'Drawing the Curtain of Words': A Strict Interpretation of Berkeley's Philosophy of Language and Its Consequences

Berkeley is commonly interpreted as having thought that sensible objects have a continuous existence when unperceived by finite minds; that this continuity is constituted by God's constant perception; that sensible objects are collections of ideas perceived at many different times by many different minds; and that, despite all appearances, this is all consonant with what commonsense says. I argue that all of these interpretive claims are false, and that we have not yet come to grips with the bulk of Berkeley's actual metaphysical views. The key to uncovering Berkeley's actual views is to understand his account of language. I defend a novel interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy of language and then apply this account to dissolve some familiar problems related to his metaphysics. Berkeley has a pluralistic view about the ends of language, but he also thinks that significant philosophical statements must express coherent ideas. That is, Berkeley holds a hybrid ideational theory of language. In part, this means that Berkeley's epistemology is fundamental. For the ideas one's words stand for are Berkeleian ideas; particular, determinate (i.e., not abstract), private, mind-dependent, sensory ideas. This has implications for how we understand a number of Berkeleian views: that we immediately perceive sensible objects; that sensible objects are collections of ideas; that sensible objects, though mind-dependent, exist continuously even when no finite mind perceives them. I argue that Berkeley held a radically nominalist account of sensible objects; Berkeleian sensible objects are just the particular ideas picked out by a name-token. The principal roadblock to a nominalist interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy is the worry that it conflicts with claims that his system is consistent with, and even more, a defense of commonsense. I show that Berkeley's defense of commonsense is misunderstood; he is not defending commonly believed propositions, but fending off what he sees as the dangerous philosophy of materialism which he considers a threat to the normal credulity and faithfulness of the vulgar, for whom the perceived world is the real world. Berkeley's radical nominalism is therefore integral to this project since it eliminates any gap between what is and what is perceived

Reflections on Muddy Waters, Marijuana, and Moving Goalposts: Against 'Returning' Reggie Bush's Heisman

When the NCAA adopted new rules allowing athletes to profit off their name, image, and likeness (NIL), few people took more interest than Reggie Bush who famously relinquished the Heisman trophy after being ruled retroactively ineligible for receiving "impermissible benefits." Bush has argued for his reinstatement and the "return" of his Heisman. In this paper, I argue that, while the NCAA never should have required players to be amateurs in the first place, Bush should not be reinstated or have the Heisman "returned." Properly understood, Reggie Bush never won the Heisman Trophy in the first place, so "returning" it would be to rewrite history — almost literally, to move the goalposts. Forthcoming in "College Sports and Ethics" by Lexington Books

A modest defense of manifestationalism

As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed aspects of reality. If the guiding idea of empiricism is that experience, and experience alone, provides us with knowledge about the world, then manifestationalism is an exceptionally strict empiricist perspective on science. Manifestationalism has primarily served within a reductio: certain empiricist views and arguments, when taken to their logical conclusion, lead to manifestationalism and so cannot be correct. The reductio works only because manifestationalism is widely agreed to be a non-starter. However, this consensus against manifestationalism is based on a single argument. We contest this assessment of manifestationalism and show that the primary argument against manifestationalism fails to hit its target. We do not intend to offer a manifesto for manifestationalism. Rather, we aim to vindicate it from a false accusation. Manifestationalism may not be the correct view of science, but the objections levied against it so far can be met