Water institutions and sector performance: A subjective theory of institutional change

Institutional developmentOrganizational changeEvaluation

The political nexus between water and economics in Brazil:A critique of recent policy reforms

The reform of water policies in Brazil has involved a combination of regulatory norms and economic-incentive instruments. Nonetheless, contrary to its formal objectives, the process has largely failed to prevent widespread environmental impacts and growing spatial and sectoral conflicts. The main reason for such failures is the perverse influence of market rationality, which is particularly evident in the reorganization of the public sector, the quantification of the monetary value of water, and the payment for environmental services

Market Power in Water Markets

Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource constraints. The number of cases explodes in the number of local markets. Under quadratic benefit functions and symmetric constant marginal extraction costs, closed-form solutions for selected cases are derived, and numerical implementation through a single optimization program is available. Upstream locations face less competition than downstream. Observed price patterns in the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District are consistent with the theoretical results

Social science in a water observing system

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/95008/1/wrcr12336.pd

How Market-Based Water Allocation Can Improve Water Use Efficiency in the Aral Sea Basin?

Increasing water demand due to population growth, irrigation expansion, industrial development, and the need for ecosystem improvements under mounting investment costs for developing new water sources calls for the efficient, equitable and sustainable management of water resources. This is particularly essential in the Aral Sea Basin (ASB) where ineffective institutions are the primary reason of intersectoral and inter-state water sharing conflicts and lack of sufficient investments for improving water use efficiency. This study examined market-based water allocation as an alternative option to the traditional administrative allocation to deal with water scarcity issues in the ASB. Potential economic gains of tradable water use rights were analyzed based on a newly constructed integrated hydro-economic river basin management model. The analysis differentiates between inter- catchment and intra-catchment water trading. The former does not consider any restrictions on water trading whereas the latter is based on the assumption that water trading is more likely to happen between neighboring water users located within the same catchment area. The analyses show that compared to fixed water allocation, inter-catchment water trading can improve basin-wide benefits by US$373 and US$ 476 million depending on water availability. Similarly, additional gains of US$259 to US$ 339 million are estimated under intra-catchment water trading depending on relative water availability. Trading gains are higher under drier conditions. However, water trading carries a series of transaction costs. We find that transaction costs exceeding US$0.05 per m3 of water traded wipe out the economic potential for water trading. Enforcement of the rule of law, infrastructural improvements, participation of representatives of all water stakeholders in decision making processes, and friendly relationships among the riparian countries are suggested as means for reducing transaction costs of water trading contracts

Institutional linkages, transaction costs, and water institutional reforms: Analytical approaches and cross-country evidences

Institutional developmentWater managementOrganizational changeCostsWater users’ associationsPolicy