Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders

I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out

The Time Structure of Hadronic Showers in Calorimeters with Scintillator and with Gas Readout

Hadronic showers are characterized by a rich particle structure in the spatial as well as in the time domain. The prompt component comes from relativistic fragments that deposit energy at the ns scale, while late components are associated predominantly with neutrons in the cascade. To measure the impact of these late components, two experiments, based on gaseous and plastic active layers with steel and tungsten absorbers, were set up. The different choice for the material of the active layers produces distinct responses to neutrons, and consequently to late energy depositions. After discussing the technical aspects of these systems, we present a comparison of the signals, read out with fast digitizers with deep buffers, and provide detailed information of the time structure of hadronic showers over a long sampling window.Comment: proceeding for CALOR2014, 6 pages, 5 figure

Monopoly, non-linear pricing, and imperfect information: a reconsideration of the insurance market

I reconsider Stiglitz's (1977) problem of monopolistic insurance with a continuum of types. Using a suitable transformation of control variables I obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal insurance policies. Closed form solutions and comparative statics results for special cases are provided

Regulating a multiproduct and multitype monopolist

I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the optimal allocation differs from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most efficient producers and features overproduction for some less efficient types

Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth

This paper investigates the role of financial constraints in R&D races of the type used in Schumpeterian growth theory. In a world of perfect capital markets these models predict that all innovations come from industry outsiders. In reality, however, we observe a pronounced persistence of some dominant firms. We show that this persistence can be explained by constraints on financial contracting. The paper highlights an indirect channel through which agency costs reduce growth: due to agency costs incumbents face little competition from outsiders. Therefore they can afford to innovate less often and to ''rest longer on their laurels'', thereby retarding growth.moral hazard, inside/outside finance, patent race, endogenous growth

Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing, and Imperfect Information : A Reconsideration of the Insurance Market

I reconsider Stiglitz's (1977) problem of monopolistic insurance with a continuum of types. Using a suitable transformation of control variables I obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal insurance policies. Closed form solutions and comparative statics results for special cases are provided.nonlinear pricing ; screening ; risk aversion

Optimal Delegation

How should a principal delegate a task to an agent? This paper studies the choice of an agent's discretion as a contracting problem. We show that the agent's freedom of action can be used as an effective incentive device: the agent's initiative is determined by the discretion he has in decision making. Due to this incentive effect the relationship between the severity of the conflict of principal's and agent's interests and the agent's optimal discretion in decision making is potentially non-monotonic: it may be optimal to curtail a subordinate's authority over decision making even if there are no conflicting interests concerning that decision. Our theory provides a rationale for commonly observed phenomena such as ''demanding clear statements'' from advisors or ''imposing an innovation bias'' on an organizational structure.

Contracts with Endogenous Information

I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy local versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function conditions, a first-order approach is justified. Under the same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agents informational rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.Asymmetric Information ; Mechanism Design ; Information Acquisition ; Stochastic Ordering ; Value of Information

Coincidences in numbers of graph vertices corresponding to regular planar hyperbolic mosaics

The aim of this paper is to determine the elements which are in two pairs of sequences linked to the regular mosaics $\{4,5\}$ and $\{p,q\}$ on the hyperbolic plane. The problem leads to the solution of diophantine equations of certain types.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figures, Annales Mathematicae et Informaticae 43 (2014