Port concession fees based on the price-cap regulation: A DEA approach

In Italy, the concessions of port terminals to stevedoring companies are currently governed by the 84/1994 law; notwithstanding Port Authorities have some discretion in charging and defining the fees. As a result, the way concessions fees are charged is not efficient and this will not provide necessary incentives for port operators to boost throughput. This paper suggests an alternative definition for the fee through a price-cap rule, which sets the fee according to the efficiency degree of each port terminal. The efficiency measure is derived from a comparison among a set of competitors, using a data envelopment analysis output-orientated model. In particular, the paper focuses on some of the outstanding results, which are derived from the adoption of the suggested concession's scheme in the main container terminals of the port of Genoa. Maritime Economics & Logistics (2009) 11, 121–135. doi:10.1057/mel.2008.20

Cooperative games and cost allocation problems

Cooperative TU games, Cost allocation problems, Game practice, 91A12, 91A80,