Different Types of Participation in Constitution Making Processes: Towards a Conceptualisation

Though participatory constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states transitioning from authoritarian rule have become a new trend, scholarly research has yet to approach the notion of participation in a sharp and distinct way. In this article, I develop a novel approach for differentiating participation in constitution making, depending on the extent of influence that participants are granted, illustrating this reasoning with eight empirical cases from the African continent

Different Types of Participation in Constitution Making Processes: Towards a Conceptualisation

Though participatory constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states transitioning from authoritarian rule have become a new trend, scholarly research has yet to approach the notion of participation in a sharp and distinct way. In this article, I develop a novel approach for differentiating participation in constitution making, depending on the extent of influence that participants are granted, illustrating this reasoning with eight empirical cases from the African continent

Doing politics within the confines of restrictive norms : the case of St Lucia

This article shows that prevailing socio-political norms contribute to a political culture of corruption and clientelism in the small island state of St Lucia. Drawing on interviews with members of parliament and senators, the study brings to evidence how entrenched norms determine the room for manoeuvre for these individuals to conduct their work. A political landscape has developed in which corruption has taken root, and in which there is neither political incentive nor will, to come to terms with fraudulent behaviour. The article also suggests that, on the few occasions that political representatives have attempted to act against this culture, the socio-political costs for the individual have been quite high.peer-reviewe

The Participation Myth : outcomes of participatory constitution building processes on democracy

Since the early 1990s a growing number of constitution building processes in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule or recovering from war or severe institutional crisis have involved public participation. This increase stems from an assumption made by many peacebuilding scholars and practitioners that public participation in constitution building will lead to higher levels of democracy. This assumption has not, however, been the subject of systematic or comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the overarching purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize the participation-hypothesis - as it is referred to in this study. The study is a two-step investigation. The first part begins with an analysis of twenty cases of participatory constitution building that have occurred in post-conflict states, transitioning states and countries that have experienced a severe institutional crisis. In order to differentiate the cases in terms of how much influence participants were granted, an analytical framework is developed and the cases are categorized as either false, symbolic, limited, consultative or substantial participation. The participation-hypothesis is then empirically investigated by comparing democracy levels prior to and after the process for each of the 20 cases. In order to further test the hypothesis, cases of constitution making in which there was no public participation are then added to the investigation. These cases are included as a point of reference – the democratic outcome in this group is compared with the democratic outcome in the twenty participatory processes. The empirical results reveal that there is no relationship between public participation in constitution building processes and higher levels of democracy. On the contrary, some cases that involved considerable influence for participants have not experienced improved levels of democracy, while cases with low levels of influence for participants have shown democratic improvement. Moreover, a majority of cases of constitution making without public participation have also experienced increases in their democracy scores. Therefore, the conclusion of the first part of the study is that the participation-hypothesis does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Particularly challenging for the participation-hypothesis is the fact that the analysis in part one shows that similar participatory processes have been followed by democratic improvement in some countries and democratic decline in others. Two such cases are Kenya and Zimbabwe. While democracy levels have increased in Kenya since the conclusion of the process, they have steadily declined in Zimbabwe. In the second part of the study, these two countries are therefore the object of intense, systematic and comparative scrutiny in order to explore factors beyond participation in constitution building that might explain the different trajectories of democracy. The comparison shows that the actions of political elites – in particular their ability to cooperate with each other – is the major explanation as to why the two wind up on different paths. The importance of elite cooperation is well-established in the democratization literature. One major conclusion of this study is therefore that the participation-hypothesis needs to be informed by insights drawn from this literature

Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others?

It could be argued that since the dawn of the peace-building era in the early 1990s, public participation in constitution-making processes has developed into a transnational legal norm. International organizations, NGOs, CSOs, scholars and think tanks around the globe repeatedly stress the value of including ordinary citizens in the making of their founding laws. As a consequence, the practice of participatory constitution-making has also increased. Though this is a seemingly established transnational legal norm, it is still a norm that has been more or less successfully adopted in different contexts. This article takes an interest in exploring why this is so. How is it that this norm is institutionalized in some contexts, internalized in others, institutionalized and internalized in yet other contexts, and simply rejected in still other contexts

The political consequences of smallness : the case of Saint Lucia

This study contributes to the literature on the political consequences of smallness, focusing on the case of Saint Lucia. Interviews with 19 MPs and senators reveal apolitical reality of patronage and corruption that occurs in daily encounters with constituents, but also within formal institutions. The study shows that politicians who habitually grant personal favours to constituents, most times do so because there is a genuine need due to economic hardship. Thus, though it is not their intent to get involved in patronage practices, their actions nevertheless create exactly such practices. When it comes to patronage and corruption within formal institutions, however, MPs and senators are fully aware of its existence. Regardless of political affiliation, they also acknowledge that there is no interest in coming to terms with these occurrences, since the shared sentiment is that keeping the status quo is politically convenient for all parties.Large Lessons from Small Cases: Façade or Democracy in Kiribati, Vanuatu and São Tomé and Príncipe

Constitution-building bodies and the sequencing of public participation : a comparison of seven empirical cases

Constitution-building is one of the most salient aspects of transitional processes, from war to peace or from authoritarian rule, in terms of establishing and strengthening democracy. This paper is part of a research project that aims to identify the circumstances under which constitution-building can strengthen democracy after violent conflict and during transitions from authoritarian rule. Previous research has indicated that the actions and relations of political elites from opposing political parties when making the constitution has bearing on the state of democracy post promulgation, but that the careful sequencing of public participation in the process can be of relevance as well. This paper conducts a systematic analysis of seven empirical cases and focuses the investigation to the type of constitution-building body that has been employed and to during what stage of the process the general public have been invited to participate. It concludes that popularly elected constitution-building bodies tend to include a broad range of political parties and that they, additionally, tend to have rules of procedure that encourage compromise and negotiation, whereas appointed bodies are dominated by one single party or one single person and do not have rules of procedure that necessitate compromise. The paper also discusses the potential need for political elites to have negotiated a number of baseline constitutional principles prior to inviting the general public to get involved in the constitution-building process, and concludes that this is an area of research in need of further in-depth empirical case-studies.How can constitution-building processes in post-conflict states and in states transitioning from authoritarian rule contribute to enhancing democracy

Negotiating the Post-Revolution Constitution for Tunisia – Members of the National Constituent Assembly Share Their Experiences

Though the Tunisian transition to democracy faces challenges seven years following the 2011 revolution and four years following the enactment of the new constitution, the country still constitutes a ‘success story’, especially in comparison to neighbouring states that were also touched by the Arab Uprisings. This paper takes an interest in exploring the Tunisian constitution-making process, and especially the political elite negotiated compromises that took place in the National Constituent Assembly. How were Tunisian religious and secular political forces able to unite and compromise on a constitutional document; what motivated their actions during the constitutional talks? Ideologies, rational pragmatism, self-serving interests or something else? This is a pertinent question that has bearing for other states that are in transition from authoritarian rule, in which religious and secular political parties are struggling to draft the political rules of the game anew. This is a qualitative study, based on interviews with political representatives, from a broad range of Tunisian political parties, who were part of the constitutional negotiations. Their responses suggest that pragmatism and rationality took precedence over ideological positions during the negotiations, and that this was indispensable for a draft to be produced. Despite this, the study argues that ideologies were likely not irrelevant in the minds of the political elites who were negotiating the post-revolution constitution, and that previous agreements and discussions among these elites that were, in fact, based on ideological positions, facilitated the constitutional negotiations that took place in the aftermath of the ousting of Ben-Al

Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm : Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others?

It could be argued that since the dawn of the peace-building era in the early 1990s, public participation in constitution-making processes has developed into a transnational legal norm. International organizations, NGOs, CSOs, scholars and think tanks around the globe repeatedly stress the value of including ordinary citizens in the making of their founding laws. As a consequence, the practice of participatory constitution-making has also increased. Though this is a seemingly established transnational legal norm, it is still a norm that has been more or less successfully adopted in different contexts. This article takes an interest in exploring why this is so. How is it that this norm is institutionalized in some contexts, internalized in others, institutionalized and internalized in yet other contexts, and simply rejected in still other contexts