How Serious are Methodological Issues in Surveys? A Reexamination of the Clarence Thomas Polls^T

Opinion polling procedures allow for reasonable inferences about attitude changes. We examined this contention using surveys about the nomination of Clarence Thomas. In this situation, prior theory allowed us to predict the direction of changes, surveys had been conducted by a number of organizations, and substantial information was available about the methodology used in the surveys. As a result we concluded that the deteriorating opinions of Thomas were real.surveys, methodology

International Evidence Review of Conditional (Suspended) Sentences: Final Report

This report reviews international use of conditional sentences, specifically understood to mean a criminal sentence of imprisonment which is suspended pending a person's satisfaction of specific criteria. These sentences are being considered in jurisdictions seeking ways of managing prison population growth. The laws and any information about use of such sentences among selected countries is considered in the first part. The second part reviews research on perceptions of such sentences, and community-based sentences generally. This research was requested by and submitted to the Scottish Government

On the Abundance of Circumbinary Planets

We present here the first observationally based determination of the rate of occurrence of circumbinary planets. This is derived from the publicly available Kepler data, using an automated search algorithm and debiasing process to produce occurrence rates implied by the seven systems already known. These rates depend critically on the planetary inclination distribution: if circumbinary planets are preferentially coplanar with their host binaries, as has been suggested, then the rate of occurrence of planets with $R_p>6R_\oplus$ orbiting with $P_p<300$\ d is $10.0 ^{+18}_{-6.5}$\% (95\% confidence limits), higher than but consistent with single star rates. If on the other hand the underlying planetary inclination distribution is isotropic, then this occurrence rate rises dramatically, to give a lower limit of 47\%. This implies that formation and subsequent dynamical evolution in circumbinary disks must either lead to largely coplanar planets, or proceed with significantly greater ease than in circumstellar disks. As a result of this investigation we also show that giant planets (${>}10R_\oplus$) are significantly less common in circumbinary orbits than their smaller siblings, and confirm that the proposed shortfall of circumbinary planets orbiting the shorter period binaries in the Kepler sample is a real effect.Comment: Accepted for publication in MNRAS (1st August 2014). 12 pages. Update to match final version, including clarifications and new figures. Results are unchange

An Interesting Charmonium State Formation and Decay : ppˉ→1D2→1P1γp \bar p \to ^1D_2 \to ^1P_1 \gamma

Massless perturbative QCD forbids, at leading order, the exclusive annihilation of proton-antiproton into some charmonium states, which, however, have been observed in the $p\bar p$ channel, indicating the significance of higher order and non perturbative effects in the few GeV energy region. The most well known cases are those of the $^1S_0$ ($\eta_c$) and the $^1P_1$. The case of the $^1D_2$ is considered here and a way of detecting such a state through its typical angular distribution in the radiative decay $^1D_2 \to$ $^1P_1 \gamma$ is suggested. Estimates of the branching ratio $BR(^1D_2 \to p\bar p)$, as given by a quark-diquark model of the nucleon, mass corrections and an instanton induced process are presented.Comment: 9 pages (no figures), Plain TeX, CBPF-NF-014/94, INFNCA-TH-94-

The Incentives for Tax Planning

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence From Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies

Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels

This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and CEO pay levels and the extent to which the higher pay found in firms using compensation consultants is related to governance differences. Using proxy statement disclosures from 2,110 companies, we find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensation consultants. CEO pay remains higher in clients of consulting firms even after controlling for economic determinants of compensation. However, when consultant users and non-users are matched on both economic and governance characteristics, differences in pay levels are not statistically significant, indicating that governance differences explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants. We find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher in potentially “conflicted” consultants that also offer additional non-compensation-related services

Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts

The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Prior research typically solves these problems in isolation, as opposed to simultaneously incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard features. We formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real-world contracting environments (e.g., agents with power utility and limited liability, lognormal stock price distributions, and stock options) as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We use state-of-the-art numerical algorithms to solve the resulting models. We find that many of the standard results no longer obtain when wealth effects are present. We also develop a new measure of incentives calculated as the change in the agent\u27s certainty equivalent under the optimal contract for a change in action evaluated at the optimal action. This measure facilitates interpretation of the resulting contracts and allows us to compare contracts across different contracting environments

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives