An Economic Study of the Effect of Android Platform Fragmentation on Security Updates

Vendors in the Android ecosystem typically customize their devices by modifying Android Open Source Project (AOSP) code, adding in-house developed proprietary software, and pre-installing third-party applications. However, research has documented how various security problems are associated with this customization process. We develop a model of the Android ecosystem utilizing the concepts of game theory and product differentiation to capture the competition involving two vendors customizing the AOSP platform. We show how the vendors are incentivized to differentiate their products from AOSP and from each other, and how prices are shaped through this differentiation process. We also consider two types of consumers: security-conscious consumers who understand and care about security, and na\"ive consumers who lack the ability to correctly evaluate security properties of vendor-supplied Android products or simply ignore security. It is evident that vendors shirk on security investments in the latter case. Regulators such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission have sanctioned Android vendors for underinvestment in security, but the exact effects of these sanctions are difficult to disentangle with empirical data. Here, we model the impact of a regulator-imposed fine that incentivizes vendors to match a minimum security standard. Interestingly, we show how product prices will decrease for the same cost of customization in the presence of a fine, or a higher level of regulator-imposed minimum security.Comment: 22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2018

On the informational content of wage offers

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high-quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low-quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high-quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham’s Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns

A CTMC study of collisions between protons and H2+H_2^+ molecular ions

We study numerically collisions between protons and $H_2^+$ molecular ions at intermediate impact energies by using the Classical Trajectory Monte Carlo method (CTMC). Total and differential cross sections are computed. The results are compared with: a) the standard one electron--two nucleon scattering, and b) the quantum mechanical treatment of the $H^{+} - H^{+}_{2}$ scattering.Comment: ReVTeX, 5 pages + 5 figs. (EPS) To be published in Physica Script

Ion Collisions in Very Strong Electric Fields

A Classical Trajectory Monte Carlo (CTMC) simulation has been made of processes of charge exchange and ionization between an hydrogen atom and fully stripped ions embedded in very strong static electric fields ($O(10^{10}$ V/m$)$), which are thought to exist in cosmic and laser--produced plasmas. Calculations show that the presence of the field affects absolute values of the cross sections, enhancing ionization and reducing charge exchange. Moreover, the overall effect depends upon the relative orientation between the field and the nuclear motion. Other features of a null-field situation, such as scaling laws, are revisited.Comment: Latex, 13 pages, 11 figures (available upon request), to be published in Journal of Physics

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with verti- cally differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical inte- gration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Raising rivals’ fixed costs

This article demonstrates that raising fixed costs can serve as a credible mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals. We identify a number of credible avenues, such as increased regulation, vexatious litigation and increased prices for essential inputs, through which such a firm can raise fixed costs. We show that for a wide range of oligopoly models this may be a profitable strategy, even if the firm’s own fixed costs are affected as much (or even more) than its rivals and even if it is less efficient. The resulting reduction in the number of firms in the market is detrimental to consumer welfare and hence worthy of scrutiny by competition and regulatory authorities

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing

Inelastic Processes in the Collision of Relativistic Highly Charged Ions with Atoms

A general expression for the cross sections of inelastic collisions of fast (including relativistic) multicharged ions with atoms which is based on the genelazition of the eikonal approximation is derived. This expression is applicable for wide range of collision energy and has the standard nonrelativistic limit and in the ultrarelativistic limit coincides with the Baltz's exact solution ~\cite{art13} of the Dirac equation. As an application of the obtained result the following processes are calculated: the excitation and ionization cross sections of hydrogenlike atom; the single and double excitation and ionization of heliumlike atom; the multiply ionization of neon and argon atoms; the probability and cross section of K-vacancy production in the relativistic $U^{92+} - U^{91+}$ collision. The simple analytic formulae for the cross sections of inelastic collisions and the recurrence relations between the ionization cross sections of different multiplicities are also obtained. Comparison of our results with the experimental data and the results of other calculations are given.Comment: 25 pages, latex, 7 figures avialable upon request,submitted to PR