Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon - Computationally

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some consistent and recursively enumerable theories which cannot be extended to any complete and consistent and recursively enumerable theory. Though any consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a complete and consistent and decidable theory. Thus deduction and consistency are not decidable in logic, and an analogue of Rice's Theorem holds for recursively enumerable theories: all the non-trivial properties of such theories are undecidable

Separating Bounded Arithmetics by Herbrand Consistency

The problem of $\Pi_1-$separating the hierarchy of bounded arithmetic has been studied in the paper. It is shown that the notion of Herbrand Consistency, in its full generality, cannot $\Pi_1-$separate the theory ${\rm I\Delta_0+\bigwedge_j\Omega_j}$ from ${\rm I\Delta_0}$; though it can $\Pi_1-$separate ${\rm I\Delta_0+Exp}$ from ${\rm I\Delta_0}$. This extends a result of L. A. Ko{\l}odziejczyk (2006), by showing the unprovability of the Herbrand Consistency of ${\rm I\Delta_0}$ in the theory ${\rm I\Delta_0+\bigwedge_j\Omega_j}$.Comment: Published by Oxford University Press. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1005.265