The BRICS and the International Development System: Challenge and Convergence?

The ‘BRICs’ acronym, in its most common usage, derives from a report to investors by Goldman Sachs’ analyst Jim O’Neill, signalling the new dynamic that four large countries; Brazil, Russia, India and China, were bringing to the global economy at the beginning of the new millennium. A conclusion advanced in the Goldman Sachs report was that the BRICs should be included in the G7 as their macroeconomic significance increased in the decade to come. From a global investment angle, the world has moved on from there to a wider set of dynamic emerging countries, including a number of fast-growing African nations, as more developing countries find their own way to catch up on growth, resisting world recessionary tendencies (O’Neill 2001 2011). The investor’s world of emerging markets has thus expanded beyond the BRICs, even as questions are raised about the sustainability of growth in the BRICs themselves, with their structural and political challenges and their vulnerability to the uncertainties of global monetary developments. This Evidence Report focuses on a distinct phenomenon – the BRICS Summits, as an ongoing new global governance process, spanning both economic and security issues, launched as a geopolitical initiative by Russia in 2006 at the level of foreign ministers. A first Leaders’ meeting was hosted by Russia in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, bringing in Heads of State from Brazil, India and China. South Africa joined in 2010 on the invitation of China following the Sanya BRIC Summit, to make up the present BRICS Summit group. We look at this BRICS Summit process as part of the broadening of the global governance system created following the Second World War, in which United States (US) leadership and hegemony has been a vital element, to a polycentric global governance system that is now evolving fast but with a future still undetermined (Ikenberry 2006). There is now a burgeoning literature on the BRICS, written in this vein, which is providing some of the keenest contemporary insights into the geopolitics and the geoeconomics of this still to be determined future world order (Carmody 2013; EUISS 2013; Kornegay and Bohler-Muller 2013a, 2013b; Observer Research Foundation 2013; Kornegay 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Sidaway 2012).UK Department for International Developmen

Engagement matters : South Africa, the United Nations and a rights-based foreign policy

This article critically examines the role of South Africa with special reference to the values embodied in the human rights principles of the UN system and argues for a reemphasis of a rights-based foreign policy guided by a non-alignment loyal only to the normative frameworks established by the UN for global governance. It is argued that South Africa’s foreign policy should be measured mainly in terms of its willingness to engage with the global governance system as represented by the UN, and its support of the normative frameworks codified by the UN as relevant reference points for any country’s policy. It is suggested that South Africa, despite its claims of being in unconditional support of such rights-based agenda, might be able to do better if less guided by strategic parameters.http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsaj20hb201

Legal analysis on the relationship between the AU/AEC and RECs : Africa lost in a "spaghetti bowl" of legal relations?

Includes bibliographical references.In Africa, the regional trade agreements (RTAs) are commonly known as regional economic communities (RECs). Currently, fourteen regional economic communities operate on the African continent. However, in the quest for a more systematic approach to promoting "a strong and united Africa", only eight RECs were officially recognised and designated to serve as the essential building blocks towards the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC). Africa's continental community AEC is envisioned as the overall objective of the African regional integration process in the Abuja Treaty. The concept of the pursuit of sustainable development through RECs is not doubted in Africa. The Abuja Treaty proposed a gradual step-by-step approach where RECs play an important role during the first stages, but then have to lead "somehow" to one big coherent continental regional economic organisation – the overall goal of the African Economic Community. Neither the Abuja Treaty nor the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) includes concise provisions on how to establish the continental AEC. The relations between the different integration players, such as the AU, AEC and RECs, that exist now or should exist in the near future, are not defined legally. Until these "relational issues" are resolved, it seems difficult and even impossible to accelerate Africa's economic integration on the way towards the AEC. Thus, it is crucial for an accelerated integration process to discuss the scarce existing legal framework with its significant lacunas and develop solutions that allow filling in the legal blanks through the adoption of new treaties and amendments as well as protocols. The African continent with its multiple and overlapping RECs still looks like a "spaghetti bowl" instead of a "cannelloni". Thus, the question of rationalisation is still without definite answer

The Ak Party’s engagement in Africa after the “Opening era”

Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa has been still a new phenomenon not only for Turkish society but also for the Continent and international arena as well. Turkey’s policy on Africa represents an approach, active involvement rather than a component of concrete and ongoing relations. Also, it is early to recognize this policy as detailed one. According to government’s official declarations “opening era” was terminated and current period signifies strategic partnership era between Turkey and Africa. In spite of this fact “opening” still continues in the strategic partnership period. Some old patterns are used in addition to new patterns like seeking African states’ cooperation in fight against terrorism. Some differences exist in implementation and formulation of African policy during different terms of the AK Party’s governance.Türkiye’nin Afrika’ya yönelik dış politikası gerek Türkiye toplumu gerekse kıta ve uluslararası arena için hâlâ yeni bir fenomeni teşkil etmektedir. Türkiye’nin Afrika politikası somut ve devam eden ilişkilerin bir öğesinden ziyade bir yaklaşımı, aktif bir dahiliyeti temsil etmektedir. Ayrıca bu siyaseti detaylı olarak tanımlamak için henüz erkendir. Hükümetin resmî açıklamalarına göre “açılım dönemi” sonlandırılmıştır ve mevcut dönem Türkiye-Afrika arasında stratejik ortaklık dönemini temsil etmektedir. Buna rağmen stratejik ortaklık döneminde “açılım” halen devam etmektedir. Çeşitli eski yapıların yanında terörizmle mücadelede Afrika devletlerinin işbirliğini arama gibi yeni unsurlar da eklenmektedir. AK Parti yönetiminin çeşitli evrelerinde Afrika siyasetinin uygulanmasında ve oluşturulmasında farklılıklar bulunmaktadı

AFRICA, THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE IBSA-BRICS EQUATION: THE TRANSATLANTIC SPACE IN TRANSITION

No contexto de crescente cooperação sul-sul, os membros de um importante fórum de diálogo que representa as potências emergentes, o IBAS, incorporaram-se a outro organismo, o BRICS. Isso foi resultado de uma sobreposição dos países em desenvolvimento do sul ao domínio das potências emergentes euro-asiáticas. Considerando-se que as duas alianças estão centradas no espaço geoestratégico do Oceano Índico e do Atlântico Sul, o potencial estratégico da África do Sul no Atlântico Sul em conjunto com o Brasil é de extrema importância.  É possível diferenciar duas correntes relativas aos laços transatlânticos: a Afro-Latina e a Trans-mediterrânea.  Também é relevante situar o papel de Angola no continente africano como uma possível influência na dinâmica do Atlântico Sul, atribuindo-se a devida importância aos vínculos lusófonos representados pela CPLP. In a context of increasing South-South cooperation, the members of an important trilateral dialogue forum that represent the emergent powers – IBSA –, have been incorporated into another organization, BRICS. It resulted from an overlap of the Southern developing countries into the domain of the Euro-Asiatic great powers. Bearing in mind that both alliances are centered on the geostrategic space of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, South Africa´s South Atlantic strategic potential in tandem with Brazil is of extreme importance. It is possible to differentiate two steams in the transatlantic ties: the Afro-Latin and the trans-Mediterranean.  It is also relevant to place the role of Angola in the African continent as a possible influence in South Atlantic´s dynamics, given due importance to the Lusophone ties which are represented by CPLP

Reviewing China and Africa : old interests, new trends - or new interests, old trends?

Africa was for a long time considered to be Europe’s backyard. This situation since the turn of the century has changed considerably. With new actors pursuing their own economic interests, mainly representing the growing influence of so-called emerging economies, new multipolar realities have arrived on the continent. Access to and control over natural resources has entered a new stage of competition among external actors and in their interaction with local elites. Africa has changed as an arena, and realities are increasingly shaped by Chinese influence too. This overview on recent contributions to the debate summarises the current assessments of the degree, impact and effects of the Chinese economic expansion. It then reflects on the potential new scope for cooperation and development and ends with some conclusions on the possible options and opportunities this might offer.http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdsa20hb2013gv201

Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences

This paper discusses three credible attempts by African governments to restrict the jurisdiction of three similarly-situated sub-regional courts in response to politically controversial rulings. In West Africa, when the ECOWAS Court upheld allegations of torture by opposition journalists in the Gambia, that country’s political leaders sought to restrict the Court’s power to review human rights complaints. The other member states ultimately defeated the Gambia’s proposal. In East Africa, Kenya failed in its efforts to eliminate the EACJ and to remove some of its judges after a decision challenging an election to a sub-regional legislature. However, the member states agreed to restructure the EACJ in ways that have significantly affected the court’s subsequent trajectory. In Southern Africa, after the SADC Tribunal ruled in favor of white farmers in disputes over land seizure, Zimbabwe prevailed upon SADC member states to suspend the Tribunal and strip its power to review complaints from private litigants. Variations in the mobilization efforts of Community secretariats, civil society groups and sub-regional Parliaments explain why efforts to eliminate the three courts or narrow their jurisdiction were defeated in ECOWAS, scaled back in the EAC, and largely succeeded in SADC

A critical appraisal of South Africa's voting patterns on resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Council in the period 2008- 2010 and 2013-2015

Magister Philosophiae - MPhilDespite the fact that South Africa in terms of its Constitution and foreign policy believes in making human rights central to its activities, on many occasions in the UNHRC, it has been found voting opposite to these values. In this regard, it has been found aligning itself with the countries known for poor human rights records. Subsequently, this raises the question of whether the current foreign policy of South Africa is still driven by the high regard for human rights. As a result, this paper endeavours to look specifically at the voting records and patterns of the Government of South Africa as a member of the UN Human Rights Council (2008-2010 and 2013-2015). It will assess such a record with a view to determine whether the Government's foreign policy is in compliance with its international human rights obligations

Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences

This paper discusses three credible attempts by African governments to restrict the jurisdiction of three similarly-situated sub-regional courts in response to politically controversial rulings. In West Africa, when the ECOWAS Court upheld allegations of torture by opposition journalists in the Gambia, that country’s political leaders sought to restrict the Court’s power to review human rights complaints. The other member states ultimately defeated the Gambia’s proposal. In East Africa, Kenya failed in its efforts to eliminate the EACJ and to remove some of its judges after a decision challenging an election to a sub-regional legislature. However, the member states agreed to restructure the EACJ in ways that have significantly affected the court’s subsequent trajectory. In Southern Africa, after the SADC Tribunal ruled in favor of white farmers in disputes over land seizure, Zimbabwe prevailed upon SADC member states to suspend the Tribunal and strip its power to review complaints from private litigants. Variations in the mobilization efforts of Community secretariats, civil society groups and sub-regional Parliaments explain why efforts to eliminate the three courts or narrow their jurisdiction were defeated in ECOWAS, scaled back in the EAC, and largely succeeded in SADC