Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.Social Security, retirement, gerontocracy, retirement incentives, political theories of Social Security

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore political' theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the efficiency theories,' which view creation of the SS program as a full or partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the SS as welfare for the elderly', the retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities', optimal retirement insurance', the prodigal father problem', the misguided Keynesian', the optimal longevity insurance', the government economizing transaction costs' and the return on human capital investment'. We also analyze four narrative' theories of social security: the chain letter theory', the lump of labor theory', the monopoly capitalism theory', and the Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory'. The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

U.S. Money Demand: Surprising Cross-Sectional Estimates

macroeconomics, U.S. Money Demand, Cross-Sectional Estimates

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.Social Security, retirement, gerontocracy, retirement incentives, political theories of Social Security

Measuring Aggregate Human Capital

In this paper we construct a set of human capital indexes for the states of the United States for each Census year starting in 1940. In order to do so, we propose a new methodology for the construction of index numbers in panel data sets. Our method is based on an optimal approach by which we choose the 'best' set index numbers by minimizing the expected estimation error subject to some search constraints. Some of the empirical findings are that the stock of human capital in the United States grew twice as rapidly as the average years of schooling and that human capital inequality across states went up during the 1980s (while the dispersion of schooling actually fell). We conclude that using the average years of schooling for the empirical study of existing growth models may be misleading.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important features of social security programs around the world: (1) they redistribute income from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct a voting model that includes a “political campaign” or “debate” prior to the election. The model incorporates “single-mindedness” of the groups that do not work: while the workers divide their political capital between their “age concerns” and “occupational concerns”, the retired concentrate all their political capital to support their age group. In our model, the elderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young) and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly. In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work more will tend to have more political power. The opposite is true for non-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidence that supports these additional predictions.Social Security, retirement, retirement incentives, single-mindedness, political theories of Social Security

A Note on the Time-Elimination Method For Solving Recursive Dynamic Economic Models

The Time-Elimination Method for solving recursive dynamic economic models is described. By defining control-like and state-like variables, one can transform the equations of motion describing the economy's evolution through time into a system of differential equations that are independent of time. Unlike the transversality conditions, the boundary conditions for the system in the state-like variable are not asymptotic boundary conditions. In theory, this reformulation of the problem greatly facilitates numerical analysis. In practice, problems which were impossible to solve with a popular algorithm - shooting - can be solved in short order. The reader of this paper need not have any knowledge of numerical mathematics or dynamic programming or be able to draw high dimensional phase diagrams. only a familiarity with the first order conditions of the 'Hamiltonian' method for solving dynamic optimization problems is required. The most natural application of Time-Elimination is to growth models. The method is applied here to three growth models.: the Ramsey/Cass/Koopmans one sector model, Jones & Manuelli's(1990) variant of the Ramsey model, and a two sector growth model in the spirit of Lucas (1988). A very simple - but complete - computer program for numerically solving the Ramsey model is provided.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross- country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.Social Security, retirement, gerontocracy, lobby, pressure groups

Social Security, Retirement, and the Single-Mindedness of the Electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important features of social security programs around the world: (1) they redistribute income from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct a voting model that includes a political campaign' or debate' prior to the election. The model incorporates single-mindedness' of the groups that do not work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns' and occupational concerns', the retired concentrate all their political capital to support their age group. In our model, the elderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young) and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly. In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work more will tend to have more political power. The opposite is true for non-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidence that supports these additional predictions.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: political', efficiency' and narrative' theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor' and the once and for all election' model), the time-intensive model of political competition' and the taxpayer protection model'. Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the efficiency' and narrative' theories and derives implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.