Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai

I. Introduction II. Economic Deprivation and Political Marginalization in the Sinai … A. The Sinai’s Strategic Significance ... B. Neglect and Criminalization of the Bedouin III. Bringing the Sinai into the National Fold ... A. Long-Term Investment in Development ... B. De-Securitizing Development in Sinai ... C. Political Inclusion and Integrating Bedouin into Security Services IV. Contextualizing Sinai’s Transition into a Failing Sub-State ... A. Festering Grievances and Militants in Sinai before the 2011 Uprising ... B. 2011 Uprisings Create a Security and Political Vacuum ... C. Violence in Sinai Reaches New Heights after Morsi Is Deposed V. Conclusio

Policing Terrorists in the Community

Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to stop terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing, developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities, is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat Islamist homegrown terrorism. Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril, both for collective civil liberties and the interests of local police in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, this Article examines how community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying post-9/11 subordination of Muslims arising from preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: (1) it is more akin to counter-radicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based, traditional community policing model; (2) to the collective detriment of Muslim communities, it divides them into Good Muslims willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government\u27s terms and Bad Muslims who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities\u27 civil rights and liberties; and (3) it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used against their collective interests as part of the predominantly federal prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime. Unless systemic reforms are made to federal preventive counterterrorism strategies, community policing is likely to aggravate existing civil liberties violations and impair otherwise good relations between Muslim communities and local police. Thus, a serious rethinking of proposals to implement community policing in counterterrorism is warranted

From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality

In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves caught at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women\u27s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. This paper examines how the September 11th attacks adversely impacted the lives of headscarved Muslim women in ways different than Muslim men. Ten years after 9/11, there is a plethora of literature about what has become known as post-9/11 discrimination. Most of the discussion focuses on the experiences of Muslim men or analyzes law and policy through a male gendered paradigm. Amidst pervasive suspicion of Islam, continuing sexism, and bias against her particular race group, the Muslim women are both visible targets and silent victims. Accordingly, this paper examines the implications of the shift in symbolism of the Muslim headscarf in America from gender subjugation to terror(ism). Specifically, this paper argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 war on terror in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are neglected by mainstream American feminist organizations or used by male leaders of Muslim organizations to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives, receiving little support from advocacy groups focused on defending Muslims, women\u27s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. Section I of this paper prefaces the paper\u27s thesis by highlighting Islam\u27s transition from obscurity to notoriety in the American public\u27s psyche as a result of the September 11th attacks. Section II highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. The reclassification is most glaring in the nationwide campaigns opposing mosque constructions because of the public\u27s fixation on mosques as hotbeds of extremism. Likewise, as Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. Against this backdrop, Section III examines how the meaning of the Muslim headscarf has transformed from a symbol of female subjugation to a symbol of terror(ism). Through an analysis of employment discrimination, racial violence, political marginalization, and exclusion from the courthouse, this article demonstrates how the transition of the headscarf\u27s meaning has resulted in palpable and widespread discrimination against Muslim women donning it. Yet, discourse on civil liberties in the national security context are woefully lacking due to the conspicuous absence of the Muslim woman\u27s voice. The internal debates within the Muslim communities about gender rights in Islam are beyond the scope of this article. Nor is the paper about whether the headscarf is effectively a patriarchal tool that subjugates women--the paradigm of the 1990s multiculturalism discourse pertaining to Muslim women. While these issues have not yet been fully resolved, this paper argues that the September 11th attacks eclipsed internal community grievances of sexism, to the detriment of women\u27s rights within the community, with more existential concerns such as the Muslim woman\u27s ability to obtain employment, right to freedom from physical attack in public spaces, and ability to shape civil rights strategies aimed at countering post9/11 discrimination. Thus, the focus here is on extra-community factors that disparately and uniquely impact Muslim women\u27s individual expressive freedoms, religious freedoms, and gender rights vis-A-vis the American public and government. By developing a more accurate and in-depth analysis of her circumstances post-9/11, this article aims to include headscarved Muslim women in the contemporary intersectionality dialogue to pave the way towards adequately redressing the multiple levels of subordination against this oft-overlooked group of intersectionals

Global Conflict and Populism in a Post-9/11 World

Remarks from the Seventeenth Annual Buck Colbert Franklin Civil Rights Lectur

State Sponsored Radicalization

Where was the FBI in the months leading up to the violent siege on the U.S. Capitol in 2021? Among the many questions surrounding that historic day, this one reveals the extent to which double standards in law enforcement threaten our nation’s security. For weeks, Donald Trump’s far right-wing supporters had been publicly calling for and planning a protest in Washington, D.C. on January 6, the day Congress was to certify the 2021 presidential election results. Had they been following credible threats to domestic security, officials would have attempted to stop the Proud Boys and QAnon from breaching the Capitol perimeter. Yet when the day came, the mob of pro-Trump extremists seemed to catch law enforcement by surprise. They seized the Capitol, ransacked congress members’ offices, and openly posted photos of their destruction and their weapons online. In the preceding two decades, the U.S. government has poured money into a behemoth national security apparatus. The FBI’s annual budget ballooned from $3 billion in 1999 to nearly$10 billion today. Much of this 300% increase went to countering terrorism with a mandate to surveil, investigate, and prosecute “homegrown terrorists.” In no uncertain terms, the directive was for the FBI to target Muslim communities

A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment?

Being political scapegoats in the indefinite “war on terror” is the new normal for Muslims in America. With each federal election cycle or terrorist attack in a Western country comes a spike in islamophobia. Candidates peddle tropes of Muslims as terrorists in campaign materials and political speeches to solicit votes. Government officials call for bold measures—extreme vetting, categorical bans, and mass deportations—to regulate and exclude Muslim bodies from U.S. soil. The racial subtext is that Muslims in the United States are outsiders who do not belong to the political community. A case in point is the “Muslim ban” issued by the Trump administration in 2017. As the ban dominated public debate and litigation, another racialized counterterrorism policy lurked in the backdrop: a Muslim registry. This Article explores the political and legal plausibility of a de jure or de facto Muslim registry. Analyzing separately the case of nonimmigrants, immigrants, and U.S. citizens, the Article concludes that proponents of a nonimmigrant special registration program based on national origin will find support in the law. A registry of immigrants is also possible, though much will depend on whether courts will look to the islamophobic political environment arising from Trump and his advisor’s anti-Muslim statements to apply strict scrutiny; or whether courts will accept facially neutral national security justifications to apply the rational basis test that nearly guarantees the government’s victory. In contrast, a registry of U.S. citizen Muslims is unlikely to pass constitutional muster, as is a special registration program explicitly based on religion. Separate from the dignitary harms and privacy concerns arising from a Muslim registry are threats to the liberty of millions of people in America. A Muslim registry could very well be the precursor to mass internment should another major terrorist attack occur on U.S. soil. For that reason alone, proponents of civil rights and liberties should be prepared to oppose what is no longer unimaginable

Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post 9/11 America

While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies have adversely impacted various groups of Americans, no group has been more profoundly affected than the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities. Mosque infiltration has become so rampant that some congregants assume they are under surveillance as they fulfill their religious obligations. Government informants have ensnared numerous, seemingly hapless and unsophisticated young men such that Muslims no longer know whom they can trust among each other. Aggressive prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals across the country have embittered communities that now feel under siege by their government and distrusted by their non-Muslim compatriots.19 Selective counterterrorism fuels public bias, as evidenced by the vitriolic discourse surrounding the Park 51 Community Center in lower Manhattan in 2010. As a consequence, the vibrancy and development of civil society within these communities has been significantly stunted. Current counter-terrorism efforts thus attack the social relationships, as well as the civil liberties, long understood as the glue holding this country together. This article focuses on three powerful components of the government\u27s counterterrorism preventive paradigm and the significant risks they pose to civil rights and civil liberties. Part I examines the adverse consequences of the government\u27s use of religiosity as a proxy for terrorism. Specifically, the current preventative paradigm for countering terrorism risks the First Amendment infringement of protected activities and misdirects limited law enforcement resources away from criminal activity. In addition to wasting limited resources, religious and racial profiling erodes trust between law enforcement and Muslim communities. To the extent constructive relations between communities and law enforcement bolster public safety, the government has an interest in curtailing arbitrary and overreaching counterterrorism enforcement. Part II demonstrates the government\u27s aggressive use of material support laws found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and B as a prosecutorial fallback against individuals that otherwise cannot be shown to have participated in terrorism. For example, in 2009 the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law found that defendants had been charged with § 2339B [i]n 11 indictments, comprising four cases ... either alone or in association with lesser statutes. The far-reaching and devastating effects of these broadly interpreted laws-felt by American Muslim charities, Muslim donors, and the broader American nonprofit sector-are the effective criminalization of otherwise legitimate charitable giving, peacebuilding, and human rights advocacy. As a result, the fear of inviting unwanted government scrutiny chills religious freedom rights and deters Muslims from fully practicing their faith. In addition to calling for more judicious enforcement of material support laws, this paper argues for a specific intent requirement in §§ 2339A and 2339B as a means of ensuring innocent but unpopular individuals are not targeted for prosecution. Part III focuses on the most recent and troubling developments in the preventive paradigm-the racial subtext of homegrown terrorism as a Muslims only club. The current debate over homegrown terrorism facilitates selective and arbitrary enforcement of counterterrorism laws against Muslims, while many non-Muslims commit or attempt to commit deadly acts of terror undetected. Notwithstanding the rise in terrorism by militias and right wing extremists, law enforcement has developed counterterrorism strategies based on essentialist stereotypes of terrorists as religious Muslims. Some congressional leaders have followed suit by calling for more aggressive scrutiny of mosques, Muslim community organizations, and Muslim student groups. This rhetoric seeks to deputize Muslim religious leaders to spy on their congregations with little regard for the broad, adverse implications on religious freedom for all Americans. The article concludes by calling for smarter, more efficient policies that focus on criminal activity rather than stereotypes that stigmatize entire communities as suspicious and disloyal. To the extent that Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians are the miner\u27s canary in forecasting the post-9/11 loss of civil rights and liberties for all Americans, their experiences demonstrate America\u27s downward progression from the Founding Fathers\u27 vision of a society where individuals can speak, assemble, and practice their faith free of government intervention or persecution

Revolution without Reform: A Critique of Egypt\u27s Election Laws

This Article compares Egypt\u27s election laws before and after the January 25 Revolution to determine whether the changes are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. This Article concludes that Egyptian elections processes and institutions remain insufficiently transparent, fail to produce results reflecting the diversity within Egyptian society, and fail to offer all Egyptians-especially women and religious minorities-an equal opportunity to actively participate in governance of their country. The Article critically assesses recent changes in Egypt\u27s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptics to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions Egyptian women and Coptics made to the revolution. Second, the limited post-revolution reforms made to election laws are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Nonetheless, in this early stage of the post-revolutionary phase, there is reason for cautious optimism. While Egyptian election laws have been amended for the better since the revolution, more legislative reforms are needed to ensure that future elections are fair, free, and accessible to all Egyptians. Sound election laws are the bedrock of a democracy insofar as they ensure that a dominant party does not extend its rule against the will of the people. As witnessed with the National Democratic Party under the Mubarak regime, laws can be manipulated to guarantee certain electoral outcomes benefitting the dominant party. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after their historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear--future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril