Collective reputation, social norms, and participation:

This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs.collective reputation, free riding, public monitoring, peer monitoring, peer sanction,

Country of Origin Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability

This paper studies whether a seller achieves higher profits by providing consumers with information that allows them to distinguish between products from different countries, and how mandatory provision of such information impacts welfare. We analyze a model of multi-product monopoly with horizontal differentiation and random country-specific input costs. We find that if the variability in the input costs is sufficiently high and the share of consumers with high valuations is in some intermediate range, the seller prefers to withhold information about product origin. Mandatory labeling of products with their country of origin may reduce or increase welfare depending on the share of consumers with high valuations. We also discuss extensions of the basic model that allow for continuous distributions of valuations and input costs, and consumer learning.Country of origin labeling, consumer learning, food policy, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, International Relations/Trade,