Adherence to Antiretroviral Treatment and Correlation with Risk of Hospitalization among Commercially Insured HIV Patients in the United States

Purpose: A lower daily pill burden may improve adherence to antiretroviral treatment (ART) and clinical outcomes in patients with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). This study assessed differences in adherence using the number of pills taken per day, and evaluated how adherence correlated with hospitalization. Methodology: Commercially insured patients in the LifeLink database with an HIV diagnosis (International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification code 042.xx) between 6/1/2006 and 12/31/2008 and receipt of a complete ART regimen were selected for inclusion. Patients were grouped according to their daily pill count and remained on ART for at least 60 days. Outcomes included adherence and rates of hospitalization. Adherence was measured as the proportion of days between the start and end of the regimen in which the patient maintained supply of all initiated ART components. Logistic regressions assessed the relationship between pills per day, adherence, and hospitalization, controlling for demographics, comorbidities, and ART-naïve (vs. experienced) status. Results: 7,073 patients met the study inclusion criteria, and 33.4%, 5.8%, and 60.8 % received an ART regimen comprising one, two, or three or more pills per day, respectively. Regression analysis showed patients receiving a single pill per day were significantly more likely to reach a 95 % adherence threshold versus patients receiving three or more pills per day (odds ratio [OR] = 1.59; P,0.001). Regardless of the number of pills received per day, patients were over 40 % less likely to have

Health and life insurance as an alternative to malpractice tort law

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Tort law has legitimate social purposes of deterrence, punishment and compensation, but medical tort law does none of these well. Tort law could be counterproductive in medicine, encouraging costly defensive practices that harm some patients, restricting access to care in some settings and discouraging innovation.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>Patients might be better served by purchasing combined health and life insurance policies and waiving their right to pursue malpractice claims. The combined policy should encourage the insurer to profit by inexpensively delaying policyholders' deaths. A health and life insurer would attempt to minimize mortal risks to policyholders from any cause, including medical mistakes and could therefore pursue systematic quality improvement efforts. If policyholders trust the insurer to seek, develop and reward genuinely effective care; identify, deter and remediate poor care; and compensate survivors through the no-fault process of paying life insurance benefits, then tort law is largely redundant and the right to sue may be waived. If expensive defensive medicine can be avoided, that savings alone could pay for fairly large life insurance policies.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>Insurers are maligned largely because of their logical response to incentives that are misaligned with the interests of patients and physicians in the United States. Patient, provider and insurer incentives could be realigned by combining health and life insurance, allowing the insurer to use its considerable information access and analytic power to improve patient care. This arrangement would address the social goals of malpractice torts, so that policyholders could rationally waive their right to sue.</p