Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations.

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations.Divisible good, Auctions, Experimental economics

Ambiguity and Overconfidence

There are two phenomena in behavioral finance and economics which are seemingly unrelated and have been studied separately; overconfidence and ambiguity aversion. In this paper we are trying to link these two phenomena providing a theoretical foundation supported by evidence from an experimental study. We derive a model, based on the max-min ambiguity framework that links overconfidence to ambiguity aversion. In the experimental study we find that overconfidence is decreasing in ambiguity, as predicted by our model

Auctioning Sovereign Bonds: A Global Cross-Section Investigation of the Price Mechanism

Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction. An important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: Uniform vs. Discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the dominance of one type of auction over the other. We investigate the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions. We find that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt securities. We use a multinomial logit procedure and discriminatory analysis to investigate the mechanism choice. It was interesting to find that market oriented economies and those that practice Common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice Civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions

Endogenizing Bidders Choice in Divisible Goods Auctions

Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction mechanism. An important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: Uniform vs. Discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the preference of one mechanism over the other. Experimental papers investigated the issue under an exogenous equal number of bidders. We investigate the bidders’ choice and the impact of that choice on the outcome of the auction by letting them choose between the two alternative systems. The majority of the bidders in the survey have chosen the uniform method. Those that prefer the uniform auction bid, on average, more aggressively than those that choose the discriminatory one. On average the revenues to the issuer were higher under the uniform price mechanism

Testing Methods to Enhance Longevity Awareness

Many people have only a vague notion of the concept of life expectancy and the longevity risk they face at older ages, which in turn implies that they are likely to undersave for retirement. This paper employs an online experiment to investigate alternative ways to describe both life expectancy and longevity risk, with the goal of assessing whether these can raise peoples’ awareness of possible retirement shortfalls. We also evaluate whether providing this information promotes interest in saving activity and demand for longevity insurance products. We find that providing longevity risk information impacts respondents’ subjective survival probabilities, while simply describing average life expectancy does not. Yet providing life expectancy or longevity information significantly affects financial decisions, mostly regarding annuitization. Interestingly, we also find that merely prompting people to think about financial decisions changes their perceptions regarding subjective survival probabilities

Longevity Perceptions and Saving Decisions During the COVID-19 Outbreak: An Experimental Investigation

We experimentally study individuals’ perceptions about and advice to others regarding retirement savings and annuitization during the pandemic. Many people recommend that others save more for retirement, but those most affected by the pandemic tell others to save and annuitize less. We investigate two possible channels for this result and show that the pandemic does not substantially alter optimism regarding survival probabilities. Hence, we conclude that economic factors are driving our results. Consequently, some financial ramifications of the COVID-19 outbreak are yet to be revealed, as the pandemic is having longer-term effects on peoples’ willingness to save and annuitize

Energizing Bidder's Choice in Financial Assets Auctions - An Experimental Investigation

The objective of this paper is to investigate the preferences of potential bidders in choosing between uniform and discriminatory auction pricing methods. Many financial assets, particularly government bonds, are issued in an auction. Uniform and discriminatory pricing constitute the two most popular mechanisms used in public auctions. Theoretical papers have not been able to provide an unequivocal preference of one mechanism over the other. This study investigates both bidder choice and the impact of that choice on the outcome of the auction by allowing bidders to choose between the two alternative systems. The majority of the bidders in the survey prefer uniform pricing. Those preferring uniform auctions tend to bid more aggressively than those preferring discriminatory. On average, the proceeds to the issuer were higher under the uniform price mechanism