Induced mutagenesis in Chickpea (Cicer arietinum (L.) with special reference to the frequency and spectrum of chlorophyll mutations

A relative study of frequency and spectrum of chlorophyll mutations induced by mutagens in M2 generation was made with chickpea (Cicer arietinum (L). Variety ‘CO-4’. The treatments include different doses/concentrations of Gamma rays (20, 30, 40, 50 and 60kR) and Ethyl Methane Sulphonate (10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 mM). From the study, the overall frequencies and spectrum of five types of induced chlorophyll mutants Viridis (0.55), Xantha (0.46), Chlorina (0.45), Albina (0.43) and Tigrina (0.35) were observed. The frequency of chlorophyll mutation was increased with increasing concentrations up to a level, beyond it declined in both the mutagens. And the chlorophyll frequency was found in the order of viridis > xantha >chlorina> Albina >tigrina. The chemical mutagen, EMS was found to be more effective in inducing chlorophyll mutations than gamma rays in Chick pea

Screening of Mutants in Black Gram (Vigna mungo (L.) Hepper) With Effect of DES and COH in M2 Generation

Cultivars developed using induced mutants may carry improvements in a wide variety of characteristics. Induced mutant cultivars also have proved to be outstanding parents for further cultivar development. The efficiency of induced mutations in increasing genetic variability has been demonstrated in several crops and a number of varieties have been evolved. In the present investigation, chlorophyll mutants chlorino, albino, xantha, variegata and viridis and morphological mutants such as, dwarf, tall, onostem, tiny leaves, hairy leaves, male sterility, brown seed, early maturity, long pod, bottom branching, top branching, trailing, spreading, and bushy type in M2 generation from both Diethyl sulphate (DES) and Colchicine (COH) treated populations. Mutants and mutant derivatives when used in cross breeding were found to be more productive in the development of improved varieties of black gram. Moreover, induced mutations have recently become the subject of molecular investigations leading to descriptions of the structure and function of related genes. Mutated genes have therefore; become valuable material to plant breeders and molecular biologists for understanding not only the function but also in isolating and shuffling the genes between varieties

What's Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market

Numerous laboratory studies report on behaviors inconsistent with rational economic models. How much do these inconsistencies matter in natural settings, when consumers make large, real decisions and have the opportunity to learn from experiences? We report on a field experiment designed to address this question. Incumbent clients of a lender in South Africa were sent letters offering them large, short-term loans at randomly chosen interest rates. Psychological “features” on the letter, which did not affect offer terms or economic content, were also independently randomized. Consistent with standard economics, the interest rate significantly affected loan take-up. Inconsistent with standard economics, the psychological features also significantly affected take-up. The independent randomizations allow us to quantify the relative importance of psychological features and prices. Our core finding is the sheer magnitude of the psychological effects. On average, any one psychological manipulation has the same effect as a one half percentage point change in the monthly interest rate. Interestingly, the psychological features appear to have greater impact in the context of less advantageous offers. Moreover, the psychological features do not appear to draw in marginally worse clients, nor does the magnitude of the psychological effects vary systematically with income or education. In short, even in a market setting with large stakes and experienced customers, subtle psychological features that normatively ought to have no impact appear to be extremely powerful drivers of behavior.Behavioral economics, psychology, microfinance, marketing, field experiment, credit markets

Induced mutagenesis in Cicer arietinum by the application of EMS and Gamma rays with special reference to the cytological studies

The present study was conducted to analyze the chemical and physical mutagenesis on Cicer arietinum with special reference to cytological studies. In this regard, CO – 4 variety of chick pea was subjected to different concentration of gamma rays (20, 30, 40, 50 and 60kR) and EMS (10, 20, 30, 40 and 50mM) for inducing mutation. The M1 plants exposed to mutagen produces a clear cut difference from the untreated control. The root mitotic studies reveal a wide range of chromosomal aberrations such as stickiness, laggards, bridges and some other precocious movement. The percentage of abnormal cell increased with dosage in both mutagens; and 50mM EMS showed more chromosomal aberrations when compared to gamma rays

An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System

The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain. While the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper develops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction. Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lenders would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions

The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the “rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical perspective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that characterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior, often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative ideals that people endorse upon reflection. The results are systematic behaviors that are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding and improved regulatory insight

Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation

Financial services decisions can have enourmous consequences for household well-being. Households need a range of financial services - to conduct basic transactions, such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access credit; and to insure against life\u27s key risks. But the financial services system is exceedingly complicated and often not well-designed to optimize house-hold behavior. In response to the complexity of out financial system, there has been a long running debate about the appropriate role and form of regulation. Regulation is largely stuck in two competing models - disclosure, and usury or product restrictions. This paper explores a different approach, based on insights from behavioral economics on one hand, and an understanding of industrial organization on the other. At the core of the analysis is the interaction between individual psychology and market competition. This is in contrast to the classic model, which relies on the interaction between rational choice and market competition. The introduction of richer psychology complicates the impact of competition. It helps us understand that firms compete based on how individuals will respond to products in the marketplace, and competitive outcomes may not always and in all contexts closely align with improved decisional choice and increased consumer welfare. This paper adopts a behavioral economic framework that considers firm incentives to respond to regulation. Under this framework, outcomes are an equilibrium interaction between individuals with specific psychologies and firms that responds to those psychologies within specific market contexts. Regulation must then address failures in this equilibrium. The model suggests, for example, that in some contexts market participants seek to overcome common human failings (as for example, with under-saving) while in other contexts market participants seek to exploit those failings (as for example, with over-borrowing). Behaviorally informed regulation needs to take account of these different contexts. The paper discusses the specific application of these forces to the case of mortage, credit card, and banking markets. The purpose of this paper is not to champion politics, but to illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the costs and benefits of specific policies

Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Policy makers typically approach human behavior from the perspective of the rational agent model, which relics on normativc, a priori analyses. The model assumes people make insightful, well-planned, highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by considerations of personal utility. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, and the one we will articulate here, provides a substantially difierent perspective on individual behavior and its policy and regulatory implications. According to the empirical perspective, behavior is the amalgam of perceptions, impulses, judgments, and decision processes that emerge from the impressive machinery that people carry behind the eyes and between the ears. Actual human behavior, it is argued, is often unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced behavioral perspective, it is suggested, can yield deeper understanding and improved regulatory insight

Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?

Are minorities treated differently by the legal system? Systematic racial differences in case characteristics, many unobservable, make this a difficult question to answer directly. In this paper, we estimate whether judges differ from each other in how they sentence minorities, avoiding potential bias from unobservable case characteristics by exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges. We measure the between-judge variation in the difference in incarceration rates and sentence lengths between African-American and White defendants. We perform a Monte Carlo simulation in order to explicitly construct the appropriate counterfactual, where race does not influence judicial sentencing. In our data set, which includes felony cases from Cook County, Illinois, we find statistically significant between-judge variation in incarceration rates, although not in sentence lengths

An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System

The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain. While the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper develops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction. Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lenders would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions