Are Big Farms More Efficient Than Small Ones?

Different sources of evidence indicate that large farms, in general, are more efficient than smaller ones. The causes and effects, however, are less clear. Size alone isn\u27t the only factor involved. Other factors include kind of farming, soil and topography, kind of management and differences among operators

Why is the Demand for Pork Dropping?

As you may have expected, there\u27s more behind the hog price situation that meets the eye. Production is still high in the face of decreasing demand for pork. And supplies of beef have also had their effect on hog prices

Appraisal of the federal feed-grains programs

The original objective of the storage programs in 1933 was to operate them as price-stabilization programs to stabilize the prices of farm products against year-to-year variations in production. In actual fact, however, the programs soon began to go further than this. After the first few years, the objective changed from merely stabilizing prices to stabilizing them upward. Loan rates were set above the average-weather-crop levels, at certain percentages of parity prices. This raised the level of prices as well as stabilized them against variations in supply. This high level of prices stimulated production, reduced consumption and led to the accumulation of unsalable surpluses in storage. On Feb. 28, 1961, the investment of the CCC in price-support programs amounted to $9,193,721,000- made up of loans outstanding of$2,141,507,000 (including $946,376,813 of loans financed by lending agencies) and the cost of inventories,$7,052,214,000. The realized cost of programs primarily for stabilization of farm prices and income in fiscal 1960 was $2,094,300,000. The total cost since the programs began in 1932 was$19,847,400,000. In the case of corn, in fiscal 1958, for example, about one-third of the cost went to the grain trade and transportation agencies to cover storage and handling charges. The acreage-control programs of the 1930\u27s had little effect on production. The programs after World War II had more effect, but since cross-compliance was not included, the effect was mostly to shift production from one crop to another

Prospects for agricultural recovery, I. The economic situation in 1933

The bulletins in this series, entitled “Prospects for Agricultural Recovery,” will deal with the marked improvement that has taken place in industry since the low point of the depression early in 1933, and with the relatively small amount of improvement that has taken place in the condition of agriculture. They will deal with the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the other measures passed during the special session of Congress, and with the present and prospective effects of this legislation on agriculture and on the country as a whole. Last year, Iowa State College published a series of 10 circulars under the general heading, “The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa.”1 These circulars drew attention to the gravity of the agricultural situation, and discussed measures for remedying it. This year the situation has changed. Drastic remedial legislation has been passed, some improvement has taken place, and the outlook is not so dark as it was a year ago. Public interest now is focused upon the recovery measures that have been enacted into law

Is Corn Production Leaving the Corn Belt?

The nation\u27s commercial corn area has grown by 64 percent since it was originally set out. But analysis of actual data for corn acreage and production indicates that both are becoming more centralized in the Corn Belt

The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, II. The Causes of the Emergency

This is the second publication in the series dealing with the present agricultural emergency in Iowa. The first circular in the series, The Situation Today,;\u27 presented the main facts of the case. The present circular deals with the causes of the present state of affairs. These two circulars will provide the foundation for the subsequent publications in this series, which will deal with remedial measures. The next circular will deal with the voluntary domestic allotment plan

The coordination of wheat and corn price controls

From July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943, about 315 million bushels of wheat were fed to livestock in the United States. For the following year (1943-44) it is estimated that 370 million bushels of domestic wheat will be fed, plus 100 million bushels of imported wheat. This is primarily a war phenomenon. In ordinary times, about a quarter of the wheat crop used to be exported. During the 1930\u27s, however, exports of wheat declined, and the quantities of wheat fed to livestock increased. After the war and the immediate postwar period, will United States wheat exports return to their 1920-30 levels, or will less wheat be exported and more fed? Will wheat become more and more a competitor with corn as a feed for livestock? The answer depends chiefly upon the price, subsidy and production policies that are adopted for wheat

Prospects for agricultural recovery VIII. Who pays for the hog reduction program?

There is uncertainty in the minds of many people as to who pays for the AAA corn-hog program. The question is not who pays the costs of administration; that is a comparatively unimportant matter. The question, or rather, series of questions, is, who actually pays the hog processing tax of $2.25 per 100 pounds—the packer, the producer, or the consumer! And will a reduction in corn and hog production mean more total income for the corn-hog farmer, or less? If it will mean more income, from whom will the increased income be taken— from the packer and other distributors, or from the consumers? Or will it perhaps be taken from no one, but from a general increased production all-round resulting from the partial restoration of agriculture’s purchasing power