Valorisation stratégique par contextes de valeur : le cas des introductions sur le nouveau marché

Study of the chapter related to firms' activity in the preliminary prospectuses for 50 listed companies in the "Nouveau marché" shows the existence of 5 disclosure policies. Except for the P/E ratio, empirical study confirms the strategic information effect on value explanation, measured by the Market-to-Book, Firm Value-to-Sales revenue, Firm Value-to-EBIT. Finally, Cumulative Abnormal Return over ten and sixty-day periods are positively associated with the disclosure policy of strategic information.L'étude du chapitre lié à l'activité dans le prospectus préliminaire de 50 sociétés candidates à l'introduction sur le Nouveau marché montre l'existence de cinq politiques de communication. À l'exception du multiple du résultat net, PER, le test empirique confirme l'importance de l'information stratégique dans l'explication de la valeur. Enfin, il s'avère que la rentabilité anormale cumulée à dix et soixante jours suivant l'introduction est positivement corrélée à l'effort de révélation de l'information stratégique, mesuré par le nombre de contextes de valeur

Foreign business activities, foreignness of the VC syndicate, and IPO value

This article examines the role played by foreign venture capital (VC) firms in U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs). We find that U.S. VC–backed IPOs benefit from the foreignness of the VC syndicate. Specifically, jointly with domestic VC firms, foreign VC firms certify the quality of their portfolio companies at the time of the IPO, which increases their IPO premium. Foreign VC firms also play an advisory role, enhancing the foreign business activities of their U.S. investees, thereby increasing the IPO premium. Finally, value added by foreign VC firms is greater through their monitoring role if they originate from countries where the investee has foreign business activities

Underpricing and CEO stock options: Do board characteristics matter?

This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price of the stock options they are granted at the time of their firm’s IPO. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between IPO grants and IPO underpricing, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venturecapital(VC) back ing are taken into account. The results suggest that powerful CEOs and VCs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options to the detriment of the shareholders

Context, governance, associational trust and HRM: diversity and commonalities

This study explores how HRM and trust are inter-related, and what this means for how we understand HRM under different varieties of capitalism. We explore the direct impact of different indicators of societal trust on intra-organizational HRM practice, using a large-scale internationally comparative survey evidence. We find that countries with high levels of associational trust, such as the Nordic social democracies, are generally associated with better communication and co-determination over the setting of the employment contract. The converse was true for countries with lower levels of associational trust, such as the liberal market economies. We failed to encounter any significant effects of multinationality or country of origin in the case of MNCs; they did not differ significantly from their domestic peers when it came to the relationship between country of domicile levels of associational trust and HRM practice. We draw out the implications for theory and practice

Executive share ownership, experience and basic salaries: the influence on IPO share option schemes and performance

Corporate governance research often focuses on two theoretical stands, agency theory and resource dependence theory. Whist both provide distinct theoretical roles, this paper combines them to argue that executive stock option plans (ESOs) can serve a dual role, that of re-alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, and board stability, by ‘locking’ the executive to reward and thus retaining managerial talent. The paper focuses on a unique sample of 311 entrepreneurial initial public offerings. It examines their choice of schemes prior to and at the initial public offering (IPO). It gives consideration to ESO choices being associated with board ownership, executive wealth and cognitive characteristics of the IPO firm’s management team. Finally, it examines performance in line with signalling theory, showing that IPO underpricing is reduced by the presence of executive stock options and that high growth positively moderates the link between underpricing and conditional ESO plans

Underpricing versus gross spread: New evidence on the effect of sold shares at the time of IPOs

This paper sheds light on the impact of initial owners' decisions to reduce underpricing at the time of initial public offerings (IPOs). Using a sample of 172 French IPOs, empirical findings indicate that the larger the percentage of primary and secondary shares sold, the higher the gross spread paid by initial owners, which reduces underpricing. Above a certain level of primary shares sold, however, underpricing increases. In contrast with prior research on US IPOs, initial owners endogenously determine the fraction of primary and secondary shares sold. When a firm goes public in the Nouveau Marché, the market for high-growth firms, initial owners are more concerned about the signalling effect of the sale of their secondary shares than the dilutive effect of primary shares. Therefore, they pay a larger gross spread in offerings with a higher participation ratio in order to reduce underpricing.

The effects of management-board ties on IPO performance

This paper studies the two potentially contrasting effects on IPO pricing and post-IPO operating performance of family ties as well as social ties the top management has with board members. While family ties may solve manager–owner conflicts of interests, they may also give rise to minority-shareholder expropriation and/or private benefits of control. Similarly, social ties may either create value or lead to entrenchment and excessive managerial power. Using q-analysis to measure the strength of top manager ties to board members, we find that IPO performance is positively related to the strength of social ties, but negatively to the strength of family ties. We also find that, controlling for social ties, board independence affects both IPO pricing and post-IPO operating performance. Further, we show that the association between IPO performance and ties depends on whether they are with inside or outside directors