The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the Netherlands

Ecologists and economists both use a different approach to determine the value of nature. Its ecological value can be measured using criteria like rarity and diversity of species in an ecosystem. The economic value can be determined using non-market valuation techniques. This paper focuses on an empirical application of the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) to find out whether this valuation method is a suitable method to estimate the economic value of natural riverbanks in the Netherlands. Natural riverbanks will provide habitat for species that particularly depend on the land water transit area. Since common riverbanks do not provide this habitat, natural river banks increase biodiversity in the Netherlands. On the basis of technical and ecological characteristics nine different types of natural riverbanks were distinguished. For each type a laymen description was made. This description served as a basis for economic valuation by means of CVM. The results of the CVM study shows that the average willingness to pay for non-use of a natural riverbank varied between 16 and 25 Dutch guilders per household year. The willingness to pay for recreational use ranged from 1,07 to 2,50 guilders per visit. The generated outcomes proved to be consistent with results from other studies. At first sight, the economic value of natural riverbanks seemed to be higher than their construction and maintenance cost

Equilibrium with a Market of Permits

In this paper we present the main results of three original studies on the equilibrium with a market of tradeable permits in a static framework. In first study, we have considered an international equilibrium of two countries which depend on the quantity of permits to each country. The allocation is efficient if and only if it is proportional to efficient labor. A redistribution in favor of the less developed country implies a redistribution to this country but leads to a dilemma with efficiency. In the second study, we analyze the consequences of the choice between giving free permits to firms and other possibilities. We show that for equalizing incomes of production factors with there marginal productivities, each factor should receive a quantity of free permits proportional to its contribution to production. In the third study, we consider the partial equilibrium of an industry where each firm is characterized by a parameter combining production efficiency and pollution effect. We define a theoretical indicator of environmental efficiency and we analyze its properties

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric Information on Private Environmental Benefits

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the Principal and two groups of agents (landowners): a green' group deriving high private utility from the projects and a conventional' group deriving lower utility. Afforestation projects may be produced in different environmental quality, and we distinguish between two cases, a high quality and a low quality project. We find that the optimal set of contracts under asymmetric information involves two different contracts. One in which green landowners are somewhat overcompensated for projects of high quality, and one where conventional landowners are offered contracts including lower quality projects, compared to the symmetric case, but with compensation equal to his indifference payment. It is the ability to reduce quality requirements along with subsidies offered that allows for revelation of the private information. Finally, we discus how the results obtained may be used in the implementation of incentive schemes

A Climate-Change Policy Induced Shift from Innovations in Energy Production to Energy Savings

We develop an endogenous growth model with capital, labor and energy as production factors and three productivity variables that measure accumulated innovations for energy production, energy savings, and neutral growth. All markets are complete and perfect, except for research, for which we assume that the marginal social value exceeds marginal costs by factor four. The model constants are calibrated so that the model reproduces the relevant trends over the 1970-2000 period. The model contains a simple climate module, and is used to assess the impact of Induced Technological Change (ITC) for a policy that aims at a maximum level of atmospheric CO2 concentration (450 ppmv). ITC is shown to reduce the required carbon tax by about a factor 2, and to reduce costs of such a policy by about factor 10. Numerical simulations show that knowledge accumulation shifts from energy production to energy saving technology

On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous agents. We use the concept of exchanging agents to give necessary conditions for internal stability and show that refraction is a sufficient condition for the failure of an enlargement of the coalition. With heterogeneous agents we can get a situation where a group of members of an unstable coalition does not deviate, neither within the coalition nor within the extended coalition. Hence, the possibilities of agreement are richer than in the standard analysis with homogeneous agents. Examples of industrial economics are used for illustration, and an application to climate change negotiations is discussed in more detail

Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure. What is the Impact on the Security of Supply?

This paper addresses the question of the infrastructure investment required for gas pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) connections to meet growing gas demand in an enlarged EU over the next 20 years. Several issues are presented, bearing in mind the major objective of the security of supply for EU countries. First, to set the scene, recent projections of gas demand in an enlarged EU are presented along with the corresponding need for additional imports. Then a scenario is developed showing possible supply routes to meet the import gap, relying on increasingly remote routes. An impressive bill of $150 to 200 billion will have to be paid for extending and building the required infrastructure in pipeline links and LNG-receiving facilities. The expected major development of LNG markets is subject to a particular discussion, as far as the progressive globalisation of this market and its inherent flexibility provide major advantages in terms of the security of supply, despite more costly infrastructure than pipeline links. The impact of technological progress is expected to reduce both capital investment and unit transport costs, offering access to new supply opportunities. Finally, the question of major obstacles to the realisation of the required huge investments in gas infrastructure over the next 20 years is addressed, opening hot debate on the subjects of future gas price, market liberalisation and financing issues

Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns

This paper estimates the dynamic conditional correlations in the returns on WTI oil one-month forward prices, and one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month futures prices, using recently developed multivariate conditional volatility models. The dynamic correlations enable a determination of whether the forward and various futures returns are substitutes or complements, which are crucial for deciding whether or not to hedge against unforeseen circumstances. The models are estimated using daily data on WTI oil forward and futures prices, and their associated returns, from 3 January 1985 to 16 January 2004. At the univariate level, the estimates are statistically significant, with the occasional asymmetric effect in which negative shocks have a greater impact on volatility than positive shocks. In all cases, both the short- and long-run persistence of shocks are statistically significant. Among the five returns, there are ten conditional correlations, with the highest estimate of constant conditional correlation being 0.975 between the volatilities of the three-month and six-month futures returns, and the lowest being 0.656 between the volatilities of the forward and twelve-month futures returns. The dynamic conditional correlations can vary dramatically, being negative in four of ten cases and being close to zero in another five cases. Only in the case of the dynamic volatilities of the three-month and six-month futures returns is the range of variation relatively narrow, namely (0.832, 0.996). Thus, in general, the dynamic volatilities in the returns in the WTI oil forward and future prices can be either independent or interdependent over time