Recent Legal Literature

Clementson: A Manual Reletaing to Special Verdicts and Special Findings; Wharton: A Treatise on the conflict of Laws, or Private International Law; Lile, Redfield, Wambaugh and Wheeler: Brief Making and the Use of Law Books; Pomroy: Pomroy: Pomeroy\u27s Equitable Remedies (supplementary to Pomeroy\u27s Equity Jurisprudence); McLaughlin: The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-178

The Practice Court

The law department of the University of Michigan has always proceeded upon the theory that the chief function of a law school is to fit men for the practice of the law. An aim to make professional instruction as thoroughly practical as possible is by no means a narrow one, nor is it out of accord with the liberalizing tendencies of university culture. The age is insisting with more and more emphasis that nothing is valuable which is not useful, a doctrine which does not put culture upon a money basis but does insist that all knowledge is but a means to an end. What the end is makes, perhaps, little difference, so long as it is legitimate. But clearly, in order to determine the value of any institution one must first ascertain what use it is designed to serve and how fully it lends itself to that use

Bringing Third Parties into Actions at Law—Set-Off Against the Assignor

It frequently happens, in an action by an assignee, that the defendant wishes to use as a cross-action a claim against the assignor. This results in no diffiulty unless the amount of the set-off against the assignor is greater than the claim of the plaintiff, or unless the cross-action calls for a specific remedy against the assigner in addition to its defensive effect upon the plaintiff\u27s demand. In each of these cases we have a three-sided controversy. In the first, the set-off operates against the plaintiff to the extent of his claim and against the assignor for the balance. In the second, the cross-action operates against the plaintiff and his assignor in ways which may be quite variously different. If the assignor can be brought into the controversy, it can be wholly determined in a single action; otherwise two or more actiops are necessary

An Inroad Upon Fiduciary Integrity

It is a principle universally recognized throughout our system of law, that no person shall be permitted to occupy a position of trust and confidence who at the same time is clearly subject to influences hostile to a faithful performance of his trust. There is a rule as old as Christianity, and it has been incorporated into our law from the earliest times, that no man shall serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other. Fiduciary relations can rest upon no foundation but absolute integrity. Once destroy the inviolate sanctity of the trust relation and the moral basis for social institutions will begin to crumble away. The law has, in this particular, been ever vigilant to ward off the least encroachment upon the high standards of conduct exacted from those who hold positions of trust and confidence

Stare Decisis - Liability of Municipal Corporations for Tort

Courts are charged with the duty of declaring the law. They are also required to decide cases. Either one of those functions might be performed with comparative ease if it were divorced from the other, but when the court is simultaneously obliged to do both, the difficulties are very apparent. To decide a case and at the same time to declare the law means that the court is required to generalize every legal proposition upon which it acts in making its decision. But judges are not omniscient. Who can so fully understand the logical implications and the latent possibilities of any rule of law that he can safely announce it as a perpetual guide for the future? This the judges are nevertheless expected to do, for if the law is to be available and certain, its rules must not only be fully formulated but consistently adhered to. The rule of stare decisis is a necessary judicial protection extended to the people

Who Is an Alien Enemy?

One Gustav Muller, a native German, resided in England on May 20th, 1915. He had never been naturalized. He owned a leasehold house in England, and on the date just mentioned he executed a power of attorney to one John White to sell this leasehold house and make proper conveyance of the same. Six days later he was permitted by the British Government to return to Germany, and he started the same day, May 26th. He was known to be in Germany on June 11th, but the date of his arrival was unknown. On June 2 the leasehold was sold to Tingley, but the latter, upon learning the facts here given respecting Muller refused to proceed with the contract of sale, and commenced an action for a declaration that the contract was illegal because at the time it was made the defendant, Muller, was an alien enemy. Eve, J., held that this fact had not been proved, and dismissed the action, and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeal, Tingley v. Muller, [1917] L. R. 2 Ch. 144, and the decision of Eve, J., was sustained

Foreign Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors

AlI laws concerning property rights are based upon the broad - doctrine that every person who owns property may dispose of the same as he sees fit. The right of disposal of property is inseparably united to the right of property itself, and indeed is an essential element of the concept of property. It might even serve as a definition of property, viewing property as that which one may dispose of,-a definition too general, it is true, for practical purposes, but undoubtedly a correct and valuable metaphysical theore

The Inefficiency of the American Jury

What is proposed in the present article is to show that in attempting to preserve the independence of the jury in its exclusive juris- diction over questions of fact, the people and the courts in most American jurisdictions have departed from the common law practice and have introduced a principle calculated to undermine the very institution which they wish to strengthen. That is to say, through the rules prohibiting judges from commenting on the weight of the evidence, juries tend to become irresponsible, verdicts tend to become matters of chance, and the intricacy of procedure, with its cost, delay and liability to error, has increased so much as to threaten popular respect for courts of justice

Reinstatement of Disbarred Attorney

The petitioner asked to be reinstated. The court, excepting Justice Fellows, who concurred in the result but expressed no opinion, said they would be glad to reinstate him but for the fact that he was a non-resident, which in their opinion made him ineligible, but they gave their endorsement of his good character by vacating the order of disbarment. The questions which occur are these: 1. Did the court have the power to vacate its order of disbarment after the time for opening, amending or vacating judgments had passed? 2. Did the vacation of the order of disbarment operate ipso facto as a reinstatement? 3. Can reinstatemeni be ordered without a compliance with the statutory conditions for admission in the first instance? 4. Did the petitioner\u27s application, in view of his expressed intention to continue in business in Tennessee, raise anything more than a moot question? 4. Does non-residence absolutely preclude membership in a state bar? 6. Did the petitioner show a meritorious case for reinstatement