Dividing the indivisible: Apportionment and philosophical theories of fairness

Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes

Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games

This paper deals with interactive multiple fund investment situations, in which investors can invest their capital in a number of funds.The investors, however, face some restrictions.In particular, the investment opportunities of an investor depend on the behaviour of the other investors.Moreover, the individual investment returns may differ.We consider this situation from a cooperative game theory point of view.Based on different assumptions modelling the gains of joint investment, we consider corresponding types of games and analyse their properties.We propose an explicit allocation process for the maximal total investment revenues.investment trusts;cooperative games

On All Strong Kleene Generalizations of Classical Logic

By using the notions of exact truth (‘true and not false’) and exact falsity (‘false and not true’), one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the (extended) Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic (K3), the Logic of Paradox (LP) and First Degree Entailment (FDE), the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar logics. We first study the members of our class semantically, after which we present a uniform sequent calculus (the SK calculus) that is sound and complete with respect to all of them. Two further sequent calculi (the (Formula presented.) and (Formula presented.) calculus) will be considered, which serve the same purpose and which are obtained by applying general methods (due to Baaz et al.) to construct sequent calculi for many-valued logics. Rules and proofs in the SK calculus are much simpler and shorter than those of the (Formula presented.) and the (Formula presented.) calculus, which is one of the reasons to prefer the SK calculus over the latter two. Besides favourably comparing the SK calculus to both the (Formula presented.) and the (Formula presented.) calculus, we also hint at its philosophical significance

Theories of Fairness and Aggregation

We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders (Utilitas 27:460–469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative game theory, that do not face the problem of non-aggregativity. We use this observation to argue that the universal claim that no non-trivial theory of fairness can guarantee aggregativity is false. Paseau and Saunders’s mistaken assertion can be understood as arising from a neglect of the (cooperative) games approach to fair division. Our treatment has two further pay-offs: for one, we give an accessible introduction to the (cooperative) games approach to fair division, whose significance has hitherto not been appreciated by philosophers working on fairness. For another, our discussion explores the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems in a comprehensive fashion

How to be fairer

We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing about fair division problems and allocative justice

A Gentzen Calculus for Nothing but the Truth

In their paper Nothing but the Truth Andreas Pietz and Umberto Rivieccio present Exactly True Logic (ETL), an interesting variation upon the four-valued logic for first-degree entailment FDE that was given by Belnap and Dunn in the 1970s. Pietz & Rivieccio provide this logic with a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and write that finding a nice sequent calculus for the logic will presumably not be easy. But a sequent calculus can be given and in this paper we will show that a calculus for the Belnap-Dunn logic we have defined earlier can in fact be reused for the purpose of characterising ETL, provided a small alteration is made—initial assignments of signs to the sentences of a sequent to be proved must be different from those used for characterising FDE. While Pietz & Rivieccio define ETL on the language of classical propositional logic we also study its consequence relation on an extension of this language that is functionally complete for the underlying four truth values. On this extension the calculus gets a multiple-tree character—two proof trees may be needed to establish one proof

Interpolation in 16-Valued Trilattice Logics

In a recent paper we have defined an analytic tableau calculus (Formula presented.) for a functionally complete extension of Shramko and Wansing’s logic based on the trilattice (Formula presented.). This calculus makes it possible to define syntactic entailment relations that capture central semantic relations of the logic—such as the relations [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.], [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.], and [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.] that each correspond to a lattice order in (Formula presented.); and [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.], the intersection of [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.] and [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.]. It turns out that our method of characterising these semantic relations—as intersections of auxiliary relations that can be captured with the help of a single calculus—lends itself well to proving interpolation. All entailment relations just mentioned have the interpolation property, not only when they are defined with respect to a functionally complete language, but also in a range of cases where less expressive languages are considered. For example, we will show that [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.], when restricted to (Formula presented.), the language originally considered by Shramko and Wansing, enjoys interpolation. This answers a question that was recently posed by M. Takano