using the regulations and technology developed for the sake of alleviating the ‘state of emergency’ related to the foreigners

How is political privacy different from personal privacy? : an argument from democratic governance

In this paper I discuss the political value of the right to privacy. The classical accounts of privacy do not differentiate between privacy as the right of a citizen against other citizens vs. the right to privacy as the right against the state or the government. I shall argue that this distinction should be made, since the new context of the privacy debate has surpassed the historical frames in which the intelligence methods used by governments were comparable to those available to individuals. I also present cases in which political privacy serves as an instrument of protecting important collective agendas exceeding the context of personal privacy. I argue that due to its function, political privacy should be considered a necessary element of democratic governance with the rule of law, imposing legal bounds on governments’ discretionary actions