Modal Integration

Chris Daly défend « l'explicationisme », la position selon laquelle l'inférence a la meilleure explication constitue une façon acceptable de justifier une théorie. Il la défend en tentant de justifier la position explicationiste par ses propres ressources, c'est-a-dire par elle-même. Je soutiens que dans le contexte de la métaphysique, cette défense échoue. L'explicationiste échoue à se justifier par ses propres ressources et l'une de ses premisses centrales ne peut pas être justifiée uniquement de façon externaliste.Chris Daly defends "explanationism", the view that inference to the best explanation is an acceptable means of providing warrant for a theory. He does so by attempting the bootstrapping operation of warranting explanationism by way of itself. I argue that in the context of metaphysics this defense fails. It fails to be a genuine bootstrapping operation and one of the key premises cannot be warranted by externalist means alone

The Metaphysics of Modality: a Study in the Foundations of Necessity (Possibility).

In the past three decades there has been a rapid development of the formal machinery for modal logic. Quantified modal logic has developed along with a semantics and model theory that is appropriate to it. With this technical development there has been relatively little discussion of what modality is all about. There are two fundamental questions that have gone unanswered. First, to what does necessity amount? Is this a new logical notion, or is it something that can be further analyzed in terms of other notions that we already have at our disposal? The second question is what makes truths involving necessity true? What is their ontological grounding in the world? This essay is directed at the first of these questions. There are three possible reductions of metaphysical modality. First, there is the reduction suggested by the semantics for modal logic: a reduction in terms of possible worlds. Second, there is the reduction in terms of cognition. What is possible is what is conceivable. Third, there is the reduction in terms of language. Necessities arise from the structures of language and /or language use. I argue that none of these is successful. All of them suffer either from presupposing some form of metaphysical necessity in the reductive base, rendering them circular and not truly reductive, or they do not do justice to the modality being reduced. Since necessity is not reducible to any non-modal features of the world, we need to determine whether we ought to reject it as unacceptable on this basis, or whether we ought to retain it, but treat is as a new primitive that is introduced into a philosophical or logical theory. I urge the latter course is the one that we ought to take because without it too many things will likewise be deemed unacceptable. Causal necessity and explanation, normally accepted theories or knowledge and perception, logic and logical validity, and one common manner of distinguishing sets from properties will be deemed unacceptable if de re necessity is unacceptable. All of these presuppose de re metaphysical necessity in some way. I conclude that de re metaphysical necessity ought to be retained in our theory as primitive, unanalyzable notion.Ph.D.PhilosophyUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/160224/1/8422332.pd

Possible worlds

Modality concerns what might or must be the case. Modal expressions are typically intensional. An expression α is intensional just in case the substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions under the scope of a need not preserve truth. Modal realism is the view that modal propositions are grounded in the existence of concrete, non-actual individuals and worlds. The fact that possibilities cannot be worlds has important implications. Indexical expressions are those that are context-sensitive. This includes expressions such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. The role that worlds traditionally played as maximal consistent doxastic states has been assumed by individuals in order to capture the distinctively de se. For every set of worlds there corresponds the set of individuals each of which inhabits one of those worlds

The Routledge handbook of modality

"Modality - the question of what is possible and what is necessary - is a fundamental area of philosophy and philosophical research. The Routledge Handbook of Modality is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising thirty-five chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into seven clear parts: worlds and modality; essentialism, ontological dependence, and modality; modal anti-realism; epistemology of modality; modality in science; modality in logic and mathematics; modality in the history of philosophy. Within these sections the central issues, debates and problems are examined, including possible worlds, essentialism, counterfactuals, ontological dependence, modal fictionalism, deflationism, the integration challenge, conceivability, a priori knowledge, laws of nature, natural kinds, and logical necessity. The Routledge Handbook of Modality is essential reading for students and researchers in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. It will also be very useful for those in related fields in philosophy such as philosophy of mathematics, logic and philosophy of science."-

The Routledge Handbook of Modality

Modality - the question of what is possible and what is necessary - is a fundamental area of philosophy and philosophical research. The Routledge Handbook of Modality is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising thirty-five chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into seven clear parts:worlds and modalityessentialism, ontological dependence, and modalitymodal anti-realism epistemology of modalitymodality in science modality in logic and mathematics modality in the history of philosophy. Within these sections the central issues, debates and problems are examined, including possible worlds, essentialism, counterfactuals, ontological dependence, modal fictionalism, deflationism, the integration challenge, conceivability, a priori knowledge, laws of nature, natural kinds, and logical necessity.The Routledge Handbook of Modality is essential reading for students and researchers in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. It will also be very useful for those in related fields in philosophy such as philosophy of mathematics, logic and philosophy of science

Possible worlds

Modality concerns what might or must be the case. Modal expressions are typically intensional. An expression α is intensional just in case the substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions under the scope of a need not preserve truth. Modal realism is the view that modal propositions are grounded in the existence of concrete, non-actual individuals and worlds. The fact that possibilities cannot be worlds has important implications. Indexical expressions are those that are context-sensitive. This includes expressions such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. The role that worlds traditionally played as maximal consistent doxastic states has been assumed by individuals in order to capture the distinctively de se. For every set of worlds there corresponds the set of individuals each of which inhabits one of those worlds