Marriage, adaptation and happiness: Are there long-lasting gains to marriage?

This paper uses 23 waves of German panel data and investigates if individuals who decide to marry become permanently happier. Following the same persons over several years we show that they do, thereby challenging a number of recent longitudinal studies in psychology and economics which suggest that individuals fully adapt to the positive impact of marriage. We then convert the estimates into Euro values. It is well known that most newlyweds experience a 'honeymoon period' shortly after marriage. We calculate the monetary equivalent of being married for five years to avoid overestimation due to this honeymoon effect. These long-run monetary benefits are quite large, e.g. for males on average 85,000 Euros a year. This supports the findings by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004, Journal of Public Economics) which are based on cross-sectional data

The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Patriotism and Tax Compliance

We study the effects of patriotism on tax compliance. In particular, we assume that individuals feel a (random draw of) warm glow from honestly paying their taxes. A higher expected warm glow reduces the government's optimal audit probability and yields higher tax compliance. Second, individuals with higher warm glow are less likely to evade taxes. This prediction is confirmed empirically by a multivariate analysis on the individual level while controlling for several other potentially confounding factors. The findings survive a variety of robustness checks, including an instrumental variables estimation to tackle the possible endogeneity of patriotism. On the aggregate level, we provide evidence for a negative correlation between average patriotic warm glow and the size of the shadow economy across several countries.patriotism, tax evasion, warm glow

The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?

We study the effects of patriotism on tax compliance. In particular, we assume that individuals feel a (random draw of) warm glow from honestly paying their taxes. A higher expected warm glow reduces the government's optimal audit probability and yields higher tax compliance. Second, individuals with higher warm glow are less likely to evade taxes. This prediction is confirmed empirically by a multivariate analysis on the individual level while controlling for several other potentially confounding factors. The findings survive a variety of robustness checks, including an instrumental variables estimation to tackle the possible endogeneity of patriotism. On the aggregate level, we provide evidence for a negative correlation between average patriotic warm glow and the size of the shadow economy across several countries.Ob ein Individuum versucht, durch falsche Angaben gegenüber den Steuerbehörden die persönliche Steuerlast zu reduzieren, hängt sowohl von "monetären" als auch von nicht-monetären Faktoren ab. Monetäre Faktoren sind vor allem die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein versuchter Betrug aufgedeckt wird, und die Höhe der Strafzahlung. Wir untersuchen zunächst theoretisch, wie Patriotismus (Heimatbindung) als ein nicht-monetärer Faktor die Steuerehrlichkeit beeinflusst. Personen mit gleichem Einkommen, aber höherer Heimatbindung, geben auch mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit ihr Einkommen korrekt an. Weiterhin führt eine Erhöhung der durchschnittlichen Heimatbindung über die gesamte Steuerbevölkerung dazu, dass im Gleichgewicht der Anteil der Steuerhinterzieher geringer wird. Diese beiden Hypothesen werden empirisch mit Hilfe von Surveydaten überprüft und bestätigt. Für die erste Hypothese auf Ebene des Individuums erlauben es die Daten, die Robustheit des empirischen Ergebnisses umfangreich zu überprüfen. Eine Vielzahl von Spezifikationen, inklusive einer Instrumentvariablenschätzung, bestätigen den positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Heimatbindung und (der Einstellung zur) Steuerehrlichkeit

The Law of Attraction: Bilateral Search and Horizontal Heterogeneity

We study a matching model with heterogeneous agents, nontransferable utility and search frictions. Agents differ along a horizontal dimension (e.g. taste) and a vertical dimension (e.g. income). Agents’ preferences coincide only in the vertical dimension. This approach introduces individual preferences in this literature as seems suitable in applications like labor markets (e.g. regional preferences). We analyze how the notion of assortativeness generalizes to integration or segregation outcomes depending on search frictions. Contrary to results from the purely vertical analysis, here, agents continuously adjust their reservation utility strategies to changing search frictions. The model is easily generalizable in the utility specification, the distribution of taste-related payoffs and the number of vertical types. Extreme utility specifications can be treated as a case of horizontal heterogeneity only.Matching, Horizontal Differentiation , Marriage Markets

Dynamics of Earnings and Hourly Wages in Germany

There is by now a vast number of studies which document a sharp increase in cross-sectional wage inequality during the 2000s. It is often assumed that this inequality is of a "permanent nature" which in turn is used as an argument calling for government intervention. We examine these claims using a fully balanced panel of full-time employed individuals in Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1994–2006. In line with previous studies, our sample shows sharply rising inequality during the 2000s. Applying covariance structure models, we calculate the fraction of permanent and transitory wage and earnings inequality. From 1994 on, permanent inequality increases continuously, peaks in 2001 and then declines in subsequent years. Interestingly the decline in the permanent fraction of inequality occurs at the time of most rapid increases in cross-sectional inequality. It seems therefore that it is primarily the temporary and not the permanent component which has driven the strong expansion of cross-sectional inequality during the 2000s in Germany.variance decomposition, covariance structure models, earnings inequality, wage dynamics

Dynamics of Earnings and Hourly Wages in Germany

There is by now a vast number of studies which document a sharp increase in crosssectional wage inequality during the 2000s. It is often assumed that this inequality is of a "permanent nature" which in turn is used as an argument calling for government intervention. We examine these claims using a fully balanced panel of full-time employed individuals in Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1994-2006. In line with previous studies, our sample shows sharply rising inequality during the 2000s. Applying covariance structure models, we calculate the fraction of permanent and transitory wage and earnings inequality. From 1994 on, permanent inequality increases continuously, peaks in 2001 and then declines in subsequent years. Interestingly the decline in the permanent fraction of inequality occurs at the time of most rapid increases in cross-sectional inequality. It seems therefore that it is primarilythe temporary and not the permanent component which has driven the strong expansion of cross-sectional inequality during the 2000s in Germany.Variance decomposition, covariance structure models, earnings inequality, wage dynamics

Bilateral Search with Horizontal Heterogeneity

We study a matching model with heterogenous agents, nontransferable utility and search frictions. Agents differ along a continuous horizontal dimension (e.g. taste) and a discrete vertical dimension, e.g. income. All individuals prefer the highest type along the vertical trait, but have different preferences regarding the horizontal trait. We characterize the equilibrium and study how matching occurs depending on the frictions in the market if income is exogenous. If the level of search frictions is low, assortative mating along both dimensions occurs. For greater levels of search frictions, equilibria with and without income segregation are possible. Finally, we study the impact of a redistributive tax on social welfare if agents decide on their effort levels before they enter the matching market

Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility

For patriotic citizens, living in their native country is intrinsically preferable compared to living in the diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the implications of such a patriotic lock-in in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. In a formal model of redistribution with international migration and fiscal competition we derive the main hypothesis: that countries with a more patriotic population should have higher redistributive taxes. Using ISSP survey data and combining them with OECD taxation data, we find robust evidence suggesting that a) higher patriotism is associated with higher tax burdens, and b) this relation is stronger for the upper-middle range of the income distribution.patriotism, international mobility, taxation, redistribution, fiscal competition

Customs compliance and the power of imagination

This paper studies the role of beliefs about own performance or appearance for compliance at the customs. In an experiment in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find: a large share, about 15-20 percent of the subjects, is more compliant if they have reason to imagine that their performance influences their subjective audit probability. In contrast, we do not find evidence for individuals who believe that by their personal performance they can reduce the subjective probability for an audit. Our results suggest that the power of imagination, i.e. the role of second-order beliefs in the process of customs declarations is important and may potentially be used to improve customs and tax compliance. --Customs,tax compliance,audit probability,second-order beliefs

The last refuge of a scoundrel? Patriotism and tax compliance

"We study the effects of patriotism on tax compliance. In particular, we assume that individuals feel a (random draw of) warm glow from honestly paying their taxes. A higher expected warm glow reduces the government's optimal audit probability and yields higher tax compliance. Second, individuals with higher warm glow are less likely to evade taxes. This prediction is confirmed empirically by a multivariate analysis on the individual level while controlling for several other potentially confounding factors. The findings survive a variety of robustness checks, including an instrumental variables estimation to tackle the possible endogeneity of patriotism. On the aggregate level, we provide evidence for a negative correlation between average patriotic warm glow and the size of the shadow economy across several countries." (author's abstract)"Ob ein Individuum versucht, durch falsche Angaben gegenüber den Steuerbehörden die persönliche Steuerlast zu reduzieren, hängt sowohl von 'monetären' als auch von nicht-monetären Faktoren ab. Monetäre Faktoren sind vor allem die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein versuchter Betrug aufgedeckt wird, und die Höhe der Strafzahlung. Wir untersuchen zunächst theoretisch, wie Patriotismus (Heimatbindung) als ein nicht-monetärer Faktor die Steuerehrlichkeit beeinflusst. Personen mit gleichem Einkommen, aber höherer Heimatbindung, geben auch mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit ihr Einkommen korrekt an. Weiterhin führt eine Erhöhung der durchschnittlichen Heimatbindung über die gesamte Steuerbevölkerung dazu, dass im Gleichgewicht der Anteil der Steuerhinterzieher geringer wird. Diese beiden Hypothesen werden empirisch mit Hilfe von Surveydaten überprüft und bestätigt. Für die erste Hypothese auf Ebene des Individuums erlauben es die Daten, die Robustheit des empirischen Ergebnisses umfangreich zu überprüfen. Eine Vielzahl von Spezifikationen, inklusive einer Instrumentvariablenschätzung, bestätigen den positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Heimatbindung und (der Einstellung zur) Steuerehrlichkeit." (Autorenreferat